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ABSTRACT 
This thesis utilises Discourse Analysis to explore argumentation as a discursive 
tool in the construction of social life. Focusing upon family argumentation, an in-
depth empirical analysis is performed upon the single case study of the 
researcher's own family. 
Discourse Analysis has traditionally assumed that argumentation is generally 
avoided by speakers. In this thesis, the enthusiastic, creative, and sociable 
pursuit of argument is highlighted. Disagreement and argument are seen to 
initiate topics and topic change and to impassion interaction. Furthermore, 
sociable argument is celebrated for its conflict-handling abilities. 
In Chapter 3 the academic debate over the role of the researcher is treated as a 
rhetorical arena in which that role is managed. After a reflexive treatment of 
methodological concerns in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 turns to the researcher's role 
in the research encounter itself. Detailed analysis highlights the ongoing and 
negotiated construction of roles in the research relationship. Chapter 6 focuses 
on preference structure as an organisational mechanism in conversation. It is 
traditionally understood that actors are constrained to accomplish sociability 
through a preference for agreement. However, this chapter uses examples to 
demonstrate that preference organisation is a resource equally deployable for 
the accomplishment of sociability through argumentation. Chapter 7 then 
explores the construction of family in the rhetorical arena of disagreement. The 
institution of the family is seen to be ongoingly "talked into being" in interaction 
(cf. Heritage, 1984). 
Over the course of this thesis, the importance of argumentation in shaping the 
social world is emphasised and celebrated. 
KEYWORDS: Argumentation, family, the research relationship, discourse 
analysis, conversation analysis, discursive construction, reflexivity. 
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I CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
A "A GOOD OLD ARGUMENT" 
In common parlance, it is generally assumed that arguing is an activity to 
be avoided. The general common-sense understanding is, that people 
are polite to others to avoid antagonising one another into overt conflict. 
Popular belief is suffused with notions that human civilisation functions 
purely because polite behaviour controls "natural" aggressive drives, 
thereby softening and containing competition and conflict. Much is made 
of the so-called "genetic imperative", which puts every individual into 
potential competition with every other of the same sex. In this picture, 
arguments are seen as flaws in a social veneer which smoothes over the 
rough contours of self-preservatory compulsions. At best, arguments are 
seen as valves, whose presence is all that allows natural pressures 
towards conflict to be contained under a lid of civilised conduct. 
Therefore, agreement with others is understood to be a pursued 
objective, while disagreement is believed to be minimised, masked and 
evaded. 
As this thesis will show, these notions are, in the main, shared by social 
scientists. However, an alternative conception of argumentation will be 
presented here. A challenge will be made to the idea that agreement and . 
sociability are mutually exclusive, and to the conceptual confinement of 
argumentation to a flaw or valve in the smooth running of the harmonious 
social machine. Instead, social life will be presented as rife with operative 
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disagreement. The spirit of contention will be shown to be fundamental to 
the very constitutive process by which social institutions and social 
objects are brought into existence. 
The title of this thesis begins with the phrase "A Good Old Argument", a 
phrase which occurs within one of the data extracts which comes under 
analysis (See Chapter 7). I believe that this description provides an 
excellent representation of the approach to argumentation adopted 
throughout this work. The central elements that represent this thesis are: 
the pleasure that arguing can afford, as expressed by the term "good"; 
the familiarity and traditionality of the behaviour, as expressed by the 
term "old"; and the image, produced by the combination of both words, 
that a potentially wild and dangerous thing is routinely tamed. In all, the 
picture presented is an unthreatening one. Argument is presented as an 
activity engaged in for the sake of enjoyment, and although meaty and 
committed, is treated as a constructive, rather than disruptive influence 
on the social relationships within which it takes place. 
In this description, and in the approach of the thesis that it represents, 
argument is treated as an activity to be celebrated. However, this 
assertion is not merely thrust upon the reader as a matter to be taken in 
faith. Instead, a detailed empirical analysis is undertaken to demonstrate, 
in concrete terms, the power and passion which argumentation 
contributes to social life. In the current work, the argumentation that 
occurs within the family is focused upon, using a single case study. In the 
light of methodological questions raised by feminism and critical 
psychology, the researcher's own family is used as the data source. Over 
the course of the individual analyses which make up the various 
chapters, the environment of argumentation is emphasised as a pivotal 
constructive force in the formation of the social. 
2 
B OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
Chapter 2 provides a literature review which brings together a number of 
disparate areas of inquiry to form a picture from which the reader can 
understand the perspective adopted in this thesis. 
To begin with, the current text is situated within the paradigm of Social 
Construction ism, which treats reality as a product of our attempts to 
understand it. What comes to count as reality is seen to be constructed 
out of social and cultural forces. In Ethnomethodology, which is 
discussed next, this process of construction is understood to arise out of 
the operationalisation by social actors, of culturally shared 
understandings of the world. In a two-way process, individual 
occurrences are treated as instantiations of such shared understandings, 
while these generalised understandings are used to make sense of the 
individual occurrences. 
Arising out of Ethnomethodology, Conversation Analysis (CA) makes a 
systematic and empirical examination of the organisation of everyday 
conversation. In this arena of social action, the shared understandings 
that individuals bring to interaction are seen to organise talk for mutual 
intelligibility. Like CA, Discourse Analysis (DA), discussed next, studies 
speakers' deployment of discursive organisational features for the 
accomplishment of social business. However, in DA, the emphasis is 
particularly keyed towards the sorts of question traditionally addressed by 
cognitive psychology. Unlike cognitive psychology, which treats language 
as a window into the minds of participants, DA sees language use as the 
moulding and creative force of the social world, and therefore, as a topic 
in its own right (cf. Potter, 1996). 
The discourse analytic treatment of the rhetorical nature of language use 
is then discussed. Advocates of argumentation as a key mode of 
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discourse stress the enthusiastic, creative, and sociable pursuit of 
argument and celebrate argumentation for its ability to handle conflict 
through humour and play. Disagreement and argument are seen to 
initiate topics and topic change, and to impassion interaction. 
At this point, the discussion returns to Conversation Analysis, this time, to 
monitor its examination of social institutions. After assuming the primacy 
of mundane conversation, CA seeks to discover how particular 
institutions are engendered out of its locally produced specialisations and 
transformations. The particular institution of Science is then focused 
upon, and the work of sociologists of science is introduced. The 
progressive drive of these authors towards a symmetrical approach to 
scientific endeavour, regardless of whether any particular example comes 
to be accepted as "true" or rejected, is outlined. This then leads to a 
discussion of the final area, reflexivity, which involves the extension of 
this symmetrical treatment to the author's own text. 
Chapter 3 discusses how preoccupations with reflexivity and democratic 
egalitarianism have led many social scientists to examine the power 
dynamics of the research relationship. Attention is mainly orientated 
towards feminist writings, but some insights from critical ethnography and 
critical psychology are also examined. 
The chapter adopts the reflexive perspective of seeing the academic 
debate as a rhetorical environment. To this end, the discussion centres 
around Merton's (1976) concept of "Sociological Ambivalence". This 
concept involves viewing paradoxes in social roles as precisely the sort of 
indispensable vehicle that allows for the ongoing interactional flexibility to 
manage such roles. Thus the academic debate over authoritarian versus 
egalitarian styles of research relationship is transformed from the search 
for a solution, into the solution itself. This chapter therefore includes a re-
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examination of some of the criticisms of feminist and ethnographic claims 
to empowerment, with the aid of Merton's sociological ambivalence. 
The conclusion reached by this chapter is: only through an examination 
of the ongoing construction of the research relationship, via the 
interactions that take place within it, can the paradox of power it involves 
effectively be accessed. The stage is thereby set for the empirical inquiry 
of Chapter 5. 
Before this, however, Chapter 4 reflexively addresses some of the key 
methodological concerns raised by Chapter 3, and the perspective 
adopted in the later chapters. Accounts about the method are discussed 
in terms of the interpretative repertoires of science formulated by Gilbert 
and Mulkay (1984). Some of the factors traditionally confined to the 
contingent repertoire are discussed, such as my own personal attributes 
and commitments, and my socialisation within the scientific community. 
The protocol of boundary demarcation is also addressed, and the thesis 
is positioned firmly within the borderlands between the traditional 
disciplines where social constructionist thought flourishes. 
Chapter 5 addresses the roles of researcher and researched as an issue 
debated in the research encounter itself. To this purpose, an extended 
extract of data receives an in-depth sequential examination. Over the 
course of the excerpt, the speakers are observed to establish the 
statuses of researcher and researched in comparison and contrast to that 
of family member. The analysis alerts the reader to the negotiated and 
ongoing process by which these roles are constructed. 
The demonstration of this process as ongoing and negotiated contrasts 
with the presumption, addressed in Chapter 3, that the roles of the 
research encounter can be (pre)constituted by the researcher. In this 
analysis, attention is drawn to the cultural assumptions that each 
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participant brings to the interaction. As a result of the irreconcilability of 
various of these assumptions, no single cohesive answer emerges. 
Instead the understanding of these roles changes dynamically as new 
ingredients are added and new actions are performed. This means that 
irreconcilable conclusions are expressed and ratified at different points 
without apparent problem. What counts as the role of the researcher or 
the researched therefore changes moment by moment according to the 
rhetorical dictates of the interaction. What is more, the analysis attends to 
the way content and form continually interact with one another in this 
process, so that a behaviour warranted in one utterance might be 
displayed in another. 
One example of the dynamic alteration of conclusions over the course of 
the interaction, is the treatment of how much control the researcher has 
over the encounter. In the first part of the extract, Ava's expertise is jointly 
worked up, while later, her amateur ineptitude is similarly co-constructed. 
Another example, is the manner in which the autonomy of the researched 
is presented. This is observed to be a concern carefully attended to by 
the participants, and managed by a continuous oscillation between 
presentations of guidance by, and independence from, the researcher. 
In addition to this demonstration of the dynamic and negotiated process 
by which social roles are constructed, one particular image of the role of 
the researched is explicated in detail. Towards the end of the extract, 
Mum presents the researched as givers of the gift of their co-operation to 
the researcher. This construction is discussed in relation to the work of 
classical anthropology on gift giving behaviour, and the work by Mulkay 
(1988) and others on the ability of humour to exploit ambiguities. The 
analysis is then related back to the questions addressed in Chapter 3, 
and it is noted that the picture of the researched as gift-giver is one 
significantly absent in the work of alternative methodologists. 
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Although agreement figures strongly in the extract analysed in this 
chapter, the speakers' attention to the need to argue for a version of 
events against competing versions, is nonetheless fundamental. In 
addition, the use of humour to manage contention and conflict is 
addressed. What is more, the chapter represents an argument in itself, 
by presenting an example of the sort of solution to the competing roles of 
the research relationship advocated in Chapter 3. In this sense, Chapter 
5 introduces the family's interaction as a rhetorical environment, while 
later chapters will examine its more explicitly argumentative dimensions. 
Chapter 6 takes the discussion onto a more overtly argumentative track 
by focusing upon preference structure as a key organisational 
mechanism of conversation. Amongst Discourse and Conversation 
Analysis, preference organisation has traditionally been understood to 
constrain actors to accomplish sociability through a preference for 
agreement. Where a preference for disagreement has been noted, as in 
the self-depreciations of Pomerantz (1984), the pursuit of harmony and 
overall conciliation remain as the assumed driving motivation of 
speakers. 
However, in this chapter concrete empirical analysis is used to 
demonstrate that speakers can also use preference organisation as a 
resource with which to accomplish their interactional business through 
sociable argument. In such a pursuit, disagreement is actively courted, 
and conciliation is strenuously avoided. Nonetheless, the end product of 
sociability remains the same - only the route is different. Within this 
chapter, an example of the adoption of that alternative route is examined. 
The analysis centres around the identification of a phenomenon I have 
called the "Check formulation" which, like the "check" manoeuvre of 
chess, places another on the defensive. The check formulation is 
characterised by the use of "so", which warrants a conclusion on the 
7 

basis of another's argument, and contrastive stress upon an item taken 
from that other, which is thereby highlighted as problematic. The 
responses to three check formulations are examined for their deployment 
of elements of the repertoire of dispreferred seconds. Through close 
analysis, the differential status of "reluctance markers" (Bilmes, 1988) 
and accounts is demonstrated. Speakers are observed to actively avoid 
displays of a reluctance to disagree, especially delay, while 
simultaneously displaying an orientation to accountability. Following this, 
a counter-example is presented, whereby, after a change of state marker, 
a "so" inference is used to accomplish a "confirmation request" (Schiffrin, 
1987). Such inferences differ from check formulations in the absence of 
contrastive stress on a problematic item. The responses to this 
alternative use of "so" are compared to those following a check 
formulation, and a very different orientation to accountability is noted. 
The in-depth examination of these four examples, which follow each 
other sequentially in the extract of data under analysis, provides evidence 
of a preference for disagreement in at least some forms of conversation. 
More than this, however, it demonstrates that preference organisation 
operates as a resource of considerable flexibility, which is available for 
speakers to accomplish almost any social action they might choose. This 
conclusion stands in direct contradiction to the assumption of (and in 
some cases assertion by) many discourse and conversation analysts, 
- -- /' 
that preference operates as a .. normative constrainf on--=-interactants, 
requiring them to behave in a manner incompatible with their personal 
desires. 
Chapter 7 then explores the construction of family and its roles, identities 
and relationships in the rhetorical arena of disagreement. The institution 
of the family is seen to be "talked into being", ongoingly, in interaction (cf. 
Heritage, 1984). Once more, the claims being made in this chapter are 
explicated through a close analysis of an extended extract of data. 
8 
In this chapter, more concretely than those that have gone before, the 
environment of contention and dispute is identified as a key factor in the 
construction of the social. The discussion under examination is seen to 
move from an appraisal of the argumentative behaviour of the family, to 
the roles and statuses of various family members. Such matters come to 
be made concrete through the requirement for warrant and justification 
indispensable to the atmosphere of contention. Furthermore, one matter 
which is never made concrete, that of "the family" itself, is observed to 
operate in an abstract and undefined manner, precisely because it never 
comes into dispute. Within this extract, it is the construction and 
responses to challenges that lead to the negotiation of social roles and 
the boundaries of acceptable behaviour, while the absence of challenge 
permits an underlying assumption to operate as a universal. 
This thesis comes to the conclusion that argumentation is a regrettably 
underestimated force in the shaping of the social world. Over the course 
of the empirical examination contained within this thesis, the successful 
accomplishment of social identities, roles and interrelationships is seen to 
arise out of an atmosphere of non-threatening disagreement, 
disalignment, and dispute. The space for social actors to move according 
to their own desires, is seen to open up between the irreconcilable 
contradictions that characterise social objects (such as roles, behaviours, 
and institutions). From this perspective, the reconciliation of these 
oppositions and contradictions ceases to be a desirable goal, in that it 
threatens the death of social entities through asphyxiation. However, the 
search for such a reconciliation is acknowledged to be indispensable. 
This argumentative perspective therefore renounces the final answer, 
and instead celebrates the messy and contentious process by which the 
search for definitive answers provides the momentum for social life. 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
A SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM 
Social constructionism is founded upon the belief that "reality", rather 
than being something "out there" to which human kind must simply 
respond, is constituted by our verJ actions of comprehension. 
Furthermore, it is not the imagination of the isolated individual that is 
looked to for this mechanism of construction. Instead, construction is 
believed to arise out of social, cultural and historical interaction between 
people (cf. Gergen, 1985; Shweder and Miller, 1985). Thus, the idea that 
there is, indeed, any distinction between things that are "real" and "out 
there in the world", and things that are the product of cultures and 
societies, is itself reduced to the level of a social artefact. That is, from 
this perspective, our only access to the world in which we live and 
breathe occurs via the medium of culture, and, as a result, anything we 
might take to be "real" and ·out there" ha;"alreadY been shaped, or 
·constructed" by social forces. 
The epistemological foundation of social construction ism contrasts 
markedly· with that of traditional soCial science. Traditionally, social 
scientists have treated ·reality" as something accessible to which the 
·social" can be compared and thereby judged for its accuracy. However, 
the traditional research questions that follow from such a premise 
become redundant when the class of things called ·real" is seen as no 
more than a constructed and ascribed category . Basing their work on 
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this alternative conception of reality, social constructionists have instead 
engaged in the examination of "the social processes through which 
'factuality' is established" (Gergen and Davis, 1985 p v), and the social 
consequences that such reification engenders. Examples of the sorts of 
"objects' that social constructionists have examined include: gender 
(Kessler and Mckenna, 1978; Gergen, 1994; Radke and Stam, 1994); the 
mind (Coulter, 1979, 1989); the emotions (Averill, 1982, 1985; HaITE3, 
1986) science (Latour and Woolgar, 1979; Collins and Pinch, 1982); the 
family (Gubrium and Holstein, 1990; Holstein and Gubrium, 1994); and 
lesbianism (Kitzinger, 1987). 
This epistemological foundation makes Social Construction ism applicable 
to a whole range of social scientific and social analytic disciplines, where, 
as an alternative "paradigm" (Kuhn, 1962. See Section G below), it 
prompts its advocates to ask novel questions about the phenomena 
traditionally studied by those disciplines . 
. Social construction ism embraces fields as diverse as psychology, 
sociology, rhetoric, philosophy, linguistics, and literary theory, to name 
but a few. As Shotter (1992) put it, the social constructionist movement 
operates in those uncertain, interdisciplinary zones between the 
mainstream disciplines ... on the boundaries of all the separate spheres of 
social and behavioural inquiry ( p 9). 
However, as Shotter conceives it, the Social Constructionist challenge is 
not an attempt to ~_uppl~n!_traditional appro~~~e~,and set up a. rr.esh 
hegemony of perspective, but to open up a dialogue with alternative 
views. In this way, without the need to privilege itself over competing 
perspectives, it can function as 
a new analytic device to reveal aspects of human conduct "obscured" by 
other forms oftalk (p 9). 
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Equally, social construction ism embraces a wide range of methods in its 
search to "demystify ... existing forms of understanding" (Gergen, 1985 p 
14). Indeed, the perspective is particularly amenable to methodological 
diversity. One reason for this is that, having abandoned the limitations of 
a search for "objective truth", the fine-honed analyses of qualitative 
methods become as acceptable as the vast sweeps of quantitative 
research. 
A second reason is rather reflexive in nature (See Section H), and follows 
from the observation by Gergen (1985) of the social constructionist belief 
in 
the inherent dependency of knowledge systems en communities of shared 
inte!ligibility (p 14). 
This insight emphasises the historical and cultural contingency of 
normative rules. If methodological dictates are seen as an example of 
such knowledge systems, it would be a contradiction for social 
constructionism to limit its methodology as if following some realist 
search for truth. Instead, a highly flexible treatment of methodological 
rules, which leaves them open to negotiation within the scientific 
community, is not only warranted, but recommended. 
One interesting distinction between the social constructionist work of 
sociologists and psychologists, proposed by Sarbin and Kitsuse (1994) is 
that 
The constructionist literature in psychology reflects a commitment to the 
rhetoric of criticism in which constructionists have deconstructed the 
dominant positivist epistemological assumptions and methodologies 
(Sarbin and Kitsuse. 1994 p 6). 
Sarbin and Kitsuse attribute these positivist assumptions to traditional 
psychology's continual attempts to emulate the positivism of the natural 
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sciences. In contrast, they note the more accepting attitude of sociology 
to the constructionist frame, resulting, they believe, out of the way paved 
by Symbolic Interactionism within the history of the discipline. It is to this, 
that they attributed the relative absence of a constituent emphasis on 
challenge and deconstruction in the social constructionist work within 
sociology. In other words, these writers are pointing to the rhetorical 
structure of the explorations into constructionism of the two disciplines -
with sociology able to present its insights as mere description, while 
psychology is required to present its analyses in opposition to the foil of 
traditional understandings. 
When realism is rejected and the correspondence of theoretical and 
analytic c::nc!usions to an "out there" reality becomes irrelevant, 
scmething else seems to be required from which to judge the validity of 
such conclusions. In social construction ism the alternative is often 
formulated as the question of morals. It is observed that the question of 
morals has had variable force within realist claims. While radical 
movements often justify themselves on the basis of their moral and 
ethical consequences when interfaced with "out there reality", the more 
conservative realist claims have tended to discount their moral 
consequences as unfortunate but unavoidable because "that's just the 
way it is", When realism is abandoned, however, social analysts are 
required to attend to the moral consequences of their constructions, 
particularly because they are not merely external commentaries on social 
life, but are part of the very mechanism by which that social life is 
constructed. As a result, social constructionist work often, but not 
invariably, contains a moral commitment to ameliorating social injustices 
towards groups which have been casualties to realist pronouncements 
about the world (cf. Sarbin and Kitsuse, 1994). 
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8 ETHNOMETHODOLOGY 
While social construction ism examines the artefacts that social forces 
create and then treat as reality, another group of social analysts concern 
themselves with how such artefacts are brought into social interaction. 
Ethnomethodology holds that people bring along to social intercourse 
culturally shared understandings of the world and use these to act within, 
and react to, the ever-novel environment that they are faced with, thereby 
constructing that environment. Ethnomethodology can be seen as social 
constructionist in epistemology, for it focuses its attention on the 
assumptions about the world that social actors require in order to function 
within that world'. It is fundamental to this enterprise that "the world" is 
created out of actions which treat certain culturally shared notions as 
assumed. 
It is impossible to talk about ethnomethodology without reference to its 
most central figure, Harold Garfinkel, the originator of the name 
"ethnomethodology" itself. According to Heritage (1984), Garfinkel was 
searching for the answer to a "single question": 
how do actors come to know, and know in common, what they are dOing 
and the circumstances in which they are doing it? (Heritage, 1984 p 76). 
With reference to this question, Garfinkel (1967) formulated what he 
called the "documentary method of interpretation". This was seen to be 
the method used by social actors - whom Garfinkel referred to as 
'There is, however, some contrcversy over the parity of ethnomethodology and social 
constructionism. The primary point of contention appears to be that social 
constructionism provides a competing version of reality to that of the 'members' it 
examines. Ethnomethodologists, meanwhile, find such a denial of "the actor's point of 
view· unacceptable (Button and Shamock, 1992 p 20). Instead, they posit that highly 
. illuminating insights into members' activities can be generated without the requirement 
that their version of reality need be contradicted (See also Watson, 1994). 
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"members" - to make sense of and live in the world. The documentary 
method has two parallel aspects. On the one hand, it 
consists of treating an actual appearance as 'the document of, as 'painting 
to', and as 'standing on behalf of a presupposed underlying pattem 
(Garfinkel, 1967 p 78). 
On the other hand, it involves any individual appearance being, in its tum, 
interpreted on the basis of 'what is known' about the underlying pattern. 
Each is used to .elaborate the other (Garfinkel, 19~7 p 78). 
The upshot of this method is that the underlying pattem in question is 
brought into being in an ongoing manner through the accumulation of 
concrete instantiations - accumulated as like instances by the very actors 
themselves. Here then, we see the process by which the world of 
members is socially constructed. 
Two of the most central notions of ethnomethodology are those of 
"indexicality" and "reflexivity". With regards to indexicality, while linguists 
identify a specific set of "indexical expressions", such as personal 
pronouns (e.g. we, you), location terms (e.g. there, here), temporal terms 
(e.g. now, then), as dependent upon context in order for their referent to 
be determined, ethnomethodology expands this set to include any 
expression that takes on a concrete meaning only in its context of use. 
This, of course, renders it increasingly difficult to discover any term that 
falls outside such a definition. However, this merely underlines the 
ethnomethodological belief that members must carry out interpretative 
work in order to accomplish the meaning of a given term. In other words, 
entities that come to be described by members are not seen as simply 
"out there" in a fixed and immutable way. Instead it is believed that 
description and concept application are contingent, negotiable and 
revisable. Past usage does not necessarily determine future usage. The 
meaning of a concept or descriptor is the range of states of affairs to which 
it is applied, and the boundaries of that range are continuously reaffirmed 
or revised in new acts of speaking (Heritage. 1984 p 147). 
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The ethnomethodological insight of reflexivity, meanwhile, observes that 
talk is context sensitive and context reproducing. This notion will be 
discussed in more detail in the sections below regarding conversation 
analysis (Section C) and reflexivity as an area of enquiry in its own right 
(Section H). 
In setting out to examine the presuppositions that "members" bring to 
their interactions, ethnomethodology comes across the problem of how to 
identify a phenomenon that is by definition implicit and un articulated. The 
answer adopted by Garfinkel (1963) was to 
start with a system with stable features and ask what can be done to make 
trouble (GarfinkeL 1963 p 187). 
In what became known as the "breaching experiments", Garfinkel (1952, 
1963, 1967) instructed confederates to act as if one or other of the 
presuppositions, or rules, of behaviour was not operational. The reactions 
of other "members", not party to the experimental enterprise, was 
discovered to be extraordinarily vivid - attesting to the efficacy of the 
assumption/rule in question. Where social actors failed to follow the rules 
required by the mobilisation of a shared background of knowledge, 
communication was seen to break down dramatically. Garfinkel was able 
to conclude from these investigations, not only that speakers attribute the 
actions of others to the operation of background knowledge, but that this 
attribution is essential to communication. Garfinkel observed that the 
communication breakdowns he documented did not entail a complete 
rejection of the premise that the Other shares the relevant background 
assumptions. Instead, members tended to stick steadfastly to this 
attribution, and treat the Other's behaviour as amenable to sense-making 
in line with these assumptions, as if such a 
sense has yet to be found and when it is it won't be pleasant (Heritage, 
1984 p 100). 
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C CONVERSATION ANALYSIS 
Conversation analysis (CA) has adopted a highly empirical approach to 
the insights of ethnomethodology, concentrating upon the single, 
delimited arena of verbal interaction. Founded on the work of Harvey 
Sacks and his colleagues Emanuel Schegloff and Gail Jefferson, CA 
examines the deployment by speakers. of the shared understandings 
identified by ethnomethodology. According. to CA, social actions are 
accomplished via the structuring of verbal interaction around these 
shared understandings. Central to the methodology is its belief in the 
primacy of natural conversation as a social medium. In line with this, the 
core pursuit of conversation analysts has been to look for the regularities 
and irregularities of ordinary conversation. In this endeavour, they have 
amassed data taken from natural conversation into a single corpus, 
within which, cross-reference can be freely made. As Heritage (1988) 
observes, CA is not about 
the application of a fixed set of methodological canons, but rather ... [the] 
resourceful use of the corpus of current knowledge (Heritage, 1988 p 144). 
Meanwhile, altemative modes of discourse, such as institutional 
interactions, are viewed as subordinate phenomena and are compared to 
conversational benchmarks in order that their institutionality might be 
understood. (This second project I shall discuss below in Section F, on 
Institutions and CA). Fundamental to this notion that the data of CA is 
open to cross-reference and comparison, is the way in which the work 
carried out by its disparate members is interconnected . and 
complementary. This leads Sharrock and Anderson (1986) to declare that 
CA is "a genuinely cumulative sociology" (p 81). 
This "resourceful use of the corpus" begins with the employment of the 
"utterance" as the unit of analysis. In other perspectives, such as 
linguistics or philosophy, categories such as the phrase or the sentence 
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have been used, which depend upon analytic judgements of content for 
their identification. According to CA, analysts thereby impose an 
unnecessary level of reality construction upon their data. In contrast, 
CA's "utterance" signifies a single speaker's turn at talk, and thus takes 
its form from judgements determined by members' turn-taking procedures 
(see below, this Section). This choice of analytical unit also reflects one 
of the most fundamental insights of CA: however effortless it appears, 
the mutual intelligibility and orderliness of conversation. is 
something that participants continually work at (cf. Nofsinger, 1991). 
This means that CA is primarily engaged in examining 
the interactional and inierential consequences of the choice between 
altemative utterances. (Levinson, 1983 p 287). 
Before we move on to look at this insight we need to acknowledge how 
the analytic unit of the utterance is treated in CA. Utterances are 
analysed in terms of their sequential placement in ongoing interaction. 
This emphasis on sequentiality, is paramount within CA. Drawing from 
ethnomethodology's understanding of reflexivity, CA is grounded in the 
belief that 
the significance of any speaker's communicative action is doubly 
contextual in being both context-shaped and context-renewing ... context-
shaped in that its contribution to an on-going sequence of actions cannot 
adequately be understood except by reference to the context ... especially 
the immediately preceding ... in which it participates (Heritage, 1984 p 
242). 
It is context-renewing, meanwhile, because 
every 'currenf action will itself form the immediate context for some 'next 
action' (Heritage, 1984 p 242). 
The second "context-renewing" manifestation of contextuality is referred 
to by Schegloff and Sacks (1973 p 296) as the 'sequential 
implicativeness' of an utterance. 
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Returning to the participant-accomplished orderliness of conversation, 
central to this insight is the CA notion of "alignmenf (Stokes and Hewitt, 
1976). As discussed by Nofsinger (1991), alignment refers to the 
activities of conversationalists to bring their contributions into sufficient 
synchronisation with those of the other participants. It is through attention 
to the procedures for alignment that participants achieve intersubjective 
. interaction,. ratherthan merely idiosyncratic action. 
Both alignment and sequential implicativeness are combined in the CA 
~otion of the adjacency pair. In this structure, a first pair part 
interactionally occasions the production of one out of a selection of 
possible seconds. Examples of adjacency pairs are questions and 
answers, invitations and acceptances, offers and rejections etc. Given a 
first pair part, a second pair part becomes what Schegloff (1972) calls 
"conditionally relevant". That is, a second pair part is heard as 
"'responsive to' ... i.e. in a serial or sequenced relation to" that first pair 
part (Schegloff, 1972 p 307). Furthermore, its absence becomes a 
"notable" event, serving 
as legitimate and recognizable grounds for a set of inferences (e.g. about 
the participant who failed to produce it) (Schegloff, 1972 p 307). 
An important point to note about adjacency pairs, is that the meaning of 
the first pair part is not irrevocably set by the speaker, it is merely 
implicative. Indeed, the second speaker's choice of a second pair part 
acts so as to retrospectively establish the meaning of the first pair part 
(cf. Leudar and Antaki, 1988). It is therefore in the action of the second 
pair part that alignment procedures are displayed. For, while the first pair 
part sets up a sequential implicativeness that is to be satisfied by the 
second, the second part reveals how the second speaker has interpreted 
the first. In a successful question-answer sequence, for example, the 
question may require an answer, but the adjacency pair is only 
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accomplished by the second speaker's complicity in supplying an 
utterance which can be taken as an answer. It is the answer which 
establishes the first contribution as a question, as much as the question 
which establishes the next contribution as an answer. It is this interplay 
that is therefore responsible for creating an intersubjective reality 
between the two speakers, thereby rendering it "interaction". 
Another key understanding of .CA, is that which Sacks (1992) calls 
"subversion". Subversion refers to the ability of speakers to exploit what 
they know about how their social actions will be interpreted (their 
''visibility'' (Edwards, 1991)) in order to carry out those actions. As with 
alignment, subversion utilises shared expectancies, such as sequential 
implicativeness. to accomplish social business. Thus, adjacency pairs 
and the specific example of the question-answer sequence can again 
provide a demonstration of how these concepts combine. For, second 
speakers can choose to fill the sequential slot after a question with items 
that, out of context, might not be taken for answers. By doing so they 
effect a conversion of those items into answers, which often carry a very 
heavy interpretational load as a result. In this way, counter-questionings, 
topic changes etc. placed in the answer slot, not only become answers in 
their own right, but operate on various other levels of meaning and 
interpretation because of their visibility as "events" in a similar way to the 
"notable absences" referred to above. This is therefore an additional way 
in which participants create conversational orderliness in a mutually 
intelligible fashion. 
Another very important aspect of creating conversational orderliness that 
conversation analysts have explored, is that of tum taking. Sacks et al. 
(1978) propose that tum-taking proceeds through tum-by-tum 
discriminations from amongst a normatively ordered set of options. Tum-
taking thereby represents what Levinson (1983) calls a "local 
management system". The system appears to rest upon what Sacks et 
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al. (1978) call "Transition Relevant Places" or TRPs. These are places 
within an utterance that other speakers are expected to hear as 
opportunities for them to start speaking. Sacks et al. (1978) documented 
three altemative manners in which conversation can proceed following a 
TRP: current speaker selects next; current speaker makes no selection; 
and current speaker continues. In the case of current speaker selects 
next, a second speaker is directly addressed, rendering them 
accountable to. respond .. This means that both a responding utterance 
and the absence of a response, are interpretable as social actions by 
members. Equally, via subversion (Sacks, 1992; see above) they can be 
designed as such. When a first speaker does not address anyone 
individual, speakers can self-select and choose to respond to what has 
gone before (This includes responses where the content of the first 
speaker's utterance is not directly addressed, for this still counts as a 
form of response). Finally, speakers can, for various reasons, choose to 
carry on speaking themselves after a TRP. 
This documentation of the three types ofTRP allow Sacks et al. (1978) to 
go on to make key insights into the phenomena of silence and overlap. 
From the perspective of most altemative methods of analysis, such 
matters may seem too minute for worthwhile examination. However, in 
emphasising talk as action, rather than communication (Edwards, 1991), 
CA rejects no detail of talk as irrelevant or unimportant (cf. Heritage, 
1984). Sacks et al. (1978) point out that, in view of the various 
manifestations of TRPs, there is an array of different meanings attached 
to silences and to overlapping talk. 
With reference to the former of these phenomena, Sacks et al. formulate 
the following typology of silences. When a first speaker selects the next 
speaker, any delay can be treated as belonging to that next speaker, 
thus serving as a form of social action by that individual - for example, 
acting as a display of hesitation, contemplation, politeness, doubt, etc .. 
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Sacks et al. therefore refer to this type of delay as an "attributable 
silence". Alternatively, a delay at a TRP, where the first speaker makes 
no selection of the next speaker, is not attributable to anyone speaker. 
This the writers call a "gap". A further type of silence differentiated by 
Sacks et al. is understood as an extended delay which marks some form 
of breakdown in normal communication. These tend to be followed by an 
articulation of discomfort and, often, an abrupt change of subject. This 
type of delay, called a "lapse", is seen to be rather rare in conversation, 
which more usually proceeds without observable breakdown. In all of 
these cases, the delay occurs at a TRP. However, delay can also occur 
when a TRP is not marked, so that the current speaker retains 
possession of the floor. This, very different type of silence, is known as a 
"pause". 
In contrast to the phenomenon of silence, speakers can find themselves 
engaged in overlapping speech. According to the turn taking rules 
outlined by Sacks et al. (1978), speakers will take steps to minimise the 
time during which interactants talk simultaneously, so that it is very 
unusual for extended simultaneous utterances to occur. Despite this, 
there are frequent occasions, in which a short sequence of a few words is 
overlapped by other speakers. Again, Sacks et al. (1978) look to 
distinguish different meanings in such occurrences. One of these occurs 
when the current speaker makes no selection of next, following which 
more than one speaker self-selects. As a result, two or more speakers 
begin to speak simultaneously (one of these speakers mayor may not be 
the current speaker themselves electing to continue after a TRP). This is 
known as a "competing first start". Another occurrence is that of 
"misprojection" whereby a next speaker erroneously projects the end of a 
current speaker's tum so as to overlap with that speaker. Speakers can 
also display either antagonism or second assessment enthusiasm 
(Pomerantz, 1984) by overlapping with another speaker. What might be 
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called interruption proper, remains a further option, usually entailing a 
change of topic or a request for clarification. 
In the above explanation of overlap, it should be apparent that 
disruptions of the general orderliness of conversation are not irrevocable, 
so that competing first starts, misprojections or overlapping requests for 
clarification, etc., represent merely transitional states of disorderliness, 
due to the actions of participants to restore order. This option for the 
restoration of order is far more widely available to speakers than in cases 
of overlap alone, and is known in CA as repair. 
Repair refers to the rectification and revision of utterances or parts of 
utterances, which thereby signals that something was problematic about 
such "repairables'. Schegloff et al. (1977) distinguish between the 
marking of an item as problematic - the initiation - and the changes that 
are subsequently made - the repair. These writers also note that either 
repair or its initiation can be carried out by either the speaker, who 
themselves made the repairable utterance, or by another speaker. Thus, 
there are cases of self-initiated self-repair, other-initiation of self-repair 
and other-initiated other-repair. The self-initiation of self-repair can be 
accomplished both at the point that the repairable is uttered, before a 
TRP, or afterward, in the "transition space" (Schegloff et aI., 1977) before 
another speaker makes a contribution. When another initiates a repair, 
this is often accomplished by expressions of mishearing, such as "What?" 
or "Sorry?", or by 
echo-questions. or repetitions of problematic items with stress on problem 
syllables (Levinson, 1983 p 341). 
Meanwhile, where other-repair occurs, dispreference markers (see the 
following paragraph), such as delay and mitigation, can often be 
included, displaying an orientation to other-repair as a dispreferred option 
compared to self-repair (cf. Levinson, 1983). 
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A presentation of CA as an area of enquiry would not be complete 
without mention of its concept of preference organisation. This topic will 
be the subject of extensive discussion in Chapter 6, however, a basic 
outline of the issues involved would seem appropriate here. The idea of 
preference again involves the adjacency pair, (or, equally, the less tightly 
paired tums that Pomerantz (1978) refenred to as "action chains") and the 
observation that choices amongst second pair parts following a first pair 
part are not of equal status. Instead, a normative apparatus exists within 
a culture, which places oppositional dyads of second pair parts in a 
hierarchical relationship to one another. Examples include: accepting 
versus declining an invitation or offer; complying with or refusing to 
comply with a request: admitting versus denying an accusation, etc .. 
Thus, for example, after an offer, acceptances tend to be produced in 
differing turn shapes to declinations. The conversation analytic contention 
is that, nonnatively speaking, the turn shape of the former tends to 
display an unproblematic status, while, the turn shape of the latter marks 
itself as problematic with options from a group of items such as 
hesitations, delaying components and accounts. The former is refenred to 
as the "prefenred tum shape", while the latter is known as the 
"disprefenred turn shape". This distinction between preferred and 
disprefenredtum shapes is held to apply for a whole range of second pair 
part dyads, including those in the list above. As a result, although 
prefenred tum shapes are response-specific, the markers of 
dispreference are believed to be more or less common across the range 
of second pair parts. 
Within CA, the work on preference structure has generated a certain 
amount of disagreement amongst analysts, whose incompatible 
approaches have lead to competing conclusions. (See Chapter 6 for a 
discussion of the controversy). However, common to most theories is the 
observation that preference organisation relies upon culturally shared 
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expectations. It is also agreed that speakers accomplish mutually 
intelligible social actions by orientating to such expectations. In this way, 
preference organisation is understood to represent a strong mechanism 
through which social communication can be managed. 
What can be seen from the above discussion, is that CA is primarily 
concerned with how conversational organisation is accomplished via the 
shape of speaker turns, as in. silence and overlap, . preference 
organisation etc. However, the issue of how an intersubjective world is 
maintained has also lead conversation analysts into the study of more 
content-orientated issues. An example of this is the interest in 
formulations. The work on formulations arises from the observation that, 
when speakers use a description of an object, that specific choice of term 
from amongst a group of alternatives, displays (to both members and 
analysts) their orientation to the social object in question. 
Particularly interesting are those formulations that refer to the preceding 
talk itself as an object to be represented. Such formulations involve 
summarisations of the gist of what has been said at some earlier point in 
the interaction, and as such, display the speaker's understanding of what 
is summarised. From a CA perspective, these utterances are not merely 
a neutral retelling, but a "re-presentation" of the talk in question, which 
focuses upon some aspects and upshots, not others. Those speakers 
whose contributions have been thereby formulated, can then confirm, 
amend or reject the formulation, thus displaying and creating the mutual 
alignment of the discourse. 
A rather different approach to the subject of formulations was taken by 
Pomerantz (1986), who identified a common rhetorical device utilised by 
speakers in the form of the "Extreme Case Formulation". This entails the 
characterisation of relevant objects in a highly exaggerated manner, so 
as to enhance emphasis. This type of formulation is not only relevant to 
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summarisations of the preceding talk, but also to any formulaic 
descriptions of social objects made by speakers. 
An even broader interpretation of formulations was adopted by Schegloff 
(1972), who used the term to express any choice of vocabulary by 
speakers. Schegloff proposed that the word-content of any given 
utterance represents a discrimination from amongst various competing 
options. In order to explicate this rhetorical perspective, Schegloff (1972) 
focused upon the example of formulations of place. Schegloff argued that 
choices of place terms involve displays by speakers of their orientation to 
a number of other matters, such as: where they themselves, their hearers 
and/or their referents are located; what membership categories they, their 
hearers and/or their referents belong to; what their relationship is to the 
topic in question; and what activity they are carrying out with their 
utterance. Meanwhile, a second speaker's response equally entails a 
reciprocal display of orientation to these matters. Here again, therefore, 
despite the focus upon the content rather than the form of utterances, the 
conversation analytic enterprise can be seen to involve the exploration of 
the mechanisms by which talk is ordered, jointly-constructed and 
rendered mutually intelligible by the activities of its participants. 
D DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 
Discourse Analysis is a name that has been taken up by a number of 
very different areas of inquiry. As Potter and Wetherell (1987) observed, . 
it is possible to pick up two books on the subject of discourse analysis 
and find absolutely no overlap in their content. Therefore it is important to 
differentiate early on the particular perspective to be taken under the 
name of discourse analysis in this thesis. 
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The discourse analysis that will be presented here (henceforth DA) is that 
adopted by such writers as Potter and Wetherell (1987) and Edwards and 
Potter (1992). This is a perspective which draws mainly upon the 
sociological enterprises of CA (see Section C), ethnomethodology (see 
Section B) and the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) (see Section 
G), but adopts instead an orientation to social psychological topics. Thus, 
the discourse analysis which derives from the post-structuralist and 
postmodemist traditions (e.g. Foucault, 1972, 1976, 1980; Derrida, 1973, 
1976, 1978) will not be addressed here. Similarly, the pages to follow will 
rarely touch upon the work within linguistics under that name, which 
expands upon the Speech Act theories of Austin (1962) and Searle 
(1975, 1976), where idealised sentences and exchanges are used to 
exemplify its anaiyses (e.g. Sinciair and Coulthard, 1975; Labov and 
Franshel, 1977). However, as some of this work has been adopted into 
the discourse analytic perspective with which this thesis claims 
allegiance, it will at times be featured. 
DA can be distinguished from CA, to which, as mentioned above, it is 
closely aligned, in that it does not concur with CA's belief in the primacy 
of natural conversation. This means that, although the CA enterprise of 
searching a random corpus for recurrent patterns remains open (e.g. 
Edwards and Potter, 1992), many Discourse Analysts choose to engage 
in interviewing interactants in an unstructured way to get directly at areas 
of analytic interest (e.g. Wetherell and Potter, 1992). Discourse analysts 
also extend their study to the analysis of printed texts. Another distinction 
from CA is that DA combines CA's insights and those of lingUistic 
discourse analyses with an emphasis on the "interpretative repertOires" 
(Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984) of SSK. These are held to be selections from 
amongst the immense array of culturally available explanations of the 
world, or as Potter and Wetherell (1988) put it, 
relatively internally consistent bounded language units (Potter and 
Wetherell, 1988 p 172). 
27 
The Discourse Analytic project is to examine how social actors 
systematically deploy discursive organisational features and repertoires 
in order to accomplish their rhetorical business. In many cases the 
analysis then goes on to explicate the way in which this process brings 
about, sustains and legitimates social practices. Uke CA, this project is a 
cumulative enterprise in which the writings of other authors are compared 
and contrasted as part of the analytic process (cf. Sharrock. and 
Anderson, 1986). 
As mentioned above, DA is a constructionist enterprise that has arisen 
out of a social psychological orientation. Thus, despite the eclectic 
approach which links it to CA, linguistics, SSK, etc., discourse analytic 
work has tended to centre around the questions addressed by 
"traditional" psychology, that is, the cognitive social psychology that 
currently represents the mainstream paradigm of the discipline. 
DA's broadest attack on traditional psychology is upon the principles of 
cognitivism itself. The cognitive perspective envisages intemal mental 
entities as the causal determinants of social action. It works with such 
terms as attitudes, thoughts, emotions, attributions, stereotypes etc., and 
conceives of each as carried around by social actors and put to use in 
appropriate social situations. The project of such psychologists is 
therefore to identify these entities and the methods in which they are 
used. The practical tools that the analysts utilise are the questionnaire, 
the survey and the experiment, whereby the parameters are set by the 
social scientist so as to display the entities in question for overt perusal. 
Language and other forms of social action are seen as merely the 
transparent media through which outward display of these inner entities 
occurs. 
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DA takes a very different view of language and social action. Rather than 
trying to look through the window of language into the minds of 
participants, DA sees language use as the moulding and creative force of 
the social world. It therefore puts aside any questions about internal 
states, regarding them as relevant only when they are made so by the 
actions of participants. Thus, it is observed that people rather regularly 
utilise the concepts of inner states to explain, justify and describe, their 
and others' behaviour and to generally make sense of the world. In this 
guise, inner states do become interesting to the discourse analyst, not as 
neutral descriptions of some "reality", however, but as interested and 
rhetorically effective mobilisations of an available cultural repertoire. It 
could indeed be said that the cognitive psychologists are buying into the 
cultural repertoire of the inner state, or equally, that their representations 
of these entities can be seen to be part of the machinery by which the 
repertoires in question are generated for the wider sOciety. This is much 
the argument that Moscovici (1976) proposed, perceiving the two-way 
flow of lay and scientific explanations of the world. 
In looking for enduring internal states through the media of experiment 
and questionnaire responses, one of the fundamental features of the 
cognitivist search, was for consistency from one occasion of use to 
another .. Consistency was seen to demonstrate the irrelevance of the 
particular language and context, which could then be written off, so that 
the nature of the underlying structure could be examined. Thus, 
consistent responses and accounts were taken as accurate 
representations of the internal realities under scrutiny .. 
For DA however, it is variation rather than consistency that is the telling 
force. DA draws upon the CA insights of Schegloff (1972), regarding 
formulations as consequential vocabulary choices (see Section C above), 
in order to conclude that social actors construct versions of the world via 
their talk and text. Discourse analysts observe: that versions are built out 
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of available cultural resources in the form of repertoires; that they are 
actively, though not necessarily consciously, selected; and that these 
selections are consequential. One way in which discourse analysts then 
demonstrate this process, is by attending to the language variation 
employed by the individual interlocutor. DA therefore insists that 
Descriptions ... are inevitably 'distorted', not simply occasionally, but 
perennially, in the sense that they are always constructions for some 
purpose (Potter and Wetherell, 1987 p 36). 
An example of the cognitive preoccupation with consistency is 
Festinger's (1957) notion of cognitive dissonance. This focused upon 
what he saw as an uncomfortable psychological state, produced when 
people recognised inconsistencies in their beliefs or between their beliefs 
and their actions - leading them to take steps to bring the two into line. 
For DA, meanwhile, 
variability is an expected usual feature of conversation and social texts. 
despite the fact that people often try to reduce it when it is pointed out to 
them or when it becomes salient for some other reason (Potter and 
Wetherell, 1987 p 38). 
From this perspective, ·consistency" and "inconsistency" can be seen as 
category terms that are themselves rhetorically deployable for the 
purposes of interactional business. On this theme, another element of 
cognitive psychology that DA highlights is that the very methods used by 
the traditional psychologists tend to suppress variability and promote 
consistency. This is not only apparent when one looks at the analytic pre-
coding of responses for the creation of closed questions, but can also be 
seen in the post-response codings by practitioners of participants' 
disparate responses to open-ended questions. 
In sum therefore, rather than seeing descriptive variation as evidence of 
inconsistency, quirkiness and error, as does cognitive psychology, DA 
points to the exigency of altemative terms and descriptions in the 
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accomplishment of discursive business. In this way, the primary focus 
within DA is upon the constructive and flexible deployment of language, 
which thus becomes a topic in its own right, rather than, as in cognitive 
psychology, a medium through which other, more intangible phenomena, 
such as attitudes, thoughts, memory etc., may be accessed (cf. Potter, 
1996). 
DA's attention to the rhetorical deployment of language, reaches much. 
further than a purely analytical interest. Discourse analysts observe that 
members are also aware of this availability, which then becomes a 
central concem in what Edwards and Potter (1992) call "fact 
construction". If the rhetorical interests of social actors can be served by 
their choice of language in describing the world, the status of such 
descriptions as "facts" is liable to be undermined. Edwards and Potter 
(1992) formulate this problem as the "dilemma of stake", in which 
members are faced with the conundrum of 
how to produce accounts which attend to interests without being 
undermined as interested (p 158). 
Edwards and Potter then bring together a number of techniques within 
the accounts and descriptions of social actors that attend to this dilemma, 
which have been identified by themselves and other discourse analysts. 
Some of the most central of these are the following. 
An actor's membership of a particular category can be invoked in order to 
.. raise-expectations and acceptances· of their access to speCialised 
knowledge, skills and interests (cf. Sacks, 1972; Schegloff, 1972). These 
are referred to by Edwards and Potter as "Category entitlements". 
Examples of such categories are those of professional expert, neutral 
counsellor, judge, etc. A speaker's attention to minute descriptive details 
can create an impression that they are re-experiencing the phenomena in 
question. Coining the term 'Vivid Description" for this device, the authors 
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contrast it with the opposite resource of "Systematic Vagueness" which 
leaves out the sorts of detail that can be undermined by hostile 
interlocutors. Another resource documented by Edwards and Potter is the 
way actors draw upon the vicarious testimony of independent others to 
project a feeling of consensus about their accounts or assessments and 
a sense that their story is corroborated. 80th contrasting pairs and lists of 
items are also identified as rhetorically effective devices for displaying 
factuality and are presented as particularly identifiable in the discourse of 
politicians (Atkinson, 1984; Heritage and Greatbatch, 1986). The authors 
make special note of the operativeness of three-part lists in displaying a 
sense of completeness and representativeness (Jefferson, 1990). 
E ARGUMENTATION AND RHETORIC 
As hinted at above, an interest in the rhetorical organisation of discourse 
is fundamental to DA. This is because, following the Conversation 
analytic insight of Schegloff (1972), DA argues that all choices of 
vocabulary involve discrimination between competing altematives, thus 
bringing to life some versions of the world and not others. In other words, 
discourse unfolds in a rhetorical arena. This, however, is not the only 
manner in which discourse can be seen as rhetorical. Speakers will often 
be involved in such social actions as exoneration, justification, and other· 
undertakings in the discursive construction of a moral order. Within such 
social actions, speakers will be arguing for some version of the world and 
against others, whether implicitly or explicitly, and in this sense they will 
be involved in what is clearly a rhetorical enterprise. 
This rhetorical emphasis within DA should not be confused with what has 
been termed "The New Rhetoric" - an area of enquiry which is currently 
seeking to revive the ancient Greek engagement with the persuasive 
power of discourse. "The New Rhetoric" generally involves the detailed 
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cataloguing of various devices and tropes available for deployment, with 
some interest in their objective effectiveness. Central figures in this 
enterprise have been Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1971). In view of 
its commitment to the local management of discourse, such generalised 
cataloguing tends not to be the business of DA. However, this does not 
preclude the potential of the new rhetoric as a useful resource for 
examining concrete instantiations of rhetorical devices in a discol!rse 
analyst's data ... 
The discourse analytic interest in argumentation has been primarily 
championed by Billig (1987, 1989, 1991, 1992, 1993). Billig advocates 
the "celebration of dialogue, argumentation and negativity" within 
psychology (Billig, 1993 P 2). In particular, Billig is critical of the 
conversation and discourse analytiC assumption that argumentation is 
merely a "marginal form of discourse" (Billig, 1989 P 211). Billig takes 
issue with the conceptualisation of argumentation, by various writers, as 
specific to certain sub-cultures (Schiffrin, 1984), settings (Atkinson and 
Drew, 1979; Molotch and Boden, 1985), or age groups (Goodwin, 1983; 
Maynard, 1985). Ironically, his own work is similarly marginalised by 
Antaki (1994), who suggests that 
The conversational convention of agreement .•. may be ..• tacitly put to one 
side for certain speech events (like his respondents' family quarrels ... ), 
but that does not affect the general background expectation that they are -
normally - in operation (Antaki, 1994 p 161) 
Billig attributes the marginalisation of argument to the nature of the 
corpus so far amassed by CA and DA, agreeing with'Goodwin's (1983) 
conclusion that, on the whole, these practitioners have regarded 
disagreement as something that speakers tend to avoid. In contrast, Billig 
takes the view that disagreement and argumentation are often engaged 
in enthusiastically by conversationalists in a creative and sociable 
manner. He is, however, eager to point out that 
33 
to celebrate argumentation is not to celebrate quarrelling. Ong (1989) and 
Billig (1987 and 1991), who bath praise the argumentative spirit, claim that 
being quarrelsome disrupts thoughtful argumentation: sulks, slammed 
doors, ill-tempered bullying etc. threaten the dialogic give and take of 
ideas. (Billig, 1993 P 9) 
As Billig (1989) mentions, Schiffrin (1984, 1985) is another advocate of 
argumentation as a sociable activity. However, like Tannen (1984) 
Schiffrin limits the scope of her gaze to a single cultural group within 
Western ~ociety, namely the. Jewish. community (see Chapter 4 Section 
B3a). In observing interaction amongst her participants Schiffrin 
concludes that 
In sociable argument, speakers repeatedly disagree, remain non-aligned 
with each other, and compete for interactional goods. Yet they do so in a 
non serious way, and in ways which actually display their solidarity and 
protect their intimacy (p 311). 
A further advocate of argumentation (or as he terms it, "informal 
discussion") and its centrality and sociability, is Knoblauch (1991). 
According to Knoblauch, speakers actively engage in the collaborative 
production of disagreement. Moreover, it is this activity of disagreement 
that accounts for the supply of topics, the mechanism for topic change 
and "the tension and the thrill of pursuing these topiCS" typical of informal 
discussions (Knoblauch, 1991 p 167). Also, like Billig (1993), he contrasts 
this with the alternative of conflict talk, including "shouting, crying and 
quarrelling" (Knoblauch, 1991 p 187), which he proposes as the very 
opposite of sociability. On this point Schiffrin (1984) takes a slightly 
different perspective, seeing sociable argument as the "playful enactment 
of ... conflict" which displays the "high tolerance of conflict in intimate 
relationships" (Schiffrin, 1984 p 331) precisely by its successful handling 
of that conflict. 
Holstein and Gubrium (1994) make yet stronger claims as to the 
importance of argumentation. For these writers, disagreement is not 
merely a fonn of sociability or a mechanism for the avoidance of 
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dangerous conflict. They assert that social objects (e.g. social 
institutions) gain their very substance from the accounts and definitions 
that an atmosphere of challenge and disagreement engenders. These 
writers insist that abstract social entities take concrete form directly out of 
the necessity to justify and warrant claims or to counter those of others. 
Such an approach takes the discourse analytic insight, that descriptions 
are neither neutral nor disembodied, one step further. This results in the 
conclusion that, if descriptions of the world come to be made as a result 
of the rhetorical business that interlocutors are engaged in, then the 
mechanism of contention and disagreement is central to the discursive 
construction of reality. This conclusion is the most important message 
that the current thesis has to communicate. The work of Holstein and 
Gubrium (1994) will receive a more detailed treatment in Chapter 7. 
F INSTITUTIONS AND CA 
As mentioned, in Section C above, CA considers mundane conversation 
to be the primary interactional medium of the social world. This does not, 
however, mean that other discursive forms have been ignored by 
conversation analysts. On the contrary, CA has utilised its insights into 
ordinary conversation in order to identify, by contrast, the unique qualities 
of institutional talk. In this way CA aims to reveal how institutions and 
institutionalised forms are constructed within their discourses,rather than 
elsewhere. In this way, despite its name, conversation analysis has 
repeatedlY,been applied as a methodology to Jorms of discourse other 
than that of ordinary conversation. 
Introducing a core volume in this topic area, the editors, Drew and 
Heritage (1992), explain that the undertaking of their volume is to 
describe how particular institutions are enacted and lived through as 
accountable patterns of meaning, inference, and action (Drew and 
Heritage. 1992 p 5). 
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This enterprise derives from the CA perspective towards institutions, 
which, rather than seeing them as pre-existing structures or settings that 
pre-determine the behaviour of interactants, treats institutions and 
institutional identities as 
locally produced, incrementally developed and, by extension, as 
transformable at any moment (Drew and Heritage, 1992 p 21). 
Central to this understanding of institutions are the related "problems" of 
"relevance" and "context" outlined by Schegloff (1991). Schegloff pointed 
out that, during a given interaction, any speaker, and any context, is 
simultaneously describable in terms of a long list of identities or 
attributes. However, simply because a speaker or context can be 
categorised in a particular way, does not make that categorisation 
relevant. Instead, Schegloff insists that both members and analysts must 
be concemed to determine which of the many possible categorisations 
are actually consequential for the interaction. According to Schegloff, the 
consequentiality of member identities and contextual features can only be 
determined by what the participants themselves can be seen to orient 
towards, during the process of the interaction under analysiS. 
When applying these problems of relevance and context to the realm of 
the institution, Heritage (1984) concludes that 
in maintaining, elaborating, or transforming their circumstances by their 
actions, the actors are also simultaneously reproducing, developing or . 
modifying the institutional realities''whiCtieriveloii those-iiCtions (p 180). . ..... . 
This shift in focus towards the engendering of institutionality has lead to a 
number of empirical investigations into concrete examples of this 
process. One of the more general conclusions of this work has been that 
"institutionality" often takes the form of 
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specific reductions of the range of options and oppommities for action ... 
and often involve specializations and respecifications of the interactional 
functions of the activities that remain (Drew and Heritage. 1992 p 26). 
Many of these have centred upon deviations from the turn-taking 
procedures of ordinary conversation outlined by Sacks, Schegloff and 
Jefferson (1978). Examples include the work of Atkinson and Drew 
(1979) on courtroom discourse, McHoul (1978) on classroom discourse 
and that of Greatbatch (1988. 1992) on news interviews. In each case, 
the respective authors reveal the 
systematically distinctive forms of tum taking which powerfully structure 
many aspects of conduct in these settings (Drew and Heritage. 1992 p 25). 
Another aspect of the organisation of institutional talk is the instantiation 
of asymmetric tasks. roles and category entitlements by its various 
members. One example of this is the work on the doing of "neutrality" by 
news interviewers (Clayman, 1988, 1992) and court officials (Atkinson, 
1992). A similar focus for exploration has been the differential access 
actors have to the "tacit procedures and architecture of talk" (Molotch and 
Boden, 1985). This body of work includes such topics of study as: 
asymmetries in the ascription of participant status in paediatric 
consultations (Aronsson, 1991); asymmetries in the opportunities for 
perspective-setting in police interrogations (Linell and Jonsson, 1991); 
and asymmetries in the provision and receipt of information during 
doctor-patient encounters (ten Have, 1991). 
Examinations such as the above have led conversation analysts to the . 
conclusion that 
. conversational mechanisms ... act to "enable" the local achievement and 
reproduction of institutional and organizational patterns in society 
(Zirnmerman and Boden. 1991 p 9). 
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It is in this sense that institutions are seen to be "talked into being" 
(Heritage, 1984 p 290). 
G THE INSTITUTION OF SCIENCE 
The study of institutions is not unique to ethnomethodology and CA. The 
study of science as a major and powerful institution in modem society 
(Woolgar, 1988 P 11) has been underway for decades. Growing out of 
the philosophy, history and sociology of science, the detailed examination 
of this particular institution has more recently embraced a constnuctionist 
epistemology. Under the title of the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge 
(SSK), and later the Social Studies of Science (SSS), the increasing 
directedness towards constnuctionism and relativism in the study of 
science has created a certain amount of convergence with the 
ethnomethodological, conversation analytic and discourse analytic 
projects discussed above. 
The first move in this convergence is usually attributed to Kuhn (1962). 
Drawing on the structural-functionalist work of Merton (1949) and 
Mannheim (1936; 1952), Kuhn proposed that science is a historical 
enterprise firmly embedded in the culture and society within which it 
takes place. He identified "paradigms" of scientific enterprise which 
premise certain beliefs and postulates, but not others. These 
unexplicated premises then determine which questions are asked and 
which hypotheses are erected for verification or refutation. Kuhn 
proposed that science most often proceeds by practitioners working from 
within a single accepted paradigm - "normal science". While, at certain 
temporal nodes, the underlying beliefs and postulates themselves come 
to be questioned, resulting in the supplanting of an "old" paradigm with a 
"new" one, which Kuhn called "extraordinary science". 
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Following Kuhn (1962), authors such as Barnes (1974) and Bloor (1976) 
embarked upon the "strong programme" in SSK. Fundamental to the 
strong programme is the injunction of Mannheim (1936) that the 
categorisations and hypotheses of, or questions about, phenomena are 
not merely a product of the phenomena themselves, but arise out of 
social interests which determine what is looked at, what is asked and 
what is seen. These social interests are perceived as both 
"extrascientific", including financial, political and other inducements and 
connections, and "intrascientific", pertaining to membership of bodies of 
like-minded colleagues (cf. Lynch, 1993).what is more, the very 
distinction between what is "extra-" and what is "intra-" scientific is 
identified by the strong programme as part of the business of scientific 
practice itself, and thus becomes a topic of study. As Lynch (1993) 
characterises it, 
the differentiation and stability of a boundary between science and 
nonscience is itself a continual social construction that can be explained by 
such factors as social consensus, the distinctive socialization of scientists, 
and scientists' ability to persuade key elites and members of the public to 
accept the authority of science as a basis for unquestioned belief (Lynch, 
1993 p 59). 
Bloor (1976) characterises the ·principles" of the strong programme in 
terms of an undertaking to produce a causal, impartial, symmetrical and 
reflexive examination of natural science. The enterprise is: causal, in that 
what is examined is the process by which knowledge and belief come 
about; impartial, because the objects under study should not be chosen 
on the basis of whether they later came to be accepted or rejected as 
science; symmetrical, in that the sociologists undertake to remain 
uninfluenced by the status of the object of study as true or false, and thus 
to carry out the same sorts of examination and to look for the same 
causes of belief regardless of such status; and reflexive, because the 
sociologists' conclusions about the generation of natural science should 
be equally applicable to sociology itself as a scientific enterprise. 
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The strong programme has by no means been the only school of thought 
that has arisen within SSK. On the contrary, a number of different 
pursuits have grown out of criticisms of and expansions on their 
"programme". One of these is what has been called the "empirical 
programme of relativism", most notably advocated by H M Collins and his 
Bath school (Collins, 1983, 1985; Pinch 1986). This programme consists 
of taking the publications and. accounts involved in scientific 
controversies as data for empirical case studies. The programme then 
utilises the impartial and symmetrical principles of the strong programme 
as central features in examining these two-sided, or multidimensional 
debates. The aim is to reveal how the irreconcilability of the competing 
srories is manifest. Moreover, keen interest is taken in the process by 
which closure of the dispute is achieved. The results of this enterprise 
have been to highlight that closure does not arise out of clear-cut and 
incontrovertible replication and replication failure, as claimed by its 
members, but through theory-driven and negotiated determinations by a 
"core set" of members involved in the controversy. 
Also centred around the strong programme's principles of impartiality and 
symmetry is the Discourse Analytic perspective on scientific discourse 
adopted by Gilbert and Mulkay (1984). In this enterprise, the published 
texts and interview discourse of scientists are compared to reveal two 
distinct "interpretative repertoires" (Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984), which 
Gilbert and Mulkay name the "Empiricist" and "Contingent" repertoires. 
Gilbert and Mulkay examine" the- highly incompatible -versions· of --
phenomena that these two repertoires represent, noting how the former 
is characteristic of published material, while the latter was more usually 
encountered in interview situations and other less formal interaction. The 
authors also note that the incompatibility of the repertoires has brought 
about its own handling system, as well as a variant of humour among 
scientists which exploits that very incompatibility. As has already been 
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discussed in Section D above, this work by Gilbert and Mulkay has been 
one of the most crucial influences responsible for the shaping of that 
variant of Discourse Analysis adopted in this thesis (see Section D). 
Another branch of SSK that has grown out of the strong programme has 
been the work known as Laboratory Studies. This programme has 
focused upon the incarnate, everyday practices of scientists within the 
laboratory, in order to inform an ethnographic approach to the social 
study of science (cf. Latour and Woolgar, 1979; Knoor-Cetina, 1981; 
Lynch, 1985). The claim is, that the social construction of science can be 
most concretely captured by observing the routine, daily unfolding of 
scientific practice. One of the major areas of interest in this programme 
has been the process by which facticity is established. This involves a 
predominantly discursive approach to scientific practice, again 
developing out of the work of Gilbert and Mulkay (1984). For example, it 
is observed that the process by which "facts" are established as scientific 
objects involves the discursive abandonment of qualifiers and references 
to authorship. 
The claim of Laboratory Studies to represent an observer's view of 
scientific practice has been criticised by Lynch (1993), who finds 
problematic the assertion that Laboratory Studies 
describe scientists' activities without buying into the scientists' 
preconceptions about the relevant objects of study (Lynch, 1993 p 96). 
Lynch points out that the wider culture· and society,·· to which the 
"observers" belong, will share many of those preconceptions held by "the 
tribe" of natural scientists (Latour and Woolgar, 1979). Moreover, the so-
called "observers" are also co-members, along with the "observed~, of the 
intermediate category of "scientists" and will thus share yet more of the 
preconceptions of their "subjects". In this way, the reformulations of the 
sociologists cannot help but include many of the scientists' referents 
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without redescription, thereby very much "buying into the scientists' 
preconceptions". 
This criticism of Laboratory Studies is fundamentally about its failure to 
see its own activity as an example of that which it attempts to study. 
Ironically, eleven years earlier, Lynch (1982) objected to the work of 
Latour and Woolgar (1979) on the basis that they warranted their 
analysis precisely by highlighting the similarity of their own activities and 
those of the scientists they studied. The programme of Laboratory 
Studies is, however, not alone in raising this question of "reflexivity" 
(Bloor, 1976). Indeed, so strong is the accusation that SSK does not 
adequately embody the principle of reflexivity, that a whole area of 
enquiry has arisen which takes this principle as its primary focus and title. 
It is towards this area of enquiry that I will now turn. 
H REFLEXIVITY 
As explained above, reflexivity is a topiC for SSK and the Social Studies 
of Science which some authors have taken up as their central focus. The 
principle of reflexivity is an extension of another of Bloors (1976) 
principles, that of symmetry, to include the social scientisfs own 
activities. Thus, not only is the symmetrical examination of "true" and 
"false" scientific objects required, but this symmetry is extended towards 
the relationship between how the natural sciences are to be treated and 
how that treatment is itself to be treated. Thus, reflexivity focuses upon 
. ,,',,- -... - .. - ... .."~.--. -. --'"-'---'-''' .~---,' 
the sociologisfs own practices as examples of the doing of science. In 
this way, the constructed nature of the social scientisfs own gloss of 
participants' accounts is acknowledged and its own rhetorical 
organisation is highlighted. According to Bloor (1976) reflexivity is 
an obvious requirement of principle because otherwise sociology would be 
a standing refutation of its own theories (Bloor, 1976 p 5). 
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One manifestation of this reflexive interest is known as "New Literary 
Forms". This reflexive approach acknowledges that the textual form of a 
discursive practice promotes a certain representation of reality. In this 
case, the scientific write-up is viewed in terms of a textual form, whose 
rhetorical structure privileges only one construction of reality above all 
others. The explorations of New Literary Forms are an attempt to adopt 
alternative textual devices and organisations and thus promote 
alternative realities. In doing so, they shed a contrastive light on the 
consequences of the predominant literary form in which science is 
presented. Writers such as Mulkay (1985), Woolgar and Ashmore (1988), 
Pinch and Pinch (1988) and Ashmore (1989), employ such novel textual 
forms as: dialogue with alternative voices, play scripts, encyclopaedic 
formats and parody, in order to accomplish their social scientific 
contributions in a manner that exemplifies their arguments (which, it 
should be noted, are not uniformly in favour of the commitment to 
reflexivity - see Pinch and Pinch, 1988). 
Two observations on this enterprise are particularly notable with 
reference to the current text. Firstly, Mulkay (1985) observes that it is not 
only the discourse of scientists and politiCians that exhibits "textual 
asymmetry" (Mulkay, ·1985 p 101). A similar asymmetry is equally evident 
in sociological texts. In this way, 
whereas members' accounts are treated as defective 'folk thecries', 
analysts' accounts are treated as accurate 'scientific theories' (Mulkay, 
1985 p 6). 
Secondly, Potter (1988) asserts that Discourse Analysis is itself a New 
Literary Form. His rationale for this claim is that the discourse analytic 
write-up includes within itself passages of the discourse under analysis. 
As a result, unlike in traditional forms of social scientific text, discourse 
analysts document their "entire reasoning process from discursive 
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materials to conclusions" (Potter, 1988 p 49). Potter concludes that this 
textual organisation makes the analyst's readings explicitly visible as 
constructs. Meanwhile, 
the reader is given the opportunity, indeed challenged, to offer alternative 
readings or better constructions (Potter, 1988 p 49). 
Moving on to the broader reflexive enterprise, Woolgar (1988) makes a 
distinction between two types of reflexivity. The first of these, which he 
calls "constitutive reflexivity", he attributes to Garfinkel's (1967) 
ethnomethodological understanding of the documentary method (see 
Section B above), which he interprets as suggesting that all acts of 
representation involve 
an intimate interdependence between the surface appearance (document) 
and the associated underlying reality (object). The sense of the former is 
elaborated by drawing on 'knowledge of the latter; at the same time, the 
sense of the latter is elaborated by what is known about the former 
(Woolgar, 1988 p 21). 
In this way, the accounts of the world that members make, actually 
participate in constituting that world (cf. Garfinkel, 1967 p 8). Woolgar 
explains that Garfinkel's insistence on the interdependence between 
representations of the world and the world 'out there', runs counter to the 
traditional beliefs which underlie the natural sciences, whereby 
representation and 'reality' are seen as entirely independent, particularly 
in the sense of the latter's immutability in relation to the former . 
. Although such an incompatibility of approaches renders the issue of -
reflexivity problematic for the natural sciences, Woolgar suggests that a 
second form of reflexivity is compatible with scientific pursuits and is 
embraced by them. This form of reflexivity he calls "benign introspection" 
which, he explains, "entails loose injunctions to 'think about what we are 
doing" and tend to take the form of "fieldwork confessions" that are 
merely appended to the end of entirely unreflexive texts in order to 
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"provide the 'inside story' on how the research was done" (Woolgar, 1988 
p 22). 
Woolgar concludes that the social sciences find themselves in a position 
between these two enterprises, having trouble with constitutive reflexivity 
in particular, because 
social science is attracted by the constructivist undertones of constitutive 
reflexivity in its literary mood, but repelled by the implications for its own 
pretensions to produce a 'scientific' social study (Woolgar, 1988 p 22). 
Lynch (1993) proposes a similar distinction between two types of 
reflexivity. In this case, Garfinkel's ethnomethodological reflexivity is 
again identified as the first distinct type. He terms this "incarnate" 
reflexivity and characterises it as: "unavoidable"; having "no antonym"; 
and as having "to do with contextual placement and background 
understandings" (Lynch, 1993 p 36). This is then contrasted with a 
second type, which he calls "referential reflexivity", naming Pollner (1991) 
as an advocate. According to Lynch, referential reflexivity is 
a matter of explicitly interpreting, reflecting on, and saying out loud (Lynch, 
1993 p 37). 
It is therefore "avoidable" and can be considered in terms of degrees -
one can be more or less reflexive, depending upon the amount of 
attention paid to one's own activities as a focus for analytical 
examination. 
However, Lynch contrasts greatly with Woolgar on where this distinction 
leads him. For, while Woolgar focuses on and attempts to explore the 
paradox that the two forms of reflexivity present for the social scientist, 
Lynch embraces the former as a fundamental, while largely dismissing 
the latter. Lynch does not reject "referential reflexivity" out of hand, 
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however. Instead, he merely relegates it to a topic of "occasional 
appropriateness" and interest. summing it up as 
pausing to consider what one has just said, thinking out loud, admitting 
self-doubt, wondering whether others see things in the same way that you 
do, confessing bias, and so on (Lynch, 1993 p 37). 
He then accuses Po liner and other followers of this path, of replacing the 
foundationalism of scientistic tendencies with an equally foundationalist 
treatment of the activities that members employ to construct the world. 
Drawing on the critique by Button and Sharrock (1993) he concludes that 
In place of :houghts or ideas in older antiobjectivist traditions, these studies 
install social, textual, interaction ai, and rhetorical practices and devices 
(Lynch, 1993 p 38). 
This is by no means the only critical reaction to reflexivity from within 
SSK, nor have New Literary Forms escaped criticism. Indeed, other 
authors are far more vehement in their rejection. Collins and Yearley 
(1992), for example, are extremely critical of any claim that reflexivity 
might represent progress within SSK. The extent of their acceptance of 
reflexivity amounts only to the conclusion that "there is a living and some 
joy in" it (Collins and Yearley, 1992 p 309. See also Collins, 1989) 
Meanwhile, they characterise the "escalation of scepticism" in SSK, of 
which reflexivity is a part, as a game of chicken, in this case 
"epistemological chicken", and conclude that the "relativist regress" of the 
escalation from nelativism through discourse analysis and "new literary 
forms' to neflexivity ... leads us to have nothing to say (Collins and Yearley, 
1992 p 302). 
These authors take issue with the satirical statement by Woolgar and 
Ashmore (1988) that 
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The exploralion of reflexivity is the next natural development of the 
relativist-constructivist perspective in the social study of science (Woolgar 
and Ashmore, 1988 p 7). 
They claim that simply packaging this statement in a tongue-in-cheek 
style does not mean that its message is thereby entirely undermined. 
Ironically, according to Latour (1988), such an accomplishment is the 
very defining feature of the reflexive enterprise itself, for he regards 
reflexivity as 
any text that takes into account its own production and which, by doing so, 
claims to undo the deleterious effects upon its readers of being believed 
too little or too much (Latour, 1988 p 166). 
However, Latour also has reservations about the usefulness of reflexivity 
as an analytic focus. In Latcur's case, this is because he believes that the 
risk of being believed too much is not as great as that of being believed 
too little (Latour, 1988 P 170; see also Chapter 4 Section B4). 
A SPACE BETWEEN THE DISCIPLINES 
Within this chapter, an attempt has been made to identify, relate and 
contrast a number of disciplines and approaches as significant in the 
fashioning of this current work. In addition, not by mere coincidence, this 
representation of the literature has, it is hoped, created a space within 
which my own work can be positioned. It is intended that this space and 
my own occupation of it will be made clear in Chapter 4, in which 
methodological considerations are discussed. Before such a task is 
undertaken, however, a more detailed inspection of some pertinent 
literature will be made in Chapter 3. Unlike the simple presentation of 
relevant research and theory adopted in this chapter, Chapter 3 will adopt 
a critical approach to its subject matter. In this way some of the literature 
concerning power in the research relationship will be examined, attending 
to its rhetorical organisation and the mechanisms by which it 
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accomplishes the social business of determining what the research 
relationship comes to be. 
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CHAPTER 3 POWER AND THE RESEARCH 
RELATIONSHIP: A REFLEXIVE LOOK AT THE 
ACADEMIC DEBATE 
A INTRODUCTION 
1 REFLEXIVITY 
In Chapter 2 Section H, Reflexivity was discussed as an enterprise within 
SSK and the Social Studies of Science, whereby the practices of the 
social scientists themselves are acknowledged to be as rhetorical as 
those of the natural scientists they study. However, reflexivity is not 
exclusive to studies of science. Instead, reflexivity can be understood 
more broadly as the process of stepping back from participation in a 
social activity to look at that activity itself as a subject of study. In this 
chapter, I would like to enter into an ongoing reflexive debate within a 
rather different type of social science. Within this debate we find social 
scientists asking reflexive questions about the internal power dynamics of 
social scientific research, with a view to democratising and equalising the 
social relationships within it. 
Some of the most notable contributors to this enterprise have been 
feminist writers. On the one hand, this may have resulted from their 
primary commitment to gender equality, which has provided theoretical 
and empirical resources that are easily adapted to more generalised 
issues of power and equality. While on the other, their philosophy of 
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experiential and subjective knowledge makes self-analysis singularly 
appropriate. As a result, I shall be placing the emphasis of my discussion 
on the feminist writings in this area, although the work in critical 
ethnography and psychology, which has addressed these feminist 
writings, will also be included. 
The aim of this chapter is to deconstruct the debate about power in the 
research relationship, using the perspectives of discourse analysis and 
social studies of science. Presenting the debate itself as a rhetorical and 
discursive interaction, I will show how the dilemmas 'it attempts to resolve 
are central to the accomplishment of research as an enterprise - both in 
the field during data collection and in the academic arena of justification 
and criticism. In this way, the question of power in the research 
relationship will be dealt with in a way that highlights the manner in which 
power is built through the practice of academia itself. It is hoped that my 
own subversion and partial reversal of some of the tropes through which 
that power is manifest, will help to expose their operation. Under 
particular scrutiny will be the asymmetrical treatment of data and previous 
academic research in warranting a current argument. The difference 
would appear to rest on fundamental assumptions about ability. 
Academics are impliCitly assumed to be in a position to judge the actions 
of those they study. Once this assumption is in place, the academic 
pursuit involves merely the question of whether or not those judgements 
are deemed correct by fellow academics. Participants, meanwhile, 
are not treated seriously as being able to speak the truth about their own 
"lives (Shotter; 1990 p168). ... '" 
Put another way, while previous research is normally drawn upon as 
supportive "fact" or refutable error, the discourse of participants is treated 
as social action. In this Chapter, an attempt has been made to redress 
some of this asymmetry. By highlighting its accomplishment of social 
action, rather than debating its veracity, some of the relevant literature is 
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treated in a manner more usually reserved for the handling of data. In this 
way, the relevant theories are neither rejected nor endorsed, but are 
examined for their rhetorical deployment within the academic debate. It 
should be noted, however, that the academic literature that appears in 
this chapter is not universally treated in this symmetrical manner. As 
academia remains the arena in which the current text makes its 
contribution, some of the relevant literature will continue to be marshalled 
for "expert" support and other writings will be reworked so as to ratify my 
argument (see also Chapter 4 Section D 2). I make no apology for this 
form of asymmetry, and take as endorsement for this the words of 
Condor (Unpublished) who, with reference to "enlisting" the voices of 
participants, insists that social scientists 
are, in fact, highly selective in which voices we allow to 'speak for 
themselves' (Condor, Unpublished p 13). 
The argument in question is set out in the following sub-section. 
2 THE DYNAMIC AND NEGOTIATED PRODUCTION OF 
RESEARCH 
Fundamental to the critical enterprise of this chapter, are two related 
insights from ethnomethodology and CA, introduced in Chapter 2. The 
first of these is the "Documentary method of interpretation" of Garfinkel 
(1967) (see Chapter 2 Section 8). According to the "Documentary 
method", a concrete instance is treated as exemplifying a pre-existing 
underlying pattern and yet is also understood by reference to that 
. --~~ -". - .~-.,~,;.:"-.-~,-"~---,.-",, ... ~.--... -,-., .. ,--,,~. --"--,~.~ .. 
underlying pattern - each informing the other. 
The second insight comes from the CA of institutions (See Chapter 2 
Section F) and is summed up by Heritage (1984) who states that 
it is within ... local sequences of talk, and only there, that ... institutions are 
ultimately and accountably talked into being (Heritage, 1984 p 290). 
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If we take these two insights together and apply them to research we 
may conclude that: what gets to be counted as the institution of 
research is the dynamic and negotiated product of the interaction 
which takes place within it It is a dynamic product, in the sense that 
research is ongoingly brought into being by individual instances of talk 
and text. Meanwhile, it is a negotiated product, in the sense that any 
individual instance of such talk or text may be accepted or rejected as an 
example of that institution on the basis of its relation to the "presupposed 
underlying pattern" of other members, yet, at the same time, will be 
produced and interpreted in the light of what each member makes 
interactionally relevant about "what is known" of that "underlying pattern" 
(Garfinkel, 1967 p 78). Furthermore, what material gets to be counted as 
"within" the institution of research and who gets to be counted as a 
member, will be established in a similarly dynamic and negotiated 
manner. It should also be noted that this chapter is itself engaged in such 
a process. I present myself as a member of the institution (See Chapter 4 
Section 83a, on the question of "personal attributes"); I enter into the 
interaction via this particular piece of text; and I contribute to the 
establishment of research as a discrete institution. For example, I outline 
two arenas as included "within" the institution - the academic community 
and the research encounter. 
With this perspective in mind, let us examine in more detail how the 
debate over power has unfolded. 
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B HIERARCHICAL RESEARCH AND THE EGALITARIAN 
ALTERNATIVE 
1 THE FEMINIST ALTERNATIVE 
One of the most influential articles critiquing traditional social science 
research was Oakley (1981). In this article she highlighted "a 
contradiction at the heart of the textbook paradigm" for research 
interviews (Oakley, 1981 p 33). According to Oakley, this contradiction is 
made up of two competing methodological aims, which are 
the warmth required to generate 'rapport' and the detachment necessary to 
see the interviewee as an object under surveillance (Oakley, 1981 p 33). 
The problem for Oakley was that the over-evaluation of the latter aim to 
the exclusion of the fonmer, in line with "classical ... gender stereotyping" 
(Oakley, 1981 p 38), was having a detrimental effect on the quality of 
research. Oakley strongly believed in the necessity for interviewees to 
receive some personal satisfaction from the interview in order to 
encourage a willingness to share their lives with the interviewer and, in 
the case of longitudinal studies, to maintain attendance at subsequent 
interviews. She therefore rejected the detached and instrumental 
relationship of the researcher as expert manipulator of data sources -
who just so happen to be human beings - and in its place called for 
researchers to adopt a compassionate and involved relationship with 
interviewees and their realities. 
Perhaps even more influential upon subsequent feminist writings than the 
contradiction between detachment and involvement, was Oakley's 
concern with researcher power and the hierarchical nature of "the 
paradigm of the 'proper' interview" (Oakley, 1981 p 38). Oakley argued 
that the relationship of the interviewer and interviewee is assumed, 
without question, to be a hierarchical one, so that the successful 
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accomplishment of the interview is attributed solely to the interviewer's 
expertise. Interviewees are treated as subordinates from whom 
information is to be extracted, while the interviewer offers little information 
in return. This leads Oakley to conclude that 
the convention of interviewer-interviewee hierarchy is a rationalisation of 
inequality; what is good for interviewers is not necessarily good for 
interviewees (Oakley, 1981 p 40). 
Meanwhile her own recommendation is that the most will be found out 
from interviewing, where the interview relationship is "non-hierarchical" 
and where the interviewer invests their "own personal identity" into that 
relationship (Oakley, 1981 p 41). 
As I have stated, although the anti-hierarchical, anti-exploitative agenda 
was not Oakley's primary concern, it functioned as a catalyst to a school 
of feminist methodologists, who Stacey (1988) lists as including: Cornwell 
(1984); Duelli Klein (1983); Du Bois (1983); Mies (1983); Reinhartz 
(1983); Stanley and Wise (1983a, 1983b), and whose goal Stacey (1988) 
summarises as being to 
assault the hierarchical, exploitative relations of conventional research, 
urging feminist researchers to seek instead an egalitarian research 
process characterised by authenticity, reciprocity, and intersubjectivity 
between the researcher and her 'subjects' (Stacey, 1988 p 22). 
Furthermore, this is not a goal that has been abandoned in the years 
between Stacey's writing and my own. (See, for example, the writing of 
Andersen, 1993 and lather, 1994.) .,_", ... 
In order to from an idea of this altemative methodology, let us briefly look 
at three theorists: 
Mies (1983), insists that feminist researchers are placed in a 
"schizophrenic situation" because of a contradiction in their role: between 
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the political objectives of the women's movement and the positivist 
methodology of "an hierarchical, non-reciprocal relationship between 
research subject and research object" (Mies, 1983 p 120). In this, and her 
article of 1990, she outlines a list of methodological postulates designed 
to achieve a theoretical and methodological foundation for a feminist 
social science that would be true to the commitment to Women's 
Liberation. Perhaps the most relevant· of these, for the present 
discussion, is that which calls for a reversal in the ''vertical relationship 
between researcher and 'research objects'" in which the "view from 
above" is replaced by "the view from below" (Mies, 1983). Mies insists 
that for this to be achieved, research must be transferred from the service 
of dominant elites and into the service of the exploited and oppressed, 
women in particular (Mies, 1983 p 123). To this moral objection, Mies 
adds a methodological objection, explaining that the hierarchical nature 
of the research relationship engenders a distrust and a feeling of 
interrogation in the participants which will have a detrimental affect upon 
their responses. 
Meanwhile, Stanley and Wise (1983b) advocate a strategy of intentionally 
increasing the vulnerability of the researcher by removing her detached 
and unexplicated status and instead locating her as central to the 
research process. This recommendation is made on the basis that 
placing 'us' in the research as well as 'them' does something to even up the 
imbalance of power between researchers and researched, though it 
obviously can't remove it (Stanley and Wise, 1983b p 181). 
A further example is Comwell (1984), who sums up traditional methods 
as "manipulating people and calculatedly treating them as objects in 
order to get what one wants out of them" (Comwell, 1984 p 12). She 
states that her alternative to this was to follow the interest of her 
interviewees, allowing them to dictate the flow of topics in the interview. 
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2 THE DIALOGIC AL TERNA TlVE 
Much more recently, Sampson (1991, 1993) has advocated a similar 
drive for a more egalitarian research process, this time within 
Psychology. Sampson (1993) proposes that current psychology is 
founded upon a monologic or self-celebratory perspective in which, as a 
dominant group, psychologists construct "serviceable Others" designed 
to meet their own needs and desires. As a result, the interaction between 
them occurs only from a single standpoint, with the Other, in this case the 
. participant, merely reflecting back what the Self elects to be. As an 
alternative, Sampson presents Dialogic Psychology as a perspective 
which focuses, not on the isolated individual, but on the dialogue that 
takes place between social actors. A methodology based upon this 
perspective would treat both researcher and researched as equally 
independent entities, each bringing their own distinct position to the 
interaction. Drawing on Feminist and Ethnographic writings (of which the 
above are examples), Sampson (1991, 1993) proposes that such a 
methodology would acknowledge the mutual construction of self and 
other in the research process. In this way, neither the knowledge of the 
expert nor of the cultural performer would be privileged above the other. 
Central to this perspective, according to Sampson, will be the co-
authorship of academic texts and a concern with the mechanisms by 
which indigenous constructions of self render social life meaningful for 
members. 
3 PROBLEMS WITH THE ALTERNATIVE METHODOLOGIES 
.. " -- _.-.. :.- .. ., ............... -_.- .- - -.. 
Within the work of the feminist writers discussed in Section 1 above, it 
seems that the solution to the contradiction between the hierarchical 
nature of the research relationship and the egalitarianism of feminist 
philosophy, is to thoroughly alter the research encounter itself and to run 
it along the lines of an involved, unexploitative and reciprocal 
relationship. However, the work that has attempted to carry out this 
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objective, has since been criticised and accused of being merely an 
alternative, more disguised, manifestation of inequality and exploitation. 
Central in this arena have been Ribbens (1989), and Stacey (1988) both 
of whom could be said to argue that the "egalitarian researcher" is a 
contradiction in terms. 
Ribbens (1989) explores the power dilemmas of the feminist researcher, 
asking 
how do we ... acknowledge our power and yet deal with feminist concerns 
with intimacy, reciprocity. and collaboration? (Ribbens, 1989 p 580). 
Meanwhile, Stacey (1988) titles her article "Can there be a feminist 
ethnography?" and examines the compatibilities and contradictions 
between ethnographic methodology and the feminist principles of 
subjectivity, reciprocity and anti-exploitation. For both these writers, it 
appears that the alternative methodologists' attempts to adhere to 
egalitarianism prove to be as exploitative as the authoritarianism that 
their approach was developed to criticise (an observation that will be 
examined in more detail in Section D). 
Similarly, the dialogic alternative of Sampson (1991, 1993) has been 
criticised for its practical realisability. Condor (Unpublished) has 
highlighted parallel pragmatic limitations to the achievement of 
Sampson's goal to those directed at the feminist methodologists. In 
addition, Condor makes the rather more damning accusation that some 
of the commitments expounded by Sampson are barely evident in the 
writings he cites as examples of his dialogic approach. 
What we are thereby left with is an apparently irresolvable dilemma for 
the institution of research. Neither the traditional hierarchical relationship, 
nor the alternative egalitarian relationship, seems to produce an 
acceptably democratic social encounter. Within the mainstream of social 
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scientific thought, this situation represents a major sticking point, a 
paradox that must be resolved before further development can take 
place. However, from the perspective of discursive and rhetorical 
analysis, it is this very dilemma which allows for the institution of research 
to function. 
C "SOCIOLOGICAL AMBIVALENCE";. WORKING WITH 
THE CONTRADICTION 
1 NORMS AND COUNTER-NORMS 
Billig et al (1988) argue that it is the dilemmas of social life that provide 
the opportunity for members to interactively accomplish their social 
business. Much of this perspective is founded upon the insights of Merton 
(1976). Merton examined a phenomenon which he called "sociological 
ambivalence", explaining that 
in its most restricted sense, sociological ambivalence refers to incompatible 
normative expectations incorporated in a single role of a single social 
status (Merton, 1976 p 6. Emphasis in originaL). 
It is Merton's belief that the very incompatibility of a social role's dominant 
norms and subsidiary counter-norms is essential to its successful 
accomplishment. This is because, according to Merton, striving to attain 
merely the dominant norms would result in a dysfunctional inflexibility in 
the face of the infinite variability of social interaction. Instead, 
a dynamic alternation of norms and counter-norms ... evolves as a social 
device for helping people in designated statuses to cope with the 
contingencies they face in trying to fulfil their functions (Merton, 1976 p 18). 
One of Merton's clearest examples of this phenomenon is the conflicting 
requirements of the physician to be at one and the same time 
detached/neutral and friendly/concerned. He suggests that the detached 
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neutrality of the physician as scientific expert conflicts with the 
compassionate concern necessary in the physician as health carer. 
Attending to only one of these norms is not sufficient for achieving 
recognition as a "good" practitioner. Instead, the "good" physician is 
required to oscillate between the two norms in a context-dependant, 
interactional manner. 
It appears to me, that Merton's notion of sociological ambivalence, 
especially as regards the contradiction in the physician's role, maps 
perfectly onto the contradiction in the researcher's role identified by 
Oakley (1981). Thus, the excessive concern with only the dominant norm 
of detached neutrality within the guide-lines for "good" research, could be 
seen to result in a similar failure on the part of the researcher to that of 
the physician. Meanwhile, the "dynamic alternation" between detachment 
and "rapport"-building concern, according to the contingencies of the 
ever-changing context, may be presented as affording the flexibility 
necessary for the successful management of this complex social 
encounter. 
2 AUTHORITARIANISM VERSUS EGALITARIANISM 
Merton's concept of sociological ambivalence has, however, yet more to 
offer this debate, for, as I have discussed above, the feminist (and other) 
writings on altemative methodology have highlighted the hierarchical 
nature of the research process, and set up egalitarianism as their 
. altemative goar. In· doing this, these writers could be said to have 
instituted yet another set of incompatible norms in the researcher's role -
between authoritarianism and egalitarianism. It is here that the work of 
BUlig et al (1988) comes into its own. For, while Merton (1976) focused 
upon the detachmentlinvolvement contradiction, in a chapter entitled 
"Expertise and Equality", these later writers utilise Merton's concept of 
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sociological ambivalence to examine what they identify as the dilemma of 
the modern expert. 
According to Billig et al (1988), the modern expert is presented with the 
following dilemma. On the one hand, expertise in a given area grants the 
expert an authoritative position compared to non-experts. Indeed, some 
idea of the form that this authority can take is presented by Addleson 
(1983), who suggests that scientific specialists do not possess the 
authority to command obedience or make either public or private financial 
decisions. Instead, specialists are accorded "epistemological or cognitive 
authority", so that 
we take their understandings of factual matters and the nature of the world 
within their sphere of expertise as knowledge, or as the definitive 
understanding (Addleson, 1983 p 165). 
On the other hand, however, Billig et al argue that in contemporary 
society, the desirability of being democratic is "taken for granted" (p 77). 
This cultural assumption renders authoritarianism unacceptable and 
requires that the expert instead acts in a democratically egalitarian 
manner. Thus, the expert must, in effect, 
balance the competing aims of equality and authority (Billig et ai, 1988 p 
77). 
These writers then go on to examine how the dilemmatically opposed 
norms of authoritarianism and egalitarianism will form a situation of 
sociological ambivalence that actually. provides the expert with the 
flexibility that the fluid and variable interactive context requires. 
3 "DOING EGAUTARIANISM": AN EXPERT SKILL 
One additional insight of Billig et al should also be noted here. For, these 
writers also identified an ironic state of affairs in which the dilemmatic 
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aspect of the expert's situation can actually be circumvented. According 
to these authors there is expertise involved in the "doing" of 
egalitarianism. In order to illustrate this idea they use the example of a 
child development centre and its relationship with the families in therapy, 
suggesting that 
expertise, which must use kindness and sensitivity in 'winning over' the 
'mums', emphasizes the gap between the experts and the non-experts. 
And the more sensitivity which is shown, the more the inequality is 
emphasized, because the sensitivity itself is part of the expertise which 
separates the expert from the recipient of expertise (Billig et ai, 1988 p 82). 
In this way behaviour directed at the goal of egalitarianism can 
simultaneously enhance authority, if not authoritarianism, for the skills 
required in making the social relationship an equitable one are 
themselves evidence of both power and expertise. 
Billig et al (1988) do not directly apply their discussion to the dilemma of 
the researcher as expert. Yet it seems to me that the debate under 
examination in this chapter recommends this particular expert role as a 
paradigm example. 
In this debate we see that a reflexive look at the research relationship 
"discovered" the norm of authoritarianism in traditional methodology. The 
reaction against this "discovery" appears as a clear example of the 
, unexplicated Westem assumption that undemocratic social relations are 
undesirable. For, the altemative methodologists not only take great pains 
to "uncover" the various dimensions of inequality in the research 
..... , . encounter'; establishing in' thisway'that there-are inequalities in need of 
disclosure and taking command of that task - but more fundamentally, 
they are very much in the business of rectifying these inequalities and 
instituting a counter-norm of democracy in their place. 
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The next step in the development of the debate then emerges, in which 
critics such as Ribbens (1989) and Stacey (1988) demonstrate that, even 
in the alternative methodologists' ostensible pursuit of democracy as a 
replacement, the norm of authority endures. This leads such critics to ask 
whether authority can be entirely abandoned when carrying out 
"research" and instead to talk of balancing the two competing aims. 
When the debate over power in the research relationship is presented as 
an example of SOciological ambivalence, we find ourselves stepping 
outside the epistemological search to find a theoretical solution to the 
authoritarian/egalitarian contradiction in the researcher's role. Instead, 
our attention is drawn to the rhetorical contexts of the two arenas in 
which research takes place: the academic circles in which researchers 
and critics interact; and the research encounter in which the researcher 
and the researched interact. In both cases our focus shifts towards the 
situated work that manages the contradiction in response to the dynamic 
and negotiated context. The remainder of this chapter will therefore 
attend to the former of these cases, while Chapter 5 will tackle the 
second rhetorical context, of the research encounter. 
The application of Merton's (1976) Sociological Ambivalence to the 
research relationship which follows, centres around one important 
additional consideration - that of rhetoric and argumentation. Merton 
himself talks of the necessity for flexibility in handling social interaction 
and the operativeness of oscillating between competing norms. However, 
. he !lelJe~ ~xplicitly accou.nts for wh.at renders this flexibility and oscillation 
necessary. As discussed in Chapter 2 Section D, discourse analysis is 
highly sensitive to the rhetorical nature of discursive interaction. Social 
actors are understood to be ongoingly engaged in the construction of a 
moral order, in which competing versions of the world are worked up by 
interactants over the course of their blamings, warrants, justifications, 
self-presentations and other similar actions. I would argue that it is this 
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atmosphere of contention that makes flexibility and oscillation 
indispensable. I would also like to stress that, in the accomplishment of 
the role of the researcher, this is a particularly rhetorical matter. 
In studies of the rhetoric of science it is understood that science is 
intimately bound up with the process of persuasion. The many and 
various authors engaged in the "literary tu m" in the social studies of 
science document the persuasive organisation of scientific discourse 
(e.g. Knorr-Cetina and Mulkay, 1983). The nature of this persuasive 
environment is explicated by Oanziger (1990). Danziger emphasises that 
science is primarily about making "knowledge claims", which are only 
converted into "knowledge" by way of a process of acceptance - by other 
scientists, those in control of the resources for research, and the general 
public (p 180). Oanziger therefore insists that the production of 
knowledge is shaped from the outset by the anticipation of this 
acceptance. In other words, the public arena of science is a highly 
rhetorical one, in which positions are attacked and defended (Oanziger, 
1990 p 12). 
D PROBLEMS WITH EGALITARIAN RESEARCH 
ADDRESSED FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF 
SOCIOLOGICAL AMBIVALENCE 
Within this final section I will examine the criticisms of altemative 
... methodology by Ribbens (1989) and to a lesser extent by Stacey (1988) 
and Condor (Unpublished), from the perspective of sociological 
ambivalence. The aim will be !o recast these critical insights, from 
irresolvable problems, into welcome rhetorical leeways which allow for 
the ongoing constitution of research as an institution. 
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1 ON DOING BEING EGALITARIAN 
I would like to begin by looking at the rhetorical accomplishment of 
acceptable research in the academic arena that is achieved by "doing 
being egalitarian" (cf. Sacks, 1984), as accessed by the criticisms of 
Ribbens (1989) Stacey (1988) and Condor (Unpublished) 
a) Collaboration 
One of the major concerns of "egalitarian" researchers, that all three of 
the above authors attend to, (each addressing themselves to their 
appropriate field) is that of collaboration. Ribbens sums up the inequality 
under scrutiny, saying that "the greatest power sociologists may have [is] 
to define other people's realities for them and for others." (Ribbens, 1989 
p 589). Stacey (1988) echoes this sentiment as follows: 
In the last instance an ethnography is a written document structured 
primarily by a researcher's purposes, offering a researcher's 
interpretations, registered in a researcher's voice (Stacey, 1988 p 23). 
Meanwhile Condor (Unpublished) accounts for this disparity in the 
"purposes", "interpretations" and ''voice" of the researcher and the 
researched. The key, according to Condor, lies in the dissimilarity 
between the rhetorical circumstances of the original elicitation and those 
in which the research write-up is presented. Given the entirely alien 
environment in which the participant's narrative is marshalled as a 
contribution to academic work, it is unsurprising that the participant's 
story should be repackaged so as to accomplish discursive business for 
. the -researcher. It is thiS process of transformation that Condor points to 
as responsible for the redefinition of participant realities. 
Each of these writers then observes that egalitarian researchers have 
presented collaboration as a method for mediating this power to 
(re)define the realities of participants. Within this collaborative solution, 
64 
intelViewees are invited to take part in authorial and editorial decisions 
and are thus given the opportunity to present their own realities to their 
audience. In this way, it is argued that reciprocity is achieved and an 
egalitarian/dialogic relationship is established between researcher and 
researched. 
However, Ribbens identifies a paradox in this proposal, for, she asks, 
what do I do if my interviewees disagree with what I write? (Rib bens, 1989 
p 589). 
Similarly, she asks, what happens if the researcher disagrees with her 
participants' representation of reality? For example, if a feminist seeks to 
research non- or even anti-feminist women. Interestingly, there is an 
underlying assumption of greater researcher power within both of these 
concerns. Ribbens does not ask what to do if the researcher disagrees 
with what the intelViewees write. Instead, it is taken for granted that the 
researcher will do the writing, even in a relationship of "collaboration". 
Neither does Ribbens ask what to do if the participants disagree with the 
researcher's representation of reality. Again it is the latter that is taken for 
granted. Participants' perspectives may "deviate" from the researcher's, 
but the whole research project will not be expected to change in 
theoretical orientation in line with such deviations. 
Stacey (1988), meanwhile, focuses on a slightly different dimension of 
the paradox, asking who should have the power to inclUde or exclude 
data in the write-up. Stacey talks of instances when her participants have 
used their status as authorial collaborators to veto the inclusion of 
sections of the data. Again, it is interesting to note that the participants 
are only offered the power of veto and no more. 
Although Condor (Unpublished) acknowledges that collaboration is a 
"practical impossibility" (p 9), she does not elaborate on this obselVation. 
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This is because, despite Sampson's (1991, 1993) major emphasis on co-
authorship within dialogic psychology, Condor can find little or no 
commitment to collaboration by the authors he cites as examples of this 
approach. In the light of such a criticism, a discussion of the paradoxes of 
co-authorship become redundant to her argument. 
Let us now apply the notion of sociological ambivalence to the paradoxes 
of collaboration highlighted by Ribbens (1989) and Stacey (1988). From 
this perspective, it appears that adhering solely to the counter-norm of 
egalitarianism undermines the ·cognitive authority" (Addleson, 1983) of 
the researcher, which, as discussed above, is an intrinsic and constitutive 
dimension of research as a social institution. The point here, is that the 
warrant for the researcher expending valuable resources is founded on a 
belief in her specialised knowledge and competence. Thus, if participants 
are considered to be equally knowledgeable and competent to define and 
represent their own realities, questions begin to emerge as to what 
contribution researchers can possibly offer to society. 
For Ribbens and Stacey, such paradoxes create an impasse in the 
execution of acceptable research. This is because, claiming a unique 
right to represent others' realities and abandoning all claim to such a 
unique right, both emerge as illegitimate enterprises for researchers. 
However, from the rhetorical perspective of sociological ambivalence, 
these same paradoxes are precisely the resources necessary for 
establishing the legitimacy of research. For, it is because of the very 
illegitimacy of the two extremes that a space is opened up in which 
research can operate. Here we see the single-minded pursuit of the norm 
of the researcher as expert authority and sole author undermined. We 
then find that the alternative counter-norm of complete 
interchangeability in the contributions of researcher and researched -
turns out to be equally unviable, in that it divests academic work of 
anything extra or unique to say. For Merton (1976) this in itself is the 
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answer, with the "dynamic altemation of norms and counter-norms" (p 18) 
serving as the mechanism by which the research enterprise obtains the 
flexibility to function in the face of the contingencies of interaction. 
In the argumentative arena in which academic work must be justified, by 
including collaboration in their research design, scholars can argue both 
for an egalitarian morality and for the status of researcher, depending on 
which of these is being called into question. Pointing to the co-authorship 
of their texts can be used to counter criticisms from influential sources 
outside the academic community, such as politicians or activists, that 
academic work is undemocratic and emanates from the unrealistic 
isolation of the ivory tower. Meanwhile, where a respondent's perspective 
is in danger of undermining the rhetorical work that the researcher sets 
out to accomplish, the superordinate expertise and objectivity of the 
researcher as scientist and observer can be called upon to legitimate 
their claims above those of the researched. These same accusations and 
defences are similarly available within the scientific community for 
attacking and defending relevant perspectives. This is the means by 
which authors can establish their own theories in the rhetorical and 
argumentative arena of the academic world itself. Thus, however 
authoritarian or egalitarian one is accused of being, the rhetorical 
equipment exists for defending oneself and for attacking rival positions. 
At the same time, it is the rhetorical opposition of these two contradictory 
altematives that provides the flexibility necessary to carry out the 
. complex social role of researcher during the research encounter. In this 
arena too, it is only by oscillating between the counter-aims of authority 
and egalitarianism that researchers can meet the ongoing interactive 
requirements of the local context - more of this in Chapter 5. 
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b) Topic selection 
Ribbens (1989) gives only a cursory mention of the issue of topic 
selection and who should have the power to decide. Ironically enough, 
she accuses other writers of seeming to "evade the issue" and then 
manages to evade it herself by moving on to a related concern. What she 
does say of this, however, is to quote Cannell and Kahn (1968) and draw 
attention to their "tacit suggestion" that topic saliency, respondent 
motivation and the "accuracy" of data will be closely related (Rib bens, 
1989 p 582). She then notes that these writers give no explicit attention 
to whether, in the light of this interrelation, participants should control the 
agenda - and then herself fails explicitly to deal with this issue. 
This dilemma over topic selection, although side-stepped by Ribbens, 
provides yet another example of how sociological ambivalence is 
managed by the "doing" of egalitarianism. The following quotations can 
be taken as examples of its presentation in egalitarian research: 
lI1X priority in composing the schedules for the interviews and interviewing 
people was, as much as possible, to take my cue from them, to /et them 
~ the course of the interview and to follow their interest in the topics 1 
proposed to them (Cornwell, 1984 p 12: emphasis added). 
By speaking in ways that open the boundaries of standard topics, we can 
create space for respondents to provide accounts rooted in the realities of 
their lives (Devault, 1990 p 99: emphasis added). 
How artfully these discourses display both equity and authority 
simultaneously. Informants are treated as active, cue-giving parties, 
. possessed of an "interest in topics" and living "realities" to "account" in 
their own ways. However, at the same time, it is the expert researcher 
who "composes", "proposes" and "creates" opportunities for these to be 
expressed. As in collaboration above, in such rhetorical packages 
egalitarian researchers can attend to both norms and present themselves 
as both egalitarian and expert simultaneously. 
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c) Friendships as reciprocity 
One of Ribbens's (1989) most central questions is 
how far are interviews different from other sorts of social encounters? 
(Ribbens, 1989 p 579). 
Ribbens is particularly concerned with how far interviews differ from 
friendships. This is because one of Oakley's central claims was that one 
index of the reciprocity of her relationship with her interviewees was the 
close friendships that had developed between them over the years 
following the research. To begin with, Ribbens points out that "the nature 
of friendship is not unidimensional" (Ribbens, 1989 p 585) and this leads 
her to question what, in fact, it means to declare that one is friends with 
ones interviewees. Furthermore, she argues that the emergence of 
friendships subsequent to a research relationship is not the best measure 
of reciprocal methodology. Instead, she is interested in 
how far it could work the other way around, so that a friendship could 
subsequently form the basis for collaborative research (Ribbens, 1989 p 
586). 
She notes the absence of such research within sociology, but that a 
psychological study by Orbach and Eichenbaum (1987) explored the 
topic of women's friendships using their own relationship. 
Ribbens's first question presented here, regarding the difference between 
interviews and other examples of social interaction, can be answered 
from the ethnomethodological perspective discussed in the introduction 
to this chapter. From such a viewpoint, interviews are "different from 
other sorts of social encounters" precisely to the extent to which they are 
jointly and dynamically constituted as such by members. Thus, it is 
Oakley's very inclusion of friendship as pertinent to the research 
relationship, that introduces friendship as an issue in that relationship. 
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The relevancy of the issue is then subject to interactive negotiation 
between other members of the academic community. In this way, when 
Ribbens calls Oakley's friendship index into question, she is 
demonstrating that the relevancy of such claims is a product which is 
ongoingly negotiated amongst members. In terms of sociological 
ambivalence, therefore, claims to an ability to make or to remain friends 
with one's participants, represent an account rhetorically designed to 
argue that egalitarianism has taken place. Whether or not such an 
account is then accepted, is for members to negotiate 1. 
d) Information as reciprocity 
Another of Oakley's claims to reciprocity is that she answered her 
interviewees' questions, rather than evading them in traditional style. 
However, this claim also promotes criticism from Ribbens (1989). 
Ribbens highlights Oakley's report that 76% of the questions put to her 
during the research interviews were requests for general information, 
rather than questions of a personal or sensitive nature, and concludes 
that 
This can hardly count as reciprocity in the mutual exchange of personal 
information (Ribbens, 1989 p 584). 
Ribbens suggests that researchers could go even further than merely 
answering candidly any personal questions by the participants, they 
could volunteer such information without being asked, thus equalising at 
least some of the vulnerability. Considered in terms of the goal of 
egalitarianism, such behaviour appears highly commendable. 
I The status of friendship in relation to the interaction which takes place in the separate arena of 
the research encounter will also be a product of the negotiation that takes place within it In 
Chapter 5 the issue of filial and sibling behaviour will be addressed as just such a negotiated and 
mutable product 
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Again, however, Ribbens identifies an important paradox created by such 
behaviour. The problem is that the voluntary offering of unsought 
personal information by the researcher may be seen in rather negative 
terms, for example, as a mere nuisance and interruption. However, more 
significantly, Ribbens wams that such behaviour represents a breach of 
what she considers to be a special research contract - one that gives 
participants "permission to do what is normally seen as an indulgence 
and socially reprehensible: to talk about oneself at length." (Ribbens, 
1989 p 584). 
An important feature of the above is that it highlights an imbalance that 
favours the researched. In this case, therefore, any move to treat 
researcher and researched equally, instead of benefiting participants, 
would actually deny them a privilege that more traditional research styles 
afforded them. This issue calls into question the implicit assumption 
amongst alternative methodologists, that all role differences between the 
researcher and the researched inherently favour the researcher, and that 
homogenising the power of the two will inherently benefit the researched. 
Instead, the possibility is raised, that in some respects the researched 
traditionally have greater power than the researcher, so that in such 
cases, developments along egalitarian lines will actually serve to 
disempower participants. 
Viewing decisions over the volunteering of information in terms of a 
paradox, once more recommends the perspective of sociological 
ambivalence. Here, we see that introducing a . reciprocal focus on 
personal information about the researcher can be represented either in 
terms of: a) substituting the detached invulnerability of the authoritarian 
with the egalitarian reciproCity of the democrat, or conversely, b) reneging 
on the empowering social contract that offers participants the special 
privilege of a unique spotlight for their concerns. Such a dilemmatic 
tension seems to me to offer yet another example of the potential for the 
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flexible management of research as a social, and argumentative, 
enterprise. 
In this way, researchers are able to argue either that making oneself 
vulnerable by offering personal information promotes egalitarianism, or, 
that withholding such information empowers one's interviewees to speak 
at length about themselves. Either way the ideal of democracy can be 
displayed. Equally, critics of a piece of work can always draw upon what 
is not done - on the one hand, the absence of reciprocal vulnerability, and 
on the other, the absence of the researched's privileged right to hold 
forth. 
One additional point of note about information as reciprocity, is that 
participants in traditional research possessed another privilege regarding 
information. This was the power to lie to researchers. In the detached 
and brief relationship that characterised most positivistic studies, the way 
lay open for participants to choose exactly what level of accuracy to 
concede to researchers. In the involved, intimate and often lengthy 
relationships that characterise the altemative research methodology, 
such a freedom may be greatly reduced, for reasons laid out more fully 
below (See Section e). If this is the case, then again some of the 
changes that the altemative methodologists champion may, 
paradoxically, lead to a disempowerment of participants. If this is so, then 
such research will be less "valuable" according to the criteria of 
egalitarian researchers. This may appear rather ironic, as such a 
reduction in "lying" will increase the "validity" of the research according to 
the criteria of the traditional methodology that it seeks to criticise. 
e) Intimacy and betrayal 
Ribbens observes that a commitment to non-hierarchical research may 
give a false semblance of intimacy and caring because, 
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the subtle distinctions between listening with empathy and actually 
responding with care and concern, rnay be hard for the interviewee to 
appreciate (Ribbens, 1989 P 587). 
She warns that this may create interviewee expectations incompatible 
with the aims and skills of the interviewer - who is carrying out research 
rather than therapy. Condor (Unpublished) makes the more sinister 
observation that, if respondents believe researchers to be genuinely 
interested in their life stories, it is because researchers lead them to 
believe this, precisely so as to secure their full co-operation. Whether by 
accident or design, Ribbens (1989) warns us that such expectations can 
lead to participants exposing themselves to an extent normally exclusive 
to long-term caring relationships, thus leaving themselves wide open to 
potential researcher abuse. 
Stacey (1988) gives us some insight into the form that such abuse might 
take. In her own experience, when groups of participants are recruited 
out of the same network of relationships, this can cause problems, if 
participants volunteer material of an illicit or secretive nature. The 
researcher is thereby placed in an in authentic position of ·potential, 
perhaps inevitable betrayal" (Stacey, 1988 p 23). Indeed, Stacey is led to 
conclude that such potentially harmful situations are inherent to the 
fieldwork method. 
Stacey also discusses another power dilemma generated by intimacy 
with one's participants. Using the extreme example of a death amongst 
her participants and her quandary about using this event as yet more 
data, she concludes that-
the conflicts of interest and emotion between the ethnographer as 
authentic, related person (i.e. participant), and as exploiting researcher (i.e. 
observer) are also an inescapable feature of ethnographic method (Stacey, 
1988 p 23). 
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Here we find that accusations of exploitation could be attached to both 
intimate and detached behaviour on the part of the researcher. Indeed, 
Stacey (1988) to some extent echoes the reservations of Condor 
(Unpublished) above, when she questions the ostensible advocacy of 
respect and equality for the researched in alternative methodology and 
asks whether this might not actually obscure a more dangerous and 
fundamental order of exploitation (cf. Stacey, 1988 p 22). 
This again appears to be just the sort of dialectical opposition explained 
by sOciological ambivalence. Whatever level of intimacy a researcher is 
seen to have established, accusations and denials of exploitation can 
both be accomplished in accordance with the rhetorical demands of the 
situation. Thus we again find that the problematic and contradictory 
nature of the researcher's two options is far from disruptive, rather, it 
functions to engender the flexibility vital to the successful management of 
the critical scientific forum within which research is carried out. 
Moreover, there are also aspects of this dilemma that seem to allow for 
the simultaneous display of egalitarianism and expertise that Billig et al 
(1988) identify. The key observation in this case, is that representing 
participants as deeply in danger of exploitation by their researcher, 
represents the researcher as being in an extremely powerful position, 
while simultaneously displaying a commendable commitment to 
egalitarianism. Such a construction is ideal for reinforcing the 
researcher's high and powerful social status, while at the same time 
presenting her as democratically principled. 
2 LIMITATIONS TO RESEARCHER POWER 
Within the debate over egalitarianism in the research process presented 
above, there lies a fundamental and unexplicated assumption. This 
assumption involves taking as read that researchers possess the 
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capacity to influence the power relationship within the encounter. As in 
the paradox outlined by Billig et al (1988), "doing" egalitarianism 
accomplishes not only the egalitarianism it claims to promote, but at the 
same time, the authoritarian expertise of dictating what the power 
relationship will look like. In other words, in a truly egalitarian relationship 
there would be no question of one actor making or enforcing a decision 
over what the research relationship would look like. It is only frQm a 
position of power that one can choose (whether or) not to exert power. 
Therefore, I would now like to turn to aspects of the research encounter 
that limit the researcher's power to dictate the shape that the research 
relationship should take. The first of these is identified by Ribbens (1989), 
while the second has, as far as I'm aware, remained unexplored to date. 
a) Making other social attributes relevant 
Ribbens (1989) makes the observation that the social attributes of the 
researcher and the researched will affect the balance of power between 
them. To exemplify this, Ribbens uses the example of McKee and 
Q'Brian (1983), who report feeling powerless as female interviewers to 
challenge the sexism of their male participants. She also uses the 
example of Smart (1984) who, in interviewing powerful men, found 
herself in a passive role, unable to interrupt and expected to agree with 
material to which she was entirely opposed. Ribbens then contrasts 
these two situations with Qakley's (1981) powerful social position as a 
middle class, educated mother in relation to the uneducated, working 
class mothers-to-be that she interviewed. 
Ribbens treats these power differentials as entirely outside a researcher's 
sphere of influence, so that, irrespective of any egalitarian behaviours 
that researchers perform, differences in social status that are external to 
those of researcher and researched will have inegalitarian effects. In 
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terms of sociological ambivalence, this perspective provides an 
interesting counter to the view of the researcher as possessed of the 
authority to dictate that the relationship will be egalitarian. In this way, it 
undermines that convenient, dilemma-managing move and presents a 
contrasting picture: of the researcher as both without authority and 
unable to achieve the goal of egalitarianism. 
Following Schegloff (1972), DA is not in the business of endorsing such a 
perspective. This is because it considers that social attributes, such as 
gender and economic power, will only have an influence on interaction as 
far as they are made relevant by those who participate ·in the interaction 
in question. This is very different to the picture given by Ribbens, of the 
researcher as entirely at the mercy of external social statuses. Instead, 
within the research encounter, the researcher is seen as a co-negotiator 
of the relevance of social statuses to the local context. The discourse 
analytic perspective on external social statuses therefore runs (at leat 
partially) counter to the image of the skilled expert "doing egalitarianism". 
The above attack on the researcher's privileged authority is, however, 
somewhat undermined when one leaves the context of the research 
encounter and turns to that of the academic community. Indeed, Ribbens 
(1989) places the reports of McKee and O'Brian (1983) and Smart (1984) 
within this arena. These researchers are said to complain about the 
social statuses of maleness and economic power within their write-ups, 
rather than during their interviews. In these reports, the researchers thus 
. utilise _thei~ .. u!!ique power il'! order to present their case in a forum from 
which the researched are invariably excluded. From this, we are again 
left with the impression that the researcher is a powerful member of the 
. research institution as long as entrance into the arena of the academic 
community remains limited for the researched. 
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In view of the above, the relevance of external social statuses remains a 
product of negotiation. However, it is one that occurs between academics 
rather than between researcher and researched. For example, it is 
Ribbens who makes relevant Oakley's (1981) status as middle class, 
educated mother and the statuses of her participants as uneducated, 
working class mothers-to-be. Oakley herself does not make such 
statuses relevant. Therefore, one should see that it is in the academic 
literature that these sorts of contributions become contested and notions 
of relevance within the academic community become negotiated 
products. 
b) Voluntary participation - an overlooked element of power 
While the· above section may seem to have converted a dimension in 
which the researcher has limited power, into one where again the 
researcher celebrates a privileged position, in this section I would like to 
propose a replacement dimension of researcher powerlessness. 
Ribbens (1989) subtitles one of the sections of her article ·subtle 
sabotages". Although she does not go into detail, one might assume that 
these sabotages would include classic problems such as non-response, 
changing the subject, lying, resisting the interviewer's directing hand, etc. 
Ribbens then goes on to highlight an interesting paradox: while the 
quantitative researcher must be concerned to minimise non-response 
amongst a random sample, qualitative research typically relies on 
voluntary recruitment. Ribbens suggests that, in volunteering, the 
. -.- -" '- . ._- .-,~-", ,', ~"" . -... ' ,-, . 
motivation of participants to co-operate might, in some ways, be assured. 
"Rather ironically", this might allow the researcher more room to exert 
power than in quantitative studies (Ribbens, 1989 p 582). Furthermore, in 
the concluding section of her article, Ribbens states that 
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groups without power more generally in society are not in a position to 
assert power aver the research process either, which is the essence of 
vulnerability (Ribbens, 1989 p 590). 
I believe that there is a missing element in the story told by the altemative 
methodologists, as well as by Ribbens herself. What goes unnoticed is 
the power of the participant as co-negotiator of what goes on in the 
research encounter. While I agree that participants will generally have 
little power over what happens to their interview responses once they are 
given, I believe that the power of interviewees to offer their own accounts 
in the first place has been greatly underestimated in the literature. 
Despite noting the power of sabotage that participants possess, few (if 
any) have acknowledged that all participants have the power to choose 
whether or not to engage in sabotage. Furthermore, the 
characterisation of participants' displays of autonomy as "sabotage" is 
extremely telling. The acknowledgement that participants always have a 
choice in how they behave, presents a very different picture of their role 
in the research encounter. Unlike the inanimate phenomena studied by 
natural scientists, interviewees have their own definition of how research 
should be carried out and unlike these inanimate objects, they actively 
engage in participatory behaviour: answering questions (or not); 
explaining their lives (or clamming up); permitting the researcher a 
directive role for the current purposes (or refusing this permission) etc .. 
Indeed, Ribbens asks of researchers: 
Are interviews a sort of neutered social encounter, divorced from issues 
relevant to other social situations,sa' that you- accept behaviour in 
interviews that you might expect to challenge elsewhere? (Rib bens, 1989 p 
581). 
However, she does not apply this question to the researched or see that 
they too may voluntarily accept behaviour in interviews that they might 
challenge elsewhere. Thus, from the perspective of DA, accepting certain 
behaviour that is challenged in other contexts, may be what constitutes 
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research as an identifiably independent institution. Furthermore, this 
constitutive behaviour will be carried out ongoingly by s!ll interlocutors 
within that institution. 
This focus on the participant's role as an active one, has an additional 
and extremely important dimension. As noted above, Ribbens (1989) 
concludes that the participant in egalitarian research will have an assured 
motivation to cooperate with the researcher. If such co-operation is 
indeed a product of altemative research methods, then the sociological 
ambivalence of the researcher's dilemma between authority and 
egalitarianism will create a similar dilemma for participants in achieving 
the goal of co-operation. In this case, the participant will be presented 
with two simultaneous requirements: co-operating with the authoritative 
guidance of the interviewer; and co-operating with the researcher's 
attempts to "do' egalitarianism - by affirming, through displays of 
autonomy, that the relationship is an egalitarian one. 
From this perspective, therefore, instead of participants being seen as 
potential saboteurs, they are seen as "participating" in the research 
encounter and carrying out a key role in the jOint-construction of what is 
research. Thus, informants are actively engaged in the "empowerment" of 
the researcher as much as vice versa, an observation which rather 
undermines the convenient management of the dilemma represented by 
claims to "doing egalitarianism". Viewing the researched as the 
magnanimous purveyors of the gift of their co-operation (ct. Mum, 
Chapter 5 Section 10 of the data), robs researchers of the power to "do" 
anything so authoritarian as to enforce egalitarianism. Instead, we are left 
with the conclusion that only through ongoing negotiation between all the 
members is the tone ofthe relationship established. 
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E CONCLUSION 
What I hope to have achieved within this chapter is to have 
deconstructed the academic debate on power in the research process .as. 
a debate - with all the occasioned usage and rhetorical construction that 
are intrinsic to argument and debate as social actions. In doing so, I have 
also presented that debate as an introduction to some of my concerns in 
the chapters which follow and introduced my own discourse analytic 
perspective, which, here, draws heavily upon Merton's (1976) notion of 
sociological ambivalence. This concept of sociological ambivalence was 
identified as an explanatory concept that seems to convert an apparently 
disruptive paradox in the researcher's professional role, into an 
indispensable vehicle for the rhetorical management of that role. The 
main emphasis here has been upon the felicitous flexibility generated by 
having the two counter-norms to draw on when acting as part of the 
scientific community. In Chapter 5 the emphasis will be upon this same 
salutary flexibility as an essential device in the management of the 
research encounter itself. 
As was noted in the introduction to this Chapter, a reflexive reversal of 
the usual treatment of the academic debate has been undertaken here. 
Instead of using the academic arguments of the alternative 
methodologists simply to situate, justify and validate a position on power 
in the research relationship, those arguments have been examined as a 
text for their discursive construction. Chapter 5 will· include some 
elements of a similar reversal. This will entail treating the discourse of my 
family not simply as a rhetorically constructed text, but also, in line with 
the observation by Shatter (1990) quoted in the introduction to this 
Chapter, as containing serious analytical proposals pertinent to the 
deconstruction of the research encounter as a social institution. 
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Before this is undertaken, however, some important methodological 
issues of using my own family as research participants will be addressed 
in Chapter 4. Even more overtly than in the current Chapter, these issues 
will be discussed using a reflexive approach, which highlights that the 
more traditional questions and explanations, as regards methodology, 
are inadequate to handle the issues raised by the current project • 
.• 
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I CHAPTER 4 A QUESTION OF METHOD 
'. - " ... 
A INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 2 a straightforward literature review was presented in order to 
introduce areas of general interest around the topic of this thesis. In 
contrast, Chapter 3 contained a reflexive treatment of some of the 
literature concerning the research process. This treatment raises various 
methodological questions. Such questions, along with numerous others 
which arise from the later chapters, will be addressed in the current 
chapter. 
Within this thesis the question of method is not a simple one. In texts 
such as this, it is usual for the reader to be informed about participants, 
procedural decisions and the approach adopted. However, in this project, 
it is very difficult to separate such matters from more epistemological and 
rhetorical business. In the light of this, many of the most central 
methodological elements will be addressed in a traditional, "realist" 
manner, in the "Non-Reflexive Box' below. Following this, some of the 
more constructionist and reflexive issues will be discussed at greater 
length. 
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A NON-REFLEXIVE BOX: METHODOLOGY 
1 THE DATA 
There are two types of data analysed within this thesis, one from the 
social institution of the "family" and the other from that of "academia". 
a) The "Family" Data· 
The participants concerned in the "family" data are the five members of 
my own family: Mum, Dad, Sue (aged 28), Ava (the author of this thesis, 
aged 26) and Mish (aged 22). At the time of the recordings, all three 
siblings were single and studying at University. Sue was living in the 
family home with Mum and Dad, while Ava and Mish were living and 
studying away from home. The family members are Jewish and either 
second or third generation English. 
b) The "Academic" Data 
The data analysed in Chapter 3 is not conversational in nature. Instead it 
consists of various pieces of academic writing on the subject of 
alternative methodology. This material is treated not only as literature for 
review, but also as "data" - as a variety of discourse to be unpacked for 
its rhetorical organisation. (See Section D2 below.) 
2 DATA COLLECTION 
a) .. The "Family'~ Data Recordings 
There are three tape-recorded sessions which make up the "family" data. 
For the first research encounter, four family members, including Ava, but 
excluding Mish, were asked to take part in Ava's doctoral research 
project. They were organised around a standard audio tape-recorder with 
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multi-directional microphone, in the family home. The verbal interaction to 
be recorded was then initiated by the researcher with the prompt "I want 
us to argue about what we argue about". 
The second session included all five family members as participants. 
Again the subjects were arranged around a tape-recorder in the family 
home. Each was given a typed transcript of the first 15 minutes of 
Session 1. Immediately following the receipt of this material, the tape 
recorder was switched on. The transcript was thereby established as a 
focus and prompt for discussion. 
Excerpts of transcripts from Sessions 1 and 2 were subsequently used as 
the basis for a meeting of the Discourse and Rhetoric Group at 
Loughborough University. This meeting was also recorded, in order to 
create a reflexive loop which would allow the family to make an analysis 
of the analysts analysing them. 
In Session 3 the family members were once again organised around a 
tape-recorder in the family home. The first 30 minutes of the DARG tape-
recording was then utilised in order to prompt a third discussion amongst 
the subjects. The procedure followed was for the family members to listen 
to a segment of the tape until an agreed juncture. The DARG tape was 
then paused so that discussion could commence among the family 
members. This discussion was itself recorded. 
b) The "Academic" Data Sources· .. 
The Academic data set is recruited via the usual means of compiling a 
literature review, featuring a selection of empirical and theoretical writing 
on the area in question. 
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8 A REFLEXIVE ISSUE: MIXING CONTINGENT AND 
EMPIRICIST REPERTOIRES 
1 TELUNG A STORY ABOUT THE METHOD 
Billig (1988) discusses the nature· of "methodology" in contrast to an 
opposing category of "scholarship". According to Billig, methodology 
involves the prescription of a set of procedures,. so as to homogenise 
social scientific practice. This standardisation of conduct thereby ensures 
that a given problem will produce identical results regardless of the 
individual characteristics of the researcher. The converse case of 
scholarship, Billig presents as concerned with following hunches which 
"--.'" 
lead the scholar along unique pathways of inte"ectual experience. In 
scholarship, novel perspectives and original conclusions reflect the 
utilisation of widely diverse readings. Furthermore, there is no edict to 
catalogue this diversity, as such an enterprise is deemed by scholars as 
at best unnecessary and at worst impossible. 
Schiffrin (1987) offers a very different perspective on the way that 
methodology is presented in social scientific reports. Recycling the 
philosophical work of Kaplan (1964), Schiffrin presents his suggestion 
that 
'science as process' is guided by a logic in use, and 'science as product' 
is guided by a reconstructed logic (Schiffrin, 1987 p 312). 
She then goes on to explain, that hertext ,has so, far been written 
according to "reconstructed logic", as are the majority of academic 
reports. However, Schiffrin then proposes that some consideration of her 
"logic in use" would be helpful. This leads her to discuss how she was led 
in the direction her analysis took her and to disclose that her "discourse 
model" was "largely an outcome" of her analysis rather than the reverse 
(p 313). 
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I would like to suggest that these stories about methodology, told by Billig 
(1988) and Schiffrin (1987), are rather reminiscent of the interpretative 
repertoires identified by Gilbert and Mulkay (1984: see Chapter 2 Section 
G). 
2 INTERPRETATIVE REPERTOIRES REVISITED 
One of the most central observations of Gilbert and Mulkay (1984) was 
that the official research reports of the natural scientists they studied 
almost exclusively utilised what they called an "empiricist repertoire". In 
the more informal context of semi-structured interviews, however, the 
natural scientists utilised an additional interpretative resource which 
Gilbert and Mulkay (1984) called the "contingent repertoire". 
According to Gilbert and Mulkay (1984), the empiricist repertoire consists 
of the following features. Firstly, experimental findings are presented as 
both logically and chronologically prior to theoretical concems. Secondly, 
the theoretical commitments of authors are elided, along with any 
mention of social connections. At the same time, methodological 
procedure is presented as a product of routine, universally applicable 
rules. Furthermore, such features are to be found within an impersonal 
literary style which proffers agency to the phenomena under study and 
the physical world, rather than the authors themselves. In this way the 
empiricist repertoire represents science as merely a neutral and 
inexorable mechanism through which the natural world makes itself 
'~-"~".'.-" ,':" .... -.,: .. - -,.... ..,--.~- •.. -.,.--,. 
intelligible. 
In contrast to this, the "contingent repertoire" characterises science as 
primarily a product of the personal attributes and social practices of 
members of the scientific community. This repertoire stresses the 
importance of scientific groups, within which unique interactions occur 
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between particular personalities, thereby creating an exclusive 
environment that alone enables essential skills to be socialised. These 
scientists are also presented as negotiating the path of scientific 
progress, not by heeding the insistent pull of nature straining to make 
herself known, but by the pre-mapped road of prior commitment, coupled 
with the random and unpredictable proddings of speculative insight. 
3 A DOSE OF THE CONTINGENT REPERTOIRE 
When the contrasting features of the empiricist and contingent repertoires 
are examined in detail, the stories told by Billig (1988) and Schiffrin 
(1987) in Section 1 above take on a rather different cast. Billig's (1988) 
presentation of "scholarship" as an enterprise led by quirky individuality, 
rather than universal methodic procedure, and Schiffrin's (1987) 
adaptation of Kaplan's "logic in use", then appear to represent examples 
of the contingent story about science. Yet, in both cases they appear in a 
scientific write-up, which, according to Gilbert and Mulkay (1984), is most 
usually characterised almost exclusively by the empiricist repertoire. 
Neither are Billig and Schiffrin the only writers to imbue their accounts 
with such doses of the contingent repertoire. Quite the contrary, such a 
form of explanation is very much part of the post-modernist discourse 
which is in vogue at the moment, in particular that of Social 
Constructionism (See Chapter 2 Section A). So, it would seem that, as a 
result of the post-modernist revolution, the contingent repertoire has 
entered the scientific write-up. What is more, I would suggest that it is this 
movement of the contingent repertoire into the formal scientific text that 
has opened up the space for reflexivity in current social science. The 
contingent account of science is one of motivated, personal and 
rhetorical factors so that, when these enter the formal empiricist domain 
of the scientific write-up, the similarities between that domain and the 
material that it seeks to examine, become a pressing concem. However, 
it should also be heeded that this same space has simultaneously 
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brought with it a double danger. Firstly, the exposure of crevices in the 
soil being sown for credibility. Secondly, the bottomless pot-holes of the 
reflexive regress (cf. Collins and Yearfey, 1992). 
Despite such dangers, let me insert my own dose of the contingent 
repertoire into this text: 
a) "Personal attributes" 
During the course of this thesis various of my own personal attributes 
have become pivotal to the argument herein. To begin with, membership 
of my family has become a central theme in my take on the data. My 
membership of the category "researcher" is also drawn upon heavily. 
These two attributes are made particularly relevant in Chapter 5, where 
the negotiation of my status as family member and researcher is 
examined. Another personal characteristic that is offered as potentially 
important, is my cultural heritage. It is mentioned in Chapter 6 that the 
data under examination comes from a Jewish family and that writers such 
as Schiffrin (1984) and Tannen (1989) highlight the propensity towards 
argumentation of this particular culture. Schiffrin (1984), for example 
observes that 
Ethnographies of Jewish life point out the importance - indeed, the positive 
value - of argument (Schiffrin, 1984. p 332) . 
. In Chapter 6, I consider the possibility that the strong tendency towards 
"argument as sociability" (Schiffrin, 1984) in my data, characteristic of 
interaction . amongst Jews, ... is· partially· responsible for· my reservations· 
about the harmonistic assumptions that underpin much of CA. The idea 
being, that the mismatch between readings of my own data and the CA 
conclusions about, for example, the preference for agreement, is what 
inspired me to disagree(I). What is more, one could consider that my 
personal upbringing in an environment rich with this form of sociability, is 
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even more fundamentally responsible for the nature of this thesis: not 
only in alerting me to the aforementioned predilections of much CA, but 
also in prompting my original choice of topic for this thesis. 
b) Scientific Community 
In Gilbert and Mulkay's (1984) commentary on the contingent repertoire, 
the unique environment of the group of scientific co-workers is presented 
as essential to the science that any individual produces. It is likewise the 
case for myself, whereby it is largely thanks to the particular socialisation 
that I have undergone within the Discourse and Rhetoric Group (DARG) 
at Loughborough University, that this thesis takes the form it does. 
Indeed, one can see some of the dynamic interaction of con- and di-
vergent elements that make up this unique research group, playing 
themselves out within these pages. Examples include: a predilection for 
analysing lengthy and continuous extracts of transcript; the fundamental 
celebration of the argumentative spirit; a strong preoccupation with 
reflexivity; and the free integration of linguistic, CA, rhetorical and SSK 
insights into an analysis concemed with contextual embeddedness and 
social consequentiality. 
c) "Prior Commitments" 
Leading on from the above, the contingent repertoire highlights the 
influence of prior theoretical commitment over the questions asked in 
research, the choices made and, as a result, the conclusions reached. 
This is no less the case with my own research. 
Although too various to be discussed here, what might be considered the 
most important of these has already figured greatly in the above. 
Reformulated, this refers to a commitment to the celebration of 
argumentation. Primarily addressed in Chapters 6 and 7, the idea of 
argumentation adopted throughout this thesis, is that it is a widely 
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available, often used and common resource in social life. As this thesis 
will attempt to show, the importance of argumentation has been 
underestimated by conversation and discourse analysts in a way that 
various writers have sought to rectify, for example, Billig (1993), Schiffrin 
(1984) and Edwards and Potter (1992). As a representative of the pro-
argumentation approach, Billig has been particularly criticised for being 
too generalised and theoretical in his championing of argumentation, 
paying. insufficient attention to the complex interaction of features which a 
close analysis of data extracts would afford (Myers, 1989). I therefore 
declare here, that part of the project undertaken by this thesis, is to 
expand and extend the pro-argumentation line. By providing a minute 
examination of the issue at a conversation analytic level of detail, such 
criticisms of the approach will be addressed. 
d) "Speculative Insight" 
It is central to the epistemology of Social Construction ism that scientific 
endeavour is not led merely by truth revealing herself to the diligent 
observer. As a result, it could be argued that speculative insight is the 
only commodity that the paradigm tenders. The rigorous discipline of 
justifying speculation, coupled with the unreplicable currency of unique 
and erudite insight, is presented as the best any researcher could have to 
offer. Furthermore, in ·owning up" to this, while their more essentialist 
fellOWS tell stories about "truth", the integrity of the social constructionist 
practitioner is procil!limed. Subsequent to such a rosy reformulation of the 
issue, let me therefore strongly pledge allegiance to this enterprise. 
_ .... -. , .. -'~ '.,', 
4 AVOIDING AN OVERDOSE 
Due to the adoption of myself and my family as participants in this 
research project, the elements from the contingent repertoire, of personal 
commitment, social ties and inspiration, become highly evident. It is my 
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hope that this feature of my work will aid in bringing to light some of the 
business accomplished by empiricist devices. 
This expectation rests upon the idea that common rhetorical devices 
become more obvious when doubts are raised. Such is the rationale 
adopted by Wooffitt (1992). In choosing to examine the fact construction 
of paranormal accounts, Wooffitt selected a phenomenon traditionally 
treated with circumspection,on the issue of facticity. In this way he was 
able to highlight with greater ease, elements that would be obscured 
given a less controversial subject. 
In my own case, by raising circumspection due to my membership, the 
question of neutrality should hopefully be rendered more transparent. I 
expect my analysis and treatment of Ava and her family to be minutely 
inspectable and accountable. The hope is, that questions and problems 
will come to light that are obscured when the relationship between the 
analyst and participants has a taken-for-granted distance. The issues 
then become reflexive in nature, with my own arguments coming under 
examination for how far they can be taken as valid scientific practice. 
Potter (1988) insists that one of the virtues of discourse analysis as a 
method, is the way in which it makes public the extracts of transcript 
under analysis. The reader's access to the data allows the analyst's 
claims to be judged for themselves, with the reader then able to accept or 
reject them on an informed basis. This leads Potter to suggest that 
discourse analysis is in itself a reflexive methodology. 
In the current text, as with all its analytical claims, the availability of the 
data offers the reader an opportunity to question the validity of the 
analysis on the basis of the author's membership. However, it is hoped 
that any doubts the reader does have on this matter, should 
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simultaneously give rise to a questioning of objectivity as a rhetorical 
device. 
The above representation might set up expectations in the reader of a 
text laced with heavy doses of the contingent repertoire. However, Latour 
(1988) cautions that being believed too little, presents far more of a 
problem than being believed too much. In my case, the subversion of 
accepted protocols involved in analysing Ava and her family, leaves me 
very much at risk of being believed too little. As I see it, therefore, the 
challenge will be to utilise all of the empiricist tools available, so as to 
counteract this danger and gain my legitimate place within the academic 
community. In deference to the danger of too little credence, therefore, 
the reflexive issues explained here will be rarely so explicitly expressed in 
the remainder of the thesis. 
At the same time, however, the underlying game that is played with the 
objectivist rhetoric of validation, will hopefully become all the clearer as a 
result of its adoption in this thesis. I believe that a symmetrical treatment 
of the utterances of Ava and those of the other participants, along with 
the confinement of my justifications to objective rather than subjective 
warrants, will serve two purposes. Firstly, the power of the rhetoric of 
objectivity will be rendered all the clearer if it can be deployed effectively 
in a circumstance that has such a strong subjective cast. Secondly, if 
such a deployment becomes at any point ineffective, the basis on which 
a non-participant analyst would be more effective should be called into 
question. It is hoped that the reader will take these two factors into 
consideration as they peruse the pages of this text. 
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C METHODOLOGICAL BORDERS AND NEUTRAL 
ZONES 
In writing a methodological chapter, there appears to be some 
expectation that one's methodological alignment will be proclaimed. This 
procedure would appear to involve the delineation of lines and 
distinctions between various ostensibly similar social scientific 
enterprises. It is here that similarities and differences are most concretely 
declared and thus (re)produced and that the business of boundary 
demarcation is accomplished (see, for example, the corresponding 
chapter in Wooffitt, 1992). 
Let me therefore state that for myself, I am reluctant to draw my 
boundaries too tightly lest it close down the space between the 
disCiplines which my own analysis seeks to inhabit. Instead, I would like 
to present a picture of overlapping terrain in this chapter and suggest that 
a "neutral zone" can be carved out of the territories of established 
schools and extended into pastures new. However, this is not to say that 
I am alone in such borderland territory. Rather, this is the picture of 
"interdisciplinary zones" that Shotter (1992) offers as the home of the 
social constructionist perspective (see Chapter 2 Section A). I would 
suggest that it is also within this borderland territory that the Discourse 
and Rhetoric Group (DARG) at Loughborough has prospered, providing 
the melting pot out of which this thesis has been forged (see Section 83b 
above). 
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D THE "MUNDANE", THE "INSTITUTIONAL" AND THE 
"NATURALLY OCCURRING" 
1 A VIEW OF THE FAMILY VIA RESEARCH 
As has been noted above, the "family' data was collected in an 
unstructured interview. Such a method might be seen to exclude it from 
the conversation analytic category of "naturally occurring' data. The 
grounds for such a judgement would be that, in the absence of the 
current project, the interactions used as data would not have taken place. 
Thus far it resembles discourse analytic methodology, so that, as 
particularly highlighted in Chapter 5, the researchers guidance of the 
topic towards an area of her interest is what enables an analysis of that 
topic to be made. However, I would argue that the "family' data is, to an 
equal extent, a "naturally occurring" instance of the institution of 
"research". Indeed, the analysis made within Chapter 5, is precisely 
concerned with the local production of that institution by the participants 
to the interaction. In this sense then, the methodology can be considered 
to align itself with the CA of institutions. 
Similarly, the approach adopted in Chapter 7 is to examine what 
precisely is "familial" about this data. In this way, although the topic of talk 
is set-up in Chapter 7, it is not the topic itself which is at issue, but rather, 
the rhetorical deployment of categories, devices and other interpretative 
resources, in order that the institution of the family might be (re)produced. 
One could argue that there is no reason why the research-generated 
nature of the talk should invalidate an enquiry of this nature. In the same 
way that the family's discourse during interaction with strangers, during a 
functional task, or over the telephone, would bring in additional issues of 
context, I would suggest that the particular context of having a 
conversation recorded for "Ava's thesis" should not preclude the 
utilisation of the mechanisms by which "family" is {re)produced (indeed, it 
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might be said that "Ava's Thesis" has now become very much a part of 
the family! See Chapter 8 Extract 1). On close inspection, this conclusion 
is very much in line with much work within CA, in which a specific 
telephone conversation is used to exemplify "ordinary conversation" or a 
particular extract of talk in a courtroom is used to access the 
institutionality of courtroom discourse. From such a representation, 
therefore, the methodology used regarding the "family" data is both 
discourse and conversation analytic. 
Ironically, this latter point could also be used to treat my methodology as 
a pointed critique of CA's presentation of "naturally occurring", "mundane 
conversation" as a valid analytical category. Instead of using "family" talk 
as an archetypal example of CA's conception of "ordinary conversation", 
my analysis attempts to highlight its own distinctive institutionality. In this 
way, my analysis calls into question the homogeneity of the category 
"mundane conversation". At the same time, the unnatural generation of 
the "family" data is here treated as, at the least, irrelevant to a CA-friendly 
analysiS and, at the most, indispensable to it. 
2 A VIEW OF RESEARCH VIA RESEARCH 
It should be obvious that the academic data set is not only textual rather 
than conversational, but is "institutional" in nature, rather than "mundane". 
In Chapter 3 aspects of this very institutionality are explored. The primary 
element under examination is the process by which the dilemma of 
authority versus egalitarianism can be managed in the research write-up. 
However, in doing this, another element of the institutionality of the 
research write-up also comes under the spotlight, that is, the institutional 
convention of warranting a current argument by aligning or disaligning 
oneself with the "facts· and opinions of previous literature. In this case, 
however, the point is not made via an analysis of the phenomenon. 
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Instead, a reflexive subversion of the process is attempted. This involves 
examining previous literature as "data" for its rhetorical structure, rather 
than treating it as material to be engaged with directly in argument. 
It should be noted, however, that only ~ previous research is treated 
in this manner (i.e. the research on alternative methodology), while other 
work is utilised in the usual way to warrant my own argument (i.e. the 
work of my fellow DARG members and any literature that they have used 
to warrant their own views!). This I hope, will be rhetorically effective, not 
only in justifying my claims, but in displaying the extent to which such a 
subversion is workable (see also Chapter 3 Section A1). 
3 A VIEW OF RESEARCH VIA THE FAMILY 
The subversion of the usual means by which claims are made in the 
research write-up is continued, to an extent, in Chapter 5. While Chapter 
3 treats some previous research as "data", Chapter 5 treats some of the 
family argument as a perspective with or against which alignment can be 
made - the treatment more usually reserved, in academic texts, for 
previous research. In other words, there is a point in Chapter 5 at which 
the opinions being aired by the family (specifically Mum) are engaged 
with directly in the write-up, rather than being treated as merely "data". It 
will be shown how one of the comments offered by Mum cuts to the very 
heart of the issue of egalitarianism in research. Here Mum can be seen to 
turn entirely on its head the means by which researchers proclaim 
egalitarianism while simultaneously procuring for themselves positions of 
power. 
4 A VIEW OF THE FAMILY VIA THE FAMILY 
At the very end of the thesis, in Extract 1 of the Conclusion, an attempt is 
made to allow the family's view of itself to be presented, unanalysed. The 
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workability of such a ploy is, however, highly questionable, as the extract 
presented is selected for inclusion by the researcher alone and not the 
remaining family members. As with all the other extracts of data that are 
analysed, whether or not they approve of this choice is also not 
examined. Therefore, although this extract is presented as "the last 
word", who it belongs to remains a matter of debate! 
E REPRESENTATIVENESS OF THE STUDY 
A final institutional requirement that, I feel, needs to be addressed in this 
methodology chapter, is that of the representativeness of the sample. 
Clearly the size and particularity of my data corpus cannot even begin to 
aspire to representativeness. One counter to possible criticism in this line 
is that one of the key features of both CA and DA is that disparate studies 
can be used to support the arguments of one another. The theoretical 
and empirical insights of other authors are frequently utilised to build up a 
picture of the phenomena under examination. Practitioners draw upon, 
expand and generally fill out the picture of social life that their combined 
efforts produce. As mentioned in Chapter 2 Sections C and D, both CA 
and DA are understood to be cumulative projects (cf. Sharrock and 
Anderson, 1986). In this cumulative process, I would suggest that 
contradiction, dispute and disagreement are equally productive, as 
alternative stories about the world are freely entertained. In this way, the 
analytic insights of my text are continually warranted by comparison to 
the insights of other authors, based on their own particularised data. 
Furthermore, my own insights are rendered publicly available in this 
thesis and I hope that they too will undergo a process of comparison 
which is the means by which they can be tested for their generalisability 
to other contexts. It is this ongoing and joint process that allows 
conversation and discourse analyses to transcend the particularities of 
individual instances and become details on the canvas of a wider picture 
of social action. 
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Also acknowledged as a significant requirement, even within discourse 
and conversation analytic work, is the use of numerous data sources so 
that comparisons and contrasts can be made within a particularised 
context. This requirement is also not met in my project. Mine is not, 
however, the first piece of work that has concentrated upon a case study 
of only one source of data. Similar analyses of a single example, in great 
detail and with emp.hasis on the unfolding local context, have been 
carried out by Smith (1978), Billig (1989) and Taylor (1995), amongst 
others. 
F CONCLUSION 
It should be clear from this chapter that the methodology adopted in this 
thesis is rather untraditional. The use of my own family as the main data 
source and the use of academic literature as a second data source, 
raises numerous reflexive issues. This has prompted me to address such 
issues in a correspondingly reflexive manner over the course of the 
chapter. Even the information presented within my "Non-reflexive Box', 
comes, at later points, to be treated as a reflexive issue. In this way, the 
"Non-reflexive Box' can be seen as a rhetorical device in itself, designed 
to do institutional business in as efficient a manner as possible. The use 
of "reflexive boxes' by Potter and Edwards (1992) to accomplish reflexive 
business in a similarly minimal way, has been criticised (Gill, 1995). In 
this chapter, the reverse is not only attempted but celebrated. It should 
be noted, however, that this chapter can be considered a form of "box' in 
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itself, containing an attention to reflexivity that is not mirrored in the 
remaIning chapters. I hope that such a compartmentalisation has here 
been iustified sufficiently for the business of those remaining chapters to 
go largely un reflected upon - while still encouraging the reader to keep a 
reflexive eye on the text. 
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CHAPTER 5 THE RESEARCH RELATIONSHIP 
REVISITED: ITS ONGOING AND NEGOTIATED 
CONSTRUCTION IN THE RESEARCH ENCOUNTER 
A INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 3 Merton's (1976) notion of sociological ambivalence was 
used in order to present a Discourse Analytic perspective on the 
academic debate over power in the research relationship. Its conclusion 
was that it is just such debates within the institution of research which 
serve to construct this scientific enterprise as an institution. In this 
chapter, research will again be examined as an institution. Here, 
however, the emphasis will be upon the research enterprise as 
constituted by a rather different configuration of interlocutors: those 
involved in the research encounter itself. The key insight that was used to 
unpack the academic debate was based upon the ethnomethodological 
insights of Garfinkel (1967) and Heritage (1984), which taken together 
and applied to research, suggested that: what gets to be counted as 
the institution of research is the dynamic and negotiated product of 
interactions in which "counting in" is enacted. These insights will now 
be applied to the research relationship. 
Within this chapter, an extended extract of my data will be examined 
using Discourse Analysis, in order to access the ongoing and jointly-
constructed character of the research relationship. This particular extract 
has been chosen because it explicitly and reflexively addresses the 
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matter of the roles of the researcher and the researched in the research 
encounter. In particular, this extract contrasts Ava's role as interviewer 
with that of famify member, in order to establish a jointfy-bom 
understanding of that very distinction. Within the interaction, the central 
themes that comprise the difemmas discussed in Chapter 3, of 
detachment versus involvement and authority versus egalitarianism, are 
put to the floor and dealt with, so that some of the academic 
controversies discussed in Chapter 3 can be re-examined from within this 
altemative arena of research practice. 
8 THE EXTRACT 
1 PRE-EXTRACT CONTEXT 
The conversation that precedes this extract involves a discussion of the 
usual conversational strategies employed by the famify members. At this 
point the conversational styles of Dad, Mum and Sue have already been 
attended to. Although this topic grew out of an observation of Mum's 
current style within the research encounter, such specific instances have 
ceased to be referred to, rather the topic has moved on to the habitual 
styles of the various famify members which transcend specific instances. 
2 FULL EXTRACT 
(Tape 2 Side A) 
1 Ava: so what do 1 do 
2 Mum: (ifs just a) ~ 
3 Ava: Uf there's any particular thing 
4 Mish: [you you'll 
5 mfor~thing 
6 you're run you Q[ganise [people and 
7 Ava: ~okright 
8 Mish: make sure they (.) 
9 sort of put them on the right!ml:ls [a little bit 
10 Mum: [you're the 
11 colmlinator 
12 Sue: yeh 
13 Ava: do you think I am acting as a family member 
14 or as an iD!erviewer 
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15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
Sue: 
Mum: 
Dad: 
Mum: 
Sue: 
Mum: 
Sue: 
Ava: 
Mish: 
Mum: 
Mish: 
Ava: 
Mum: 
Ava: 
Mum: 
Sue: 
Mum: 
Ava: 
Mum: 
Mish: 
Sue: 
Mum: 
Mish: 
Sue: 
Ava: 
Sue: 
Ava: 
Mum: 
Ava: 
Sue: 
Ava: 
Sue: 
Ava: 
Mish: 
Mum: 
Mish: 
Sue: 
Mum: 
[!l.Q!b. 
[!l.Q!b. yeh both (o) definitely 
both 
both 
you're gyiding us (o) 
into the way that you want us to gQ 
and w we make we're making our llYiD. decisions 
about what we lalK about 
'cause we'll ignmt you 
and go off at a langent sometimes 
but you're mill saying 
and what do you think about l!lSlt 
and do ¥QlJ. say that 
(yes 
[and you're ~ing 
but have I got [the ( ) 
(you're driving us 
to find out what you want to k!Jmol 
mm (yes 
[not necessarily that we're 
going to give you [the right oll.inion 
[yes so I've got 
have I got J.IDdue power 
in this partk;ular (o) 
no 
situation 
fiQ 
compared to llQUTIal 
no 
compared to 
what I ~ [have for example 
o THINK YOU'RE NORMALLY like that 
well ~ says you ~ 
fiQ she's not U don't think she is 
(you don't think so 
do you think no [then 
[SHE JUST HAS HER lWOPENNETH 
[LIKE WE; DO 
[can I just say, [no not like a 
[SHE'S IN A QlEEERENT POSITION 
she's in a more of a 
higher power [position~ 
[have I got like 
yeh 
like m 
o think 
(you k!Jmol (o) 
l!Q[\'l1alJy I wouldn't be all~ 
this sort of (o) con[lmlling 
[di~ng 
di~ng 
no you YiQlIk1n't fcause we'd slap (0) 
[no we'd have a gQ at you 
slap (you down 
(yeh we'd say ~ up 
~up8Y.a 
it's lIlY. tum {(laughs)) 
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16 Sue: 
17 Dad: 
18 
19 
20 
21 Sue: 
22 Dad: 
23 
24 Sue: 
25 Dad: 
26 
27 
28 Ava: 
29 Dad: 
30 
31 
32 Mish: 
33 Mum: 
34 Mish: 
35 Dad: 
36 Mish: 
37 
38 Mum: 
39 
40 Ava: 
41 Mum: 
42 Sue: 
43 Mum: 
44 Mish: 
45 
46 Mum: 
47 Ava: 
48 Mish: 
49 
50 Mum: 
51 Sue: 
52 Dad: 
53 
54 Mish: 
55 Ava: 
56 Mish: 
57 Sue: 
58 Ava: 
1 
2 Mish 
3 
4 Ava: 
5 Mish: 
6 Sue: 
7 
8 
9 Ava: 
10 Sue: 
11 Ava: 
12 
13 Sue: 
we could argue about what ~ want [to argue 
[the Q.Q.int is 
the QQ.iDt is it ~ and gQ§ doesn't it 
I mean when you're in full jjQyt 
and you're in the sort of general dis~ion 
yeh in the !rIlilM of it 
[then you're just like er 
one of the tim that 
yeh [thafs right 
[when you tIlinK about it 
you sort of suddenly remember 
what we're doing here and ~ (.) 
yeh 
and then you're sort of then (.) 
having a little ru.tm 
in one direction or anQ!her or (.) 
yeh 
mm 
'cause otherwise ~ we are 
[controlling the situaliQn 
we're likely to go on 
to something ccmplmely (Qjfferent 
[ITHINKW~ 
I THINK [WE 
[does it Jll21ter 
I THINK WE'RE TREA TlNG [you 
[good point 
with a little bit more disC cretion 
[WELL THE ONLY WAY 
THAT YOU COULDN'T QQ IT 
b~ of your situation 
which is very [!simt of you thanks very much 
[WELL THE ONLY WAY 
THATYOU COULDN'T DO IT 
thafs lIl.Iim alright [(.) don't mention it 
[«laughs)) 
[«laughs)) 
i1 it what you wanted or JlQt 
lliE ONLY WAY YOU [COULD IS TO SIT OUT= 
[yes ifs exactly what I wanted 
=AND JUST ]i1ten and not say anything 
why is it the [(important) thing 
[no no I don't want to 
[this is how I ~ it to be 
[NO I WAS JUST SAYING that is 
the only way that you could not do that 
yeh 
'cause you ~ to 
I d!lnl think (.) 
she wouldn't be ~ to 
she'd be sitting there going [mmm mmm mmm 
[«laughs)) 
[trying to m something 
[can you imagm then 
[you'd say something that [( 
[you'd never [( 
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C ON THE SUBJECT OF ROLES 
SECTION 1 
(1:1-12) 
1 Ava: 
2 Mum: 
3 Ava: 
4 Mish: 
5 
6 
7 Ava: 
8 Mish: 
9 
10 Mum: 
11 
12 Sue: 
so what do 1 do 
(it's just a) ~ 
[If there's any particular thing 
[you you'll 
~ for lIlm thing 
you're IllIl you llr9anise [people and 
~oKright 
make sure they (.) 
sort of put them on the right ~ [a little bit 
[you're the 
cOQEjinator 
yeh 
The extract begins when Ava asks: 
1 Ava: so what do 1 do 
3 Ava: Pf there's any particular thing 
This utterance fits into the current topic in which the habitual 
conversational styles of the family members are discussed. However, 
Mish responds with: 
5 ~ for lIlm thing 
6 you're IllIl you l2[ganise [people and 
7 Ava: !llfi OK right 
8 Mish: make sure they (.) 
9 sort of put them on the right ~ [a little bit 
In this way, she chooses to address Ava's specific behaviour in the 
research situation, rather than any generalised style characteristics. By 
emphasising ''this thing" in line 5, Mish is able to side-step, yet 
Simultaneously leave open, the possibility that Ava's current behaviour 
differs from her general behaviour. Ava's triple acknowledgement in line 7 
is initiated at a non-transition relevant place (Sacks et ai, 1978) and 
appears to display enthusiastic support of Mish's mode of answering her 
question. Indeed, Mish goes on to finish her utterance overlapping with 
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this affirmation. Mish interrupts herself repeatedly in this utterance and, I 
would suggest, each altemative wording mitigates the extent of Ava's 
acceded power - "run" is changed to "organise", while "make sure they" is 
abandoned in favour of "put them on the right ~" which has already 
been mitigated by ·sort or and is further mitigated by "a little bif. Mum 
then overlaps Mish's final mitigation with an altemative contribution of her 
own: 
10 Mum: (you're the 
11 coQC!iinator 
Sue, meanwhile, offers a simple agreement. In this way a display of 
consensus is produced between these three family members, proposing 
that Ava is performing some sort of special role within the interaction. 
However, at the same time, some delicacy is displayed as to the exact 
status of this special role, through the increasing mitigation from running, 
to organising, to putting onto track and finally, to co-ordinating the other 
family members (who therefore do not have such powers). 
SECTION 2 
(1:13-18) 
13 Ava: 
14 
15 Sue: 
16 Mum: 
17 Dad: 
18 Mum: 
do you think I am acting as a family member 
or as an iD!erviewer 
[Ilgj!l 
lblltb. yeh both (.) definitely 
both 
both 
This section of the extract and the talk which surrounds it, provides an 
excellent demonstration of the ongoing and negotiated nature of the 
research relationship. For, I would argue that it is precisely the 
consensual affirmation of her special directive role in the previous section 
that makes such a role available to Ava in the current section. It is this 
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newly agreed status that then encourages Ava to change her "footing" 
(Goffman, 1981) and ask the probing question of lines 13-14: 
13 Ava: do you think I am acting as a flImily member 
14 or as an iDIerviewer 
Despite its organisation as a question, Ava's utterance of lines 13-14 
seems to introduce a novel pair of terms for the family to contrast with 
one another. Here, Ava has reformulated the prior talk into a role 
dilemma between that of "family member" and "interviewer". What Mish 
may have meant with her particularisation of "tIllil thing" (rather than any 
other) is thus framed by Ava. In this way, Ava's utterance could be said to 
both enact the special role affirmed for her by the utterances that precede 
it and to recharacterise that role as that of an interviewer. 
The family's response of "both" then carries out two actions of 
negotiation. On the most simple level, this agreement on "both" and the 
absence of moves to hold Ava accountable for this particular 
reformulation of the talk, affirms that Ava is legitimate in introducing the 
two roles of "family member" and "interviewer". Meanwhile, on a more 
complex level, Ava's utterance becomes an instance of the family being 
"put" "onto the right track" - in this case the "right track" consists of having 
their prior talk organised into this duality. Thus, it is only through the 
family's legitimisation of both of these roles that they become relevant to 
the research process: before line 13 they were not consequential for the 
talk, while in lines 13-14 - before they were affirmed by the group - they 
were only· candidates for relevancy. Ava's dual role as family member 
and interviewer is therefore a dynamic and negotiated product. 
This issue of Ava's dual role is then put aside until later in the interaction. 
Mea!1while, the nature and extent of Ava's ·co-ordinating" behaviour is 
further addressed by Sue, as we shall see in the next section. 
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SECTION 3 
(1:19-27) 
19 Sue: 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 Mum: 
29 Sue: 
you're gyiding us (.) 
into the way that you want us to gQ 
and w we make we're making our llYm decisions 
about what we ~ about 
'cause we'll igJlQm you 
and go off at a taogent sometimes 
but you're miII saying 
and what do you think about lllal 
and do ~ say that [yes ' . 
[and you're ~fying 
Within this extract, Sue displays what could be seen as a very delicate 
management of the dilemma between authority and equality. As 
discussed in Chapter 3 Section D2b, participants are faced with 
sociological ambivalence in carrying out the role of co-operative 
informant. As explained, their dilemma lies between affirming the 
interviewer's authoritative guidance and affirming an environment of 
egalitarianism through displays of autonomy. Sue can be seen to 
manage this dilemma in just the sort of functional oscillation between the 
two aims that Merton (1976) envisaged. 
Firstly, in lines 19-20, Sue reiterates the family's earlier organising and 
co-ordinating conclusions: 
19 Sue: you're gyiding us (.) 
20 into the way that you want us to gQ 
In this way, she affirms Ava's power to guide the family according to her 
own agenda. This, however, is directly followed by a statement of the 
family's autonomy and independence in: 
21 
22 
and w we make we're making our llYm decisions 
about what we lalk about 
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In this section of the utterance, the competing requirement of autonomy 
is addressed. Here, although no-one has actually attacked the 
construction of Ava as guiding the family, the counter-presentation of 
family autonomy is presented directly alongside it. In this way, despite the 
absence of disagreement in response to the former formulation, Sue 
displays her rhetorical sensitivity in the counter-balancing invocation of a 
directly opposing version of events. 
, ... 
In lines 23-4 this balance is even more minutely accomplished. Here Sue 
talks of ignoring Ava's direction and going "off at a tangent". This allows 
her to both acknowledge Ava's directive role and at the same time, to 
establish the extent to which this direction is allowed by the family. To 
speak of tangents is to imply that there is a given path from which to stray 
- a "right track" - while to ignore Ava's direction would constitute the 
active withdrawal of participation in their empowerment of her. It should 
be noted, however, that "sometimes" mediates this behaviour and 
reduces it from actual to potential power. This is something that the 
family can do but which they choose to do only sometimes, thus affirming 
truill: power to lend 8Ys. the power to organise them! 
The concluding section of Sue's utterance and her next utterance 
constitute a commentary on the form that Ava's guidance takes: 
25 but you're d saying 
26 and what do you think about lIla1 
27 and do :lQY say that 
29 Sue: [and you're ~ing 
The essence of lines 25-27 seems to conclude that Ava guides through 
probing questions, while line 29 (after a "yes" from Mum) suggests that 
Ava also says things to clarify what other members of the family have 
said. The key point here, I feel, is that in the two examples in lines 26-7 
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and in the choice of the word "clarifying", Sue demonstrates that although 
Ava is guiding, it is the family's thoughts and words that are 
autonomously communicated and it is these raw materials that Ava 
organises and distils through her probing questions and her clarifications. 
If we take this representation of events as an analytical framework, we 
can use this idea of Ava's "clarifying" the discourse of others with probing 
questions, to analyse what occurs in lines 13-14. In this way we may· 
conclude that Ava clarifies the family's diverse comments on her 
organising and co-ordinating behaviours into a question of role behaviour 
as interviewer versus family member. Used in this reflexive fashion, we 
find that Sue's analysis retrospectively sheds light on the discursive 
action carried out by Ava's question. However, Sue's utterance does not 
actually represent an uptake of the issue in Ava's question, which is 
about family member versus interviewer. Instead, Sue is returning to the 
issues of organisation and coordination raised just prior to it. One could 
see this as an example of the family "making ... [their] ... own decisions 
about what ... [to] ... talk abouf by "ignoring" Ava and "go[ing] off at a 
tangenf'! 
SECTION 4 
(1:30-40) 
30 Ava: 
31 Mish: 
32 
. 33 Mum: 
34 Mish: 
35 
but have I got [the ( ) 
[you're driving us 
to find out what you want to lmmI! 
mm[yes . - :-
[not necessarily that we're 
going to give you [the right oQinion 
am going to leave Ava's utterance in line 30 to be discussed 
subsequently, after I address Mish's comments. Here Mish interrupts 
Ava's question to fonnulate her own version of Ava's interactive 
strategies in the research situation. In a manner almost identical to Sue's, 
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she oscillates between confirming the power of the researcher and the 
autonomy of the other participants, balancing the rhetorical 
consequences of lines 31-2, with the counter-presentation of lines 34-5. 
In the first part, Mish represents what Sue called "guiding" as "driving": 
31 Mish: [you're driving us 
32 to find oyt what you want to Jsnmy 
She continues immediately, however, with a balance of this power that· 
mirrors Sue's in lines 1:21-4: 
34 Mish: [not necessarily that we're 
35 going to give you [the right o!2iD.ion 
Indeed it is as if the comment of lines 31-2 establishes Ava's power too 
strongly, thereby putting into question the independence of the family's 
opinions. Thus, lines 34-5 come as an immediate remedy that re-
establishes the family's free thinking. As in Sue's analysis, Mish 
establishes through her oscillation between the two aims, that Ava's topic 
guidance does not signify that she is at liberty to generate concordant 
opinions from the other participants. 
From the utterances of both Sue and Mish we can derive a picture of the 
research process as currently constituted - Ava guides the family to 
express their opinions on topics that interest her, by clarifications and 
prompting questions. However, the family is always free to express 
opinions from their own agenda and in all cases, the opinions expressed 
by~the' family will be-entlrelytheitownaiid-nofAva'sbysome form "Cif 
ventriloquism. In this way the family can be seen to be very much in the 
business of co-operating in the research - their established freedom 
signals that it is co-operation and not coercion that produces the 
unfolding discourse, while the oscillation between guidance and 
autonomy ensures that both forms of co-operation are displayed. 
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D A QUESTION OF POWER 
SECTIONS 
(1:30 and 1:36-46) 
30 Ava: but have I got [the C ) 
36 Ava: [yes so I've got 
37 have I got lIIldue J:2mller 
38 in this pa~ular C.) 
39 Mum: no 
40 Ava: situation 
41 Mum: JlQ 
42 Sue: compared to l!Q..rmal 
43 Mum: no 
44 Ava: compared to 
45 what I ~ [have for example 
46 Mum: [I THINK YOU'RE NORMALLY like that 
47 Mish: well who says you should 
In line 30 Ava begins to ask a question but is interrupted by Mish's 
observation. When she comes to reiterate her utterance in line 36, she 
does so in the form of a statement rather than a question. However, this 
is promptly transformed into a question again in lines 37-8 and line 40. 
The switch from question to statement to question, I would suggest, 
establishes Mish's observation (discussed above) as a partial answer to 
Ava's "intended" question. Ava begins by introducing a question but this 
is interrupted by Mish's utterance. Ava then affirms Mish's observation 
with "yes" followed by "so" - establishing the utterance which follows as 
an inference based upon this observation (see Chapter 6). However, by 
" - ,:.. ,- """ . ~. - . . 
--'~"'-.'''''".,...;--.. ~~- ., .. , ... .,:. '.':-,-'._' ' ..... __ ....... - .... ,-'.' , .. ---' .--.. -~. 
then repairing the statement form and reformulating it as a question, Ava 
displays that there remains an element of query thus far unaddressed by 
Mish's outline of Ava's behaviour. This additional element is presented in 
the following manner: 
37 have I got lIIldue J:2mller 
38 in this pa~lar C.) 
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40 Ava: situation 
I would like to argue that the family's uptake of this question displays a 
resistance to the manner in which it formulates the research relationship. 
If this is the case, then this section of the interaction can give us a key 
insight into the negotiation that determines what gets to be counted as 
the research relationship. 
I would argue that the family identify and take issue with the negative 
framing of Ava's question. Ava does not merely raise the question of 
whether her power is legitimate or not, she uses the term "undue" and 
thus casts her question in a negative vein. In addition, as discussed 
above, the repaired false start in the statement format "yes so I've got" 
(line 36), even more concretely establishes this negative appraisal as the 
focus rather than any positive altemative, such as legitimacy. I believe 
that the responses of Mum, Sue and Mish carry out a great deal of work 
in order to avoid affirming the negative evaluation of Ava's behaviour that 
is inherent in the question's formulation. 
The clearest uptake on this negativity is Mum's. Her response takes the 
form of an emphatic repetition of "no" three times. The first of these is 
introduced before Ava has finished, while the other two sandwich the 
utterance by Sue. Sacks et al (1978) identified one form of overlap 
between interlocutors as arising in the form of a display of enthusiasm by 
. a second speaker to support _the . contribution of the first speaker. 
- - - -, •• ~ •• ~--. - _._, _-- • • _. _q - • 0.- _. - _.' ____ . . _ '.. . 
Meanwhile, Pomerantz (1984) postulated that disagreement with a prior 
speaker's self-depreciations carry out a social support function (see 
Chapter 6). I would suggest that Mum's early and reiterated strong 
disagreement with Ava's formulation is just such a display of social 
solidarity in response to a self-depreciation. However, it is also more than 
this, for it actively and retrospectively constitutes Ava's formulation as a 
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self-depreciation precisely in the socially solidary design of its rejection. 
In this way, Mum frames Ava's question as an appeal for reassurance -
that she is not over-reaching the bounds of behaviour deemed 
acceptable by the family - and responds so as to unequivocally offer that 
reassurance.1 
Meanwhile, Sue postpones directly responding to the framing of Ava's 
. question, by initiating a classic insertion sequence (Schegloff, 1972) 
requesting a clarification of the question's parameters and thus some 
puzzlement with Ava's formulation of the issue. Here, Sue reconstitutes 
undueness as a comparative term and offers "normal" as the benchmark 
for comparison: 
42 Sue: compared to 11QUT1al 
Ava's answer to this question is as follows: 
44 Ava: compared to 
45 what I ~ [have for example 
This can be seen as an extremely deft management of the sociological 
ambivalence associated with the "dilemma of the expert" (Billig et ai, 
1988). In this response, Ava dismisses the proposed comparison 
between her current level of power and her normal level. In doing so she 
deflects the inquiry away from defining whether researchers have greater 
power than that possessed by actors in "normal" (supposedly egalitarian) 
situations. Such a comparison requires a head-on confrontation between 
Although perhaps, as it were 'over-reaching the bounds of behaviour deemed 
acceptable' for analysts, one might be tempted to read this as responding to Ava's 
question as presented by a "family member" rather than an "Interviewer" - as a self-
depreciation requesting reassurance, rather than a probing question framed in a 
directively biased manner in order to illicit a negative response! 
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authority and egalitarianism. Instead, she sets up the comparison as 
between the power she currently brui and that which she currently should 
have. In this way she establishes as given the power differential between 
the roles of family member and interviewer. This then allows her to set up 
the comparison to decide between the illegitimate, commandeered power 
of the authoritarian and the legitimate, negotiated power of the egalitarian 
expert who is successfully engaged in "doing egalitarianism". The 
possibility of not-having power is thus excluded and an expert status is 
assured.2 
Furthermore, this presents the family with the opportunity to doubly affirm 
their status as co-operative participants by choosing the latter option. 
Such a choice both represents co-operation with Ava's direction; and 
establishes that Ava requires their co-operation in order to have power in 
the first place! 
Interestingly enough, Mum chooses an entirely different option by saying: 
46 Mum: U THINK YOU'RE NORMALLY like that 
In this way, she resists Ava's dismissal of the current/normal comparison 
of her behaviour and presents Ava as powerful (perhaps even 
overpowering) within the family, regardless of any researcher status. In 
doing this she undermines any claim to expert privilege and at this point 
:tThis is rather reminiscent of the question by Ribbens (1989) discUssed in Chapter 3: 
how do we .•• acknowledge our power and yet deal with feminist concerns 
with intimacy, reciprocity and collaboration? (Ribbens, 1989 pp 580) 
My suggests that it is precisely through acknowledging power and simultaneously 
professing feminist egalitarian committments, that claims to carrying out egalitarian 
research are a=mplishedl 
113 
answers the question posed by Ribbens (1989) and discussed in Chapter 
3: 
how far are interviews different from other sorts of social encounters? 
(Ribbens, 1989, p 579). 
This she does by more or less implying that when the social encounter 
for comparison is family interaction, there is no difference between that 
• and interviews, if the interviewer is an inordinately bossy family member 
under "normal" circumstances. In addition, this utterance serves as a 
substantiation of the previous emphatic reassurances of "no" so as to 
reiterate that Ava is not commandeering illegitimate power in the current 
interaction. 
Mish's subsequent utterance also avoids the option that Ava has set up 
for the family. She asks instead: 
47 Mish: well 'llIJQ says you ~ 
As with Sue's response in line 42, she avoids directly engaging with 
Ava's question with an insertion sequence, however, in this case her 
query is also what Knoblauch (1991) termed a "calling into question". 
Such questions do not simply require an answer, they also render the 
preceding utterance accountable (See Chapter 6). In this utterance, 
rather than confirming Ava's expert egalitarianism and the family's 
double-edged co-operation, Mish calls into question the assumptions that 
.. Ava has been making and thus raises the problematic issue of authority 
that Ava has been deftly avoiding. 
Mish's question is indeed a very fundamental one for the dilemma of the 
expert, for she is asking ''wb2'' authorises an elevated quota of power. If 
the answer is members of the community of altemative methodologists, 
then their goal of egalitarianism is undermined by their very authority to 
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make such an "authorisation". However, if the answer is the family itself, 
then theirs, as participants, is the ultimate power - this time directly 
undermining the authority of the community of researchers. Furthermore, 
to the extent that this utterance calls into question the right to elevated 
power, it also censures the presumption of researchers to set themselves 
up as authorities I There is no uptake of this extremely thomy question I 
SECTION 6 
(1:48-56) 
48 Sue: 
49 Mum: 
50 Mish: 
51 Sue: 
52 
53 Ava: 
54 Sue: 
55 
56 
ll.Q she's not U don't think she is 
[you don't think so 
do you think no [then 
[SHE JUST HAS HER TWOPENNETH 
[LIKE WE DO 
[can I just W [no not like a 
[SHE'S IN A PIFFERENT POSITION 
she's in a more of a . 
higher power [position..DQl!! 
This extract is dominated by an exchange between Sue and Mum that 
develops out of Mum's statement in line 46: 
46 Mum: [I THINK YOU'RE NORMALLY like that 
Sue's utterance in line 48 begins with a strong, direct disagreement with 
this statement 
48 Sue: ll.Q she's not ... 
The disagreement is then repeated in the more mitigated form of: .' ------." .--
48 Sue: U don't think she is 
Mum's response to this disagreement is: 
49 Mum: (you don't think so 
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In overlapping the latter part of line 48, this utterance displays an element 
of eagemess - through early initiation based on the prediction of a TRP 
{Sacks et ai, 1978}. What Mum is doing with this eagemess becomes 
clearer if we consider the questioning tone with which this utterance is 
delivered, despite its format as a statement. I would suggest that the lack 
of hesitation and the questioning flavour of Mum's contribution, display an 
absence of commitment to an adopted position, thus signaling an 
openness to the consideration of opposing positions. This reading of 
Mum's utterance also underscores the status of Mum's earlier position (of 
"I think you're normally like that") as one adopted for the purposes of 
reassurance. This is accomplished through the contrast of the earlier 
reassuring comment with the current display of serious deliberation over 
an issue. It is as if Mum's readiness to discard her earlier position itself 
marks that earlier message as mere reassurance - rather than a 
committed stance on the issue. In doing this, Mum prioritises supportive 
behaviour, displaying that, only once such interpersonal concems are 
dealt with, can she entertain informational and content oriented 
considerations. I would suggest that in these utterances, Mum not only 
skilfully oscillates between the roles of supportive mother and co-
operative, independently-minded research participant, she also conveys 
a moral hierarchy between such roles. 
In line 50 Mish asks the question: 
50 Mish: do you think no [then 
This would appear to inquire whether Sue's disagreement with Mum 
indicates a negation to Ava's original question about undue power. 
However, this question, like her previous contribution, is ignored by the 
others. 
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Instead, Sue explains the nature of her disagreement with Mum. To begin 
with, she constructs what Ava's normal behaviour is like: 
51 Sue: [SHE JUST HAS HER TWOPENNETH 
52 [LIKE WE DO 
Following this, she goes on to explain in what way this differs from Ava's 
current actions: 
54 Sue: 
55 
56 
[SHE'S IN A DlEEERENT POSITION 
she's in a more of a 
higher power [position.!!llYt 
In this way, Sue proposes that, in the current context, Ava has greater 
power than simply the normal "twopenneth" that is her equal right within 
the family. However, she makes no mention of whether this extra power 
is "undue" or not. Thus, the issue of power is again pursued amongst the 
participants in the form of a comparison between "normal" and current 
behaviour, rather than the comparison between current and due power 
that Ava has attempted to initiate. 
It is interesting to note that in all of this interaction, from line 48 to 56, Ava 
is not addressed directly - she is talked aboyt (in the third person) but she 
is not talked tQ. She does attempt an interruption of the others, with: 
53 Ava: [can I just ~ [no not like a 
However, despite the fact that this appears to be another signal that the 
••• 4. ___ .... _.""_- ."_,_.,-:_ •• __ 
family are not pursuing the line of inquiry that she favours, this attempt to 
gain the floor is entirely unsuccessful. There is a particularly humorous 
irony in this, from an analytical point of view. The disagreement that 
ensues debates Ava's power position, asking whether she is generally 
endowed with the heightened powers of "guiding" and "directing" the 
family, or merely possessed of them in the current interaction. Yet, 
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throughout this section of the dispute Ava herself is excluded and her 
attempts at direction go unheeded! What is more, if we return to Sue's 
description of Section 3 lines 19-24, we find that this situation has 
actually been described within the discourse. Thus, in the manner 
outlined by the "Documentary Method" of Garfinkel (1967), Sue's 
utterance both sets up a pattem for this behaviour to conform to and 
allows this behaviour to count as an example of that pattern: When 
addressing Ava and referring to the family, she says: 
(Section 3) 
19 Sue: you're gyiding us (.) 
20 into the way that you want us to gQ 
In this case, that guidance is towards a discussion of the legitimacy of her 
current, taken for granted position of elevated power, 
21 
22 
23 
24 
and [yet] w we make we're making our llYlll decisions 
about what we laIk about 
'cause we'll ig~ you 
and go off at a llmgent sometimes 
In this case, their ·own decision" would appear to be, to discuss their 
concerns about whether or not Ava indeed bmi. any more power in the 
current context than she possesses "normally"! 
SECTION 7 
.... (2:1-16) 
1 Ava: 
2 Mum: 
3 Ava: 
4 Sue: 
5 Ava: 
6 
7 
8 Sue: 
9 Ava: 
10 Mish: 
[have I got like 
yeh 
like m 
p think 
(you~(.) 
JlQ[lI1ally I wouldn't be all~ 
this sort of (.) conl1n2lling 
[dioong 
di~ng 
no you WQJJk1n't rcause we'd slap (.) 
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11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
Mum: 
Mish: 
Sue: 
Mum: 
Sue: 
[no we'd have a 92 at you 
slap [you down 
[yeh we'd say [ml1i up 
[ml1i up 8Y..a 
ifs lIlY. turn ((laughs)) 
we could argue about what Wll want [to argue 
In line 1, Ava makes another question initiation but then displays 
hesitation about this form of address in lines 1, 3 and 5. This hesitation is 
marked by the delay after line 1 (which allows Mum to slip in a "yeh" (line 
2)); her repeat.of "like" in line 3; and her repair of "m" with "you know". At 
this point she is acceded the floor when Sue elects not to continue after "I 
think" in line 4. Her contribution then reverts back to the statement form in 
the following: 
6 
7 
OQ...rmally I wouldn't be allowed 
this sort of (.) con[tmlling 
By beginning with the question "have I got", Ava sets up her current 
intervention as a reformulation of her earlier question. Her display of 
hesitation then establishes the statement form of lines 6-7 as a repair. 
This statement is, I feel, particularly designed not only to foster the 
agreement that she has failed to illicit thus far, but to display that 
agreement is being sought To begin with, lines 6-7 manage to avoid the 
self-deprecatory characteristics of lines 36-8 of Section 5, which led to 
disagreeing reassurances. This means that supportive behaviour by the 
family is in this case managed as involving agreement rather than 
disagreement. At the same time, in line 6, Ava addresses the family's 
concem with "normal" behaviour, so as to affirm its relevance, yet 
manages to subordinate it to her mIm. concemwith the legitimacY of her .. 
power. Additionally, she firmly establishes that it is the family who 
"allows" - or deems ·undue" - the special "controlling" behaviour of the 
research encounter, thereby answering Mish's question of line 47. 
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Tne sought after agreement is then forthcoming, in the form of a 
completion by Sue which responds to Ava's hesitation after "sort of in 
line 7: 
8 Sue: [di~ng 
The status of this completion as an agreement is then ratified when Ava 
repairs her own almost simultaneous self-completion of "controlling" with 
a repeat of Sue's chosen verb in line 9: 
9 Ava: di~ng 
What then follows is an overlapping, jointly engendered agreement from 
Mish, Mum and Sue, which sets out the form that this prohibition would 
take if Ava attempted to take illegitimate power under "normal" 
circumstances: 
10 Mish: 
11 Mum: 
12 Mish: 
13 Sue: 
14 Mum: 
15 
no you ~n't ['cause we'd slap (.) 
[no we'd have a !IQ at you 
slap [you down 
[yeh we'd say ~ up 
~up8Y.a 
it's Jm tum ((laughs)) 
Within this interaction each member makes an individual contribution to 
the picture being established of the family's reaction to ·undue" 
behaviour. Thus the issue of 'undueness" is transferred into the arena of 
"normal" family interaction where it can be addressed without 
undermining researcher power or participant co-operation and without 
encountering any need for reassurance. 
Let us now compare what Mum says here with what she said earlier. In 
Section 5 line 46, Mum's comment concerning Ava's current "guiding" 
behaviour was: 
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(Section 5) 
46 Mum: [I THINK YOU'RE NORMALLY like that 
In this section, however, Mum wams that if Ava "normally" exhibited "this 
sort of controlling .•• directing" behaviour, the family would "have a go at" 
her and say "shut up Ava it's my tum". Such an apparent contradiction 
underlines the rhetorical nature of the interaction, along with the ongoing 
and negotiated construction of the social objects under discussion. 
Mum's responses demonstrate their situated contingency, in that her 
initial position responds to a call for reassurance, while the subsequent 
position responds to a call for support. Furthermore, the negotiated status 
of the interaction is displayed in that the earlier position is modified 
through interaction with other interlocutors, while the later position makes 
up part of a jointly established scenario. 
In this section of the data, therefore, we find that Ava has converted the 
problematic issue of "undue power" into the idea that the other family 
members would not "normally" permit her current "directing" behaviour. In 
agreeing with her, the family offer some specific behaviours that are at 
the general disposal of the family for the impediment of such actions. 
Implicit within this is the waming that in the current encounter the family 
possess the power to actively prevent Ava from seizing control of the 
interaction, yet they choose to forego this right and "allow" Ava to direct 
them. This thus establishes an overt difference between Ava's current 
and normal behaviour, yet frames it in terms of what the family choose to 
, _c ._~ • ,-~. ,;_, ___ ~~. 
permit. In so doing, the family can be considered to have answered Ava's 
question about "undue power". They are indicating that "undue power" 
need never be an issue - because of the family's inherent ability to 
disallow any behaviour that they find unacceptable. In this way, the family 
not only display themselves as "normally' egalitarian, but also as 
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supportively co-operating with Ava's "doing" of egalitarianism in the 
research encounter! 
The next utterance by Sue is as follows: 
16 Sue: we could argue about what ~ want [to argue 
Here, Sue implies that, if Ava were not guiding and directing the 
discourse, the family would be free to argue about topics of their own 
choice. Within this utterance two implicit messages can be identified. The 
first follows on from the above discussion, reminding Ava that the family 
are voluntarily consenting to argue about the topics of Ava's choosing. 
Meanwhile, the second suggests that, because of Ava's guidance, the 
family are !1Q1 arguing about what they want to argue about. 
If this second implication is accepted, Sue's utterance could easily 
become an excellent example of the sort of dilemma in collaborative 
research that Ribbens (1989) identifies. As I discussed in Section D1a of 
Chapter 3, Ribbens talks of the paradox that occurs 
where the researcher seeks to treat what is said with respect, but does not 
like or agree with what is said (Ribbens, 1989 P 590). 
When this research programme was designed, it was anticipated that, 
once each interaction had been initiated via a question or the 
presentation of material (see Chapter 4), the topics of the conversation 
would be able to flow without direction from the researcher. This picture ... 
of the family's interaction would suggest that the topics that arise over the 
course of the arguments are initiated, sustained and terminated via 
negotiation between all the family members. This characterisation would 
suggest that the family ~ argue about what they want to argue about 
The above utterance by Sue, however, presents a rather different picture. 
Indeed, this utterance rather exemplifies the case where the family do not 
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give what, according to Ava, would be the "righf' opinion. Again, the 
issue concerns the dilemma between authority and egalitarianism: The 
researcher's favoured image would present the data in an egalitarian 
light, with the family entirely free to determine topics for argument; while 
in Sue's representation of affairs, Ava's family-legitimated authority to 
direct influences the family away from topics they may wish to argue 
about. 
This particular embodiment of the experfs dilemma provides an 
interesting opportunity for a reflexive examination of the dilemma of 
collaboration discussed in Chapter 3. This is just the sort of discrepancy 
in the construction of the proceedings between that which the researcher 
would make and that made by another of the participants, that Ribbens 
(1989) problematises. What can a researcher do in such a situation? 
In Chapter 3 we saw that "egalitarian researchers" are able to justify any 
position within the collaboration dilemma by drawing upon: either the 
transcendental position of researchers in determining what is acceptable 
to the academic audience for whom the write-up is designed; or upon the 
transcendental goal of egalitarianism which dictates that anti-exploitative, 
participant-friendliness outweighs the fads and fashions of the academic 
elite. For the reflexive "meta-" analyst, a different form of management is 
available for handling the dilemma: and that is the ironic and pithy 
examination of multiple options. The following are some such rhetorical 
moves: 
Firstly, I could characterise Sue's reading of who guides the topics of the 
interaction as context-dependent - as occurring within a section of the 
discourse that particularly recommends her conclusion that Ava generally 
guides. In this way, I could call to my aid an observation about the irony 
of the present extract. When compared to the remainder of the data, the 
question of power in the research encounter would appear to be one of 
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the most directed topics of the recording - being one of the most clearly 
identifiable as of particular concern to the researcher. Thus, I would be 
able to present Sue's suggestion - that the family is not freely choosing its 
own topics - as a context-contingent observation. Meanwhile, the 
researcher's contrasting representation could then be proffered as a 
"truer" observation of the wider picture: imputing that when the research 
is taken as a whole, the participants are free to choose the topics under 
discussion! 
Secondly, I could treat Sue's implication, of a directed selection of topics, 
as of equal standing to my own assertion of the family's freedom to 
negotiate topics. This option would suggest that the discursive work 
carried out by my own construction of topic selection should become as 
much a matter for deconstruction as Sue's. In this way, a symmetrical 
treatment would be recommended. Sue's assertion would be 
characterised as accomplishing an emphasis on the family's voluntary 
conferral of power on Ava; while my own representation would be 
identified for its rhetorical value in playing down the influence of the 
researcher's objectives on the data. 
Using this second strategy, although I would suffer from a loss of 
authority in terms of supplying a definitive interpretation of the data, I 
would hope to gain integrity by displaying sincerity, openness to criticism 
and a commitment to the egalitarian handling of discursive constructs. 
This equal treatment of the two positions would also allow both Sue's 
representation of the co-ordinating expert and my own representation of 
the researcher as iust another participant, to stand simultaneously! 
Furthermore, such a move might also accomplish the presentation of 
myself as "doing egalitarianism" with expert subtlety (See Chapter 3 
Section C3). 
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Thirdly, I could side-step an interrogation of my own discursive actions by 
presenting this dilemma as a problem in itself requiring reflexive 
treatment. I could make a list of various altemative strategies for 
accounting for this difference of opinion and discuss each in a self-aware, 
"multisubjective" manner (Billig, 1989). This would act so as to make 
public my own stake - whereby Sue's comment can be fitted into an 
explanation that presents my(l) research as both collaboratively 
egalitarian and expertly co-ordinated. In so doing, I would be able to 
present the authorship of this chapter as itself egalitarian (though not 
collaborative), in the sense of avoiding preferential treatment of this 
discourse above that of the data. A further bonus of this strategy would 
be that it might either confuse or amuse the reader sufficiently to 
circumvent the requirement that a single conclusion be reached. 
As you see, I have decided against all of the above options on the 
grounds that whatever I write will be informed by rhetorical concems and 
thus open to criticism by you, the reader - a situation that would, of 
course, highlight the status of this analysis as a discursive construct in 
itself! 
E OSCILLATION 
SECTIONS 
(2:17-33 and 2:35) 
17 Dad: [the I2Qict is 
18 the I2Qict is it ~ and gQ§ doesn't it 
19 I mean when you're in full fIlllIl 
. -. '-20 -. -. -andyoll're-in-thes6rtofgeneraldis~ion .-.----
21 Sue: yeh in the ~ of it 
22 Dad: [then you're just like er 
23 one of the ~ that 
24 Sue: yeh [thars ri9llt 
25 Dad: [when you tIJ.iDK about it 
26 you sort of suddenly remember 
27 what we're dOing here and ~ (.) 
28 Ava: yeh 
29 Dad: and then you're sort of then (.) 
30 having a little I2YM 
31 in one direction or anQiller or (.) 
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32 Mish: yeh 
33 Mum: mm 
35 Dad: [controlling the situruiQa 
At this point in the interaction, Dad's contribution resurrects Ava's original 
question from earlier in the discussion -Section 2Iines13-14: 
(Section 2) 
13 
14 
Ava: •• do you think I am acting as a family member 
or as an interviewer 
Beginning in line 17, Dad asserts that: 
17 Dad: [the QQiot is 
18 the ~ is it ~ and ~ doesn't it 
He then goes on to explain that, whether Ava is acting as a family 
member in the discussion, or as an interviewer, depends on the flow of 
the talk. He says that on the one hand: 
19 I mean when you're in full ~ 
20 and you're in the sort of general dis~ion 
22 Dad: [then you're just like er 
23 one of the mam that 
On the other hand, however: 
25 .- Dad:- .- [when you tIli.nk about it-·· 
26 you sort of suddenly remember 
27 what we're doing here and e C.) 
29 Dad: 
30 
31 
35 Dad: 
and then you're sort of then C.) 
having a litHe ~ 
in one direction or anQiher or C.) 
[controlling the situatiQn 
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The above description of Ava's behaviour not only represents yet another 
skilful management of the researcher's dilemma, but can also be seen to 
accomplish a number of key manoeuvres in the constitution of the roles 
of those engaged in the current encounter. 
Looking firstly from the perspective of the expert's dilemma, it is 
extremely tempting (particularly for this researcher) to ignore lines 25-7, 
so that we are left with the following construction of Ava's behaviour~ 
When the conversation is "in full floW" Ava acts "just like .. , one of the 
team". However, at other times she finds herself "having a little push in 
one direction or another ... [and] ... controlling the situation". Such a 
description would present the researcher as, at one and the same time: 
a) an egalitarian member "of the team"; and b) a highly competent 
researcher whose merest "little push" is all that is necessary for 
"controlling the situation". This is what Dad almost says, drawing upon 
the egalitarian and authoritarian themes thus far raised within the 
discussion. However, Dad's lines 25-7 are fundamental to his description 
and cast an entirely different view of Ava's behaviour. 
In the lines thus far ignored, Dad suggests that Ava's controlling pushes 
occur when she "suddenly remember[s] what we're all doing here and 
why". Taking this into account provides a formulation of her behaviour 
that is not so flattering I Instead of the egalitarian expert, the picture that 
can be constructed is of a subjective family member and amateur 
analyst. This is a person who generally gets carried away in the "full flow" 
... of the discussion_and as a result, acts "jusUike er one of the team". - ...- --, -" --
However, every now and then, when she has time to "think about if', she 
"sort of suddenly remember[s] what we're doing here and why". This 
representation characterises Ava as unprofessional for getting caught up 
in her own subjectivity and only sporadically reminded of her duty as a 
"real" researcher. Thus her oscillation between family member and 
interviewer is presented as indicating a J.aQJs.of expertise rather than the 
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reverse! In this alternative formulation of Ava's behaviour, the description 
of the "controlling" "push" as "Iittle.", rather than accrediting fine-tuned 
expertise, seems to imply that Ava's power of influence is rather limited. 
This observation of Dad's appears to be a perfect example of where the 
family display what Mish warns in line 34 of Section 4: 
(Section 4) 
34 Mish: [not necessarily that we're 
35 going to give YOJl [the right oQinion 
Instead of presenting Ava as the egalitarian expert and expert egalitarian, 
Dad portrays her as a barely competent researcher, not only lax in her 
control but also rather ineffectual when she does get around to doing her 
job! Such a characterisation of the current research encounter hinges on 
Dad's implicit suggestion about ''what we're doing here and why". 
It is in this, rather damning, representation of Ava's behaviour that we 
most clearly see the power of the participant in the research encounter. 
The first important pOint is that it is not only the researcher who brings to 
the research encounter a view of the research process - the participants 
too have ideas and expectations about what the research process 
entails. Thus, it is only where the participants co-operate with the 
researcher's ideas about how the encounter should be conducted, that 
the researcher can "do egalitarianism", or "do authoritarianism" for that 
. matter. In other words, these ·preconceptions on the part of all concerned 
will have an important part to play in the negotiation of what goes on, 
acting dynamically and interactively so as to constitute what exactly ~ 
go on. 
The resulting implication is that, in spite of a researchers egalitarian 
principles and intentions of empowerment, if the participants are 
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. .. 
possessed of a more traditional understanding of what it means to be 
involved in research, they will play their part according to their own 
model. Thus the final interaction will be a negotiated product of the 
different constructions of the power relationship, bearing in mind that the 
participants' constructions will not necessarily be homogeneous. 
In Dad's observation, what Ava has been constructing (with some co-
operation from Sue, Mum and Mish) as an expert handling of her dual 
role, Dad presents as an inexpert blurring of her two roles - in which she 
is only an interviewer when she "remembers". This, I would suggest, 
represents a more traditional perspective of how research should be 
conducted - with authoritative guiding and co-ordinating as the only valid 
researcher behaviour, while being "one of the team" is merely an 
erroneous behaviour bom of overfamiliarity. It is also interesting to note 
that Dad characterises Ava as having a supplementary view of the 
proceedings to that held by "the family", of which she is also a part. Dad 
implies that, in her occasional recollections, Ava uses an altemative 
perspective on the encounter that is particular to herself: it is what "you" 
remember that ''we'' should be doing and what "you" do as a result. 
Presumably, this supplementary perspective is available exclusively to a 
researcher. 
SECTION 9 
(2:34; 2:36-40; and 2:42) 
34 Mish: 'cause othelWise ~ we are 
, .. - ,. ~-" 
36 Mish: we're likely to go on 
37 to something comp~ely (djf[erent 
38 Mum: PTHINKWYEa 
39 I THINK [WE 
40 Ava: [does it matter 
42 Sue: [good point 
In lines 34 and 36-7 Mish says: 
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34 Mish: 'cause othelWise ~ we are 
36 Mish: we're likely to go on 
37 to something complmely [rufferent 
This leads on from Dad's observation and supports earlier suggestions 
that the family "go off at a tangent sometimes' and that Ava's "directing" 
behaviour prevents the family from "arguing about what we want to 
. ,-
argue" about. Ava's response is to ask: 
40 Ava: [does it mmter 
However, despite the question format of this utterance, Sue's subsequent 
rejoinder, is: 
42 Sue: [good point 
This orientates to Ava's utterance as a statement, rather than a request 
for Mish's opinion. In judging Ava's question as a "good point", Sue 
acknowledges its discursive action in communicating that the topic of the 
conversation does not matter. In this way, Ava's utterance is treated as 
an almost classic "rhetorical question". 
It is through just such minor exchanges as these that I feel that the power 
relationship between the researcher and the other participants is 
negotiated. In content, the exchange signals that the researcher is willing 
for the participants to take a greater share in directing the topics of the 
interaction - Ava implies that it would not matter if the family were to "go 
on to something completely different". In this way she attends to the 
earlier construction of the effect of her guidance on topic choice and hints 
that she does not agree with such a level of direction. Meanwhile, in form, 
the ostensibly democratic strategy of asking an opinion is interpreted as, 
in fact, the giving of an opinion and thus a form of subtle guidance rather 
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than autonomy. In this way, despite a democratic front, the business 
achieved by this utterance is expert skilfulness - in the form of guidance 
away from a view of her as overly affecting topic choice. 
It should, however, be noted that discourse analysis makes no 
extrapolations about whether or not Ava intended her utterance as a 
statement of opinion. Similarly, whether or not Ava acts as a skilful expert 
who subtly guides her participants is not a matter to be concluded from 
this sort of analysis. Our onlY concem is with the treatment of Ava's 
utterance by the other participants. What we can say, however, is that 
Sue responds to Ava's utterance in a way that constitutes it as guidance -
Ava's utterance becomes skilful guidance purely and simply because Sue 
permits it to be. Thus, the above exchange provides us with a concrete 
example of the participants' active role in promoting privileged behaviour 
by the interviewer, discussed in Section D2b of Chapter 3. 
Until this point in the data, it has been possible to analyse the 
proceedings in an almost exclusively sequential manner, with only a few 
stray utterances being grouped with others that do not immediately 
precede or follow them. However, at this juncture there occurs a 
fragmentation of the discourse that merits a slightly different ordering of 
" ",," 
the analysis. 
Therefore I will group the appropriately linked utterances into two 
sections and analyse them separately. The first of these is the following: 
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F THE GIFT 
SECTION 10 
(2:41;:4346-7; 50-53; and 55) 
41 Mum: I THINK WE'RE TREATING [you 
43 Mum: with a litue bit more dis[ cretion 
46 Mum: be~ of your situation 
47 Alia: . which is very !lsiiisI of you thanks very much 
50 Mum: that's ~ alright [(.) don't mention it 
51 Sue: [((laughs)) 
52 Dad: [((laughs)) 
53 ~ it what you wanted or JlQl 
55 Ava: [yes it's exactly what I wanted 
In lines 41, 43 and 45 Mum offers her opinion of Ava's role in the 
research encounter: 
41 Mum: I THINK WE'RE TREATING [you 
43 Mum: with a litue bit more dis[ cretfon 
46 Mum: be~ of your situation 
In this statement Mum concludes that, during the data collection, the 
family are proffering upon Ava a special dispensation because of her 
status as researcher. 
Ava's uptake on this utterance deserves particular attention because of 
its significance in the ongoing construction of the research relationship. 
Ava responds with: 
47 Ava: which is very ~ of you thanks very much 
In order to understand the social actions accomplished by this utterance, 
we need to turn to the work of Goffman (1971) on discursive phenomena 
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he called "ritual offerings". Goffman proposed that ritual offerings occur 
when 
one individual provides a sign of involvement in and connectedness to 
another (Goffman, 1971 p 89). 
Furthermore, Goffman· suggested that, following such "giving 
statements", "it behoves the recipient" to make a rather prescribed form 
of response which he termed a "show of gratitude" (Goffman, 1971 p 89). 
According to Goffman, this response projects a fourfold message -
displaying: an appreciation of the initiator's message; an affirmation that 
the implied relationship does indeed exist; the worth of the initiator as a 
person; and the appreciative and grateful nature of the recipient. 
As discussed in previous chapters, a central feature of both Conversation 
and Discourse Analysis, are their emphasis on the pivotal role of the next 
tum in ongoingly constituting the meaning of the current tum (see 
Chapter 2 Section C in particular). It is in this sense that Mum's utterance 
in lines 41, 43 and 46 becomes a "giving statemenf' as a result of Ava's 
"show of gratitude" in line 47. This emphasis departs from Goffman's 
(1971) thesis in the sense that Goffman looks to displays of gratitude as 
demonstrations 
that the affirmed relationship actually exists as the performer implies 
(Goffman, 1971 p 89). 
This therefore assumes that "the performer" (in this case Mum) ~ in 
..• fact· implied a particurar relationship (in this case, . that the family's act of 
granting discretionary behaviour to Ava should be considered as a gift). 
Meanwhile, the Discourse Analytic perspective would argue that the 
implied relationship is precisely what is problematised by Ava's response. 
In this sense, whether Mum "really" implied that the research relationship 
involves a gift from researched to researcher, is not at issue. Instead, 
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what requires attention is how far this implication is established as a 
"reality" for the participants. Indeed, I shall argue within this discussion 
that the "reality" of this implication is precisely the problematic issue that 
is skilfully managed within the extract through the application of humour. 
Before we move on to the management of humour in the extract some 
background to the concept of gift giving, or "prestatlon" as Mauss (1966) 
called ,it, is required. Here we can look to some of the classical 
sociological and anthropological work on the social convention of gift 
giving. 
In exploring gift-giving behaviour, Malinowski (1932) argued that 
participating pairs of actors are govemed by a notion of reciprocity, in 
which "equivalent services" are ongoingly exchanged in such a manner 
that, over time, a balance is maintained in which both parties benefit 
equally. Gouldner (1960) points out that this reciprocal relationship 
means that, in benefiting the recipient, the donor creates an obligation (p 
174). Ironically, this position - in which obligation is owed to a donor - can 
be seen as a benefit in itself. This is because, as Mauss (1966) intimated, 
prestation procures for the most recent donor in the ongoing process, an 
"authority and power" over the most recent recipient (Mauss, 1966 p 10). 
A similar observation then leads Gouldner (1960) to anticipate that 
societies will actually generate 
mechanisms which induce people to remain socially indebted to each other 
and which inhibit their complete repayment (Gouldner, 1960 p 175). 
- .-... -:--;-:-.- _ .... - •. - -----'" - ." - - ..• - - •.•.. - - . . ------ -._. 
In these cases, therefore, the reciprocation does not occur through 
counter-prestation but through the benefit to the donor that results from 
the moral constraint upon the recipient to show their gratitude, "or at least 
to maintain peace" with them (Gouldner, 1960 p 174). This picture of an 
exchange of benefits thus far greatly resembles other forms of 
commodity exchange, such as sale and barter. However, what these 
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writers argue is unique to prestation, is that it is an action displayed as 
"voluntary, disinterested and spontaneous" (Mauss, 1966 p 1). This leads 
Mauss to conclude that although 
The form usually taken is that of the gift generously offered ••• the 
a=mpanying behaviour is formal pretence and social deception, while the 
transaction itself is based on obligation and economic self-interest (Mauss, 
1966 p 1). 
Thus. gift giving behaviour, as represented by these authors, is founded 
upon an inherent incongruity. The donor marks their offering as a gift 
(rather than sale, barter etc.) through a display that reciprocity is 
unnecessary and that the gesture unilaterally (and thus disinterestedly 
and generously) benefits the recipient. However, the very mechanism 
though which the recipient ratifies the offering ~ a gift is the show of 
gratitude that actually provides reciprocation. It is because both parties 
are aware of this paradox that "formal pretence and social deception" are 
involved. 
One of the most notable manifestations of this social deception is the 
pretence, upheld by both parties, that a show of gratitude is spontaneous 
rather than obligatory. It is particularly pertinent to the current discussion 
that this formal pretence is potentially undermined if donors draw explicit 
attention to their actions as prestation. If the show of gratitude is the 
required response to prestation, when a donor highlights their act of 
prestation they would appear to have stolen the initiative from the 
recipient and belied the spontaneity of the recipienfs gratitude. For this 
- - reason, . L would.suggest . that. explicit reference. to their. gift giving 
behaviour becomes a more or less forbidden topic for donors. 
Tuming now to the use of humour in the extract, Mulkay (1988) identifies 
two modes of discourse available in Westem society - the serious mode 
and the humorous mode. He argues that 
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in the serious realm we normally employ a unitary mode of discourse which 
takes for granted the existence of one real world. and within which 
ambiguity. inconsistency. contradiction and interpretative diversity are 
potential problems (Mulkay. 1988 p 4). 
Meanwhile, 
humour actively creates and fosters ambiguity. and uses it to generate 
incongruity and interpre~tive contrast (p 28). 
Mulkay's does not, however, assert that these two realms are utterly 
distinct but rather. that the boundary between them is symbolic and 
ambiguous. This ambiguity utilises the implicit and allusive nature of 
humour to render any serious intent ultimately deniable, thereby allowing 
what might otherwise be problematic interactional business to be 
accomplished. As a result, Mulkay argues, the humorous mode is not 
properly understood as a ·self-contained altemative to serious discourse" 
since it is generally utilised as a resource for the accomplishment of 
serious business (p 217). What is more, the humorous mode does not 
merely make problematic social actions achievable, it actually feeds upon 
the paradoxes and incongruities of social life taking them up as 
"resources to be exploited, added to and enjoyed." (Mulkay, 1988 p 215). 
It is in this sense that I believe that humour is being employed within the 
extract under discussion. I would argue that Ava's utterance in line 47 
utilises the humorous mode in just such a manner. Ava responds with: 
..... , .. ~_47~Ava: ,', which is very [!illN of you thanks very much 
-~- .-._- ._. -.,"--~~- -- ,~-.-~.--... - .. '."'-,-
This, I would suggest, is a tease of Mum which is able to exploit the 
incongruity intrinsic to gift giving, thereby accomplishing a number of 
strategic actions in a manner impossible through the exclusive use of the 
serious mode. These actions include: interpretative multiplicity. denial, 
reproof and the handling offorbidden topics. 
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Let us begin by setting out some of the multiple interpretations that are 
simultaneously available for Ava's utterance: 
One available perspective is to see Ava's utterance as a sincere 
expression of gratitude in acknowledgement to a gift received. Such an 
interpretation explicitly establishes the family's discretion as a case of 
prestatioll, \Vhilesimultaneously acc;omp,lishing the required display of 
gratitude and acceptance of obligation appropriate to the receipt of such 
a gift. 
From another perspective, Ava's utterance can be considered as a tease 
of Mum. In explicating the work of Drew (1987) on teases as a particular 
instance of informal humour, Mulkay (1988) summarises Drew's analysis 
in the following way: 
Teases, Drew shows, are characterised by exaggerated or extreme 
reformulations of something that the recipient has said or done previously. 
These reformulations contrast with or contradict some statement, 
assumption, or meaningful action uttered, implied or carried out by the 
recipient They also, playfully, question the adequacy, reality or propriety of 
what the recipient has said or done, whilst simultaneously indicating that 
their own interpretative challenge is not to be taken seriously (Mulkay, 
1988 p 76). 
As a tease, Ava's utterance can be seen to carry out a number of actions. 
Firstly, Mum is established as having intentionally implied a gift-giving 
relationship. Meanwhile, this behaviour is also constructed as 
transgressional: as discussed above, intentionally drawing attention to 
onej's'gift~i~ing-~n~~n~titut~ a'ki~d ofPursuit"of'gratfuJd~;~d caiHor' ,'. 
obligation to be acknowledged, thereby contravening the "formal 
pretence" of gift giving (Mauss, 1966). At the same time, Ava 
accomplishes a denunciation of the behaviour, drawing attention to the 
transgression, questioning the ·propriety" of such behaviour and 
responding with irony. 
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A third available perspective would view Ava's utterance as actually 
constitutive of the gift-giving implication in Mum's words. In this light, 
Mum has no connection to the implication - it is not a feature of Mum's 
delivery, but of Ava's receipt. Thus, Ava's utterance becomes a tongue-
in-cheek pretence of hearing an implication that, in reality, it actively 
creates. From this viewpoint, Mum is involved in no transgressional 
activity - for she. herself has implied nothing and therefore has not 
contravened any conventions of prestation. On the contrary, it is Ava who 
may be seen as a transgressor, who highlights her own debt of gratitude, 
yet displays this gratitude in an ironic manner rather than with the 
required sincerity. In this way she is belying the acknowledgement of a 
debt that she herself has established as due. 
As Mulkay (1988) has shown us, humour is specifically designed to 
exploit the sort of interpretative multiplicity demonstrated by these three 
alternatives. Mulkay explains that the crucial element in exploiting 
multiple meanings centres around the ability to deny responsibility for any 
one possible interpretation. Within the extract under discussion I believe 
that there are two main ways in which the ability to deny intent is put to 
use. 
The first of these is the deployment of deniability for the purposes of 
. reproof. Mulkay suggests that "the allusive, self-denying discourse of the 
tease" allows a teaser to correct and reprove another "without 'really' 
doing so" (Mulkay, 1988 p 79). Whereas serious reproof might hazard the 
danger of a descent into conflict, the deniability of humour "makes such 
interpretative confrontation less likely' (p 79). Thus, Ava is able to 
reprove her mother in a manner that is deniable and therefore 
nonconflictual. 
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The second of these is the recruitment of denial for the purposes of 
broaching topics that are generally "forbidden" from open discussion. As 
discussed above, due to the incongruity of the donor's relationship with 
reciprocity, donor interest in gaining acknowledgement for their act of 
prestation becomes a more or less forbidden topic. It is this topic that is 
raised via the humorous mode in the current extract.. Mulkay (1988) 
discusses the work of Emerson (1973) on the ability of humour to handle 
the introduction of forbidden topics into conversation. Emerson studied 
the discourse of patients and nurses, particularly noting the expression of 
fears about death through the medium of humour. Emerson's conclusion 
was that the opportunity for denial presented by humour's simultaneous 
communication of multiple meanings permits speakers to 
introduce a forbidden topic into the conversation whilst insisting that it was 
never 'really' mentioned (Mulkay, 1988 p 81). 
In the case of this extract, Ava is able to introduce the topic of Mum's 
interest in presenting the family's discretion as a gift to Ava. 
To summarise the key conclusion, in the cases of both reproof and the 
introduction of a forbidden topic it is the simultaneous communication of 
several inconsistent messages that allows these potentially blameable 
social actions to be accomplished. This is because the denounceable 
interpretations co-exist alongside a number of other, less blameable, 
interpretations. As a result, any accusation levelled at such an 
interpretation can always be countered by invoking one of the other 
available interpretations._ Meanwhile~ the existence of ambiguity about the . _____ _ 
intended seriousness of the censurable message acts as a further safety 
net from social denunciation. 
At this point I would like to move on to Mum's response to Ava's 
utterance. In his discussion ofteases, Drew (1987) argues that there is a 
mixture of humour and hostility in teasing and that responses to teases 
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can be oriented to either or both of these messages. To this end he 
presents a quantity of data in terms of their position along a continuum: at 
one extreme he places serious responses to the hostility element; at the 
other he places joking responses to the humorous element; and in the 
middle ground he positions cases where 
recipients simultaneously acknowledge the humour of the tease and treat 
the tease seriously, by building laughter into the rejection/correction (Drew, 
1987 p 222). 
As Mulkay (1988) points out, it is the interpretative multiplicity of humour 
that allows such a duality of social actions - humour and hostility - to be 
simultaneously accomplished by teases. When evaluating the continuum 
of responses we see that this multiplicity is what proves problematic for 
handling the receipt of teases. The serious interpretation and 
consequences need to be attended to but so too does the non-
seriousness of the message. Thus, participants may be forced to make a 
choice between allowing the reproving message of the tease to stand 
uncorrected, or, if the humorous message is not responded to, risking 
accusations of po-facedness and lack of a sense of humour. 
Drew (1987) concludes from the analysis of his data that speakers who 
are teased usually respond to the serious message contained within the 
tease, despite the equal availability of the humorous message of the 
tease - in other words, responses tend to populate the serious end of his 
continuum. Drew postulates that speakers are motivated to return to the 
serious mode because teases 
playfully, question the adequacy, reality or propriety of what the recipient 
has said or done (Mulkay, 1988 p 76) 
Speakers will therefore be interested in re-establishing the reality and 
propriety of the action under attack. 
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In the case of this extract, Mum's response accomplishes a particularly 
skilful management of the competing messages. Here Mum actually 
makes a reciprocal tease of Ava: 
50 Mum: that's glIim alright [(.) don't mention it 
In throwing the tease back onto Ava, Mum accomplishes much more than 
simply establishing the propriety of her utterance, or even addressing the 
. . . . ... -. 
ambiguity over her responsibility for the gift giving implication. Instead, 
she undermines the status of the tease itself. Mum's response in line 50 
could be itself examined in terms of a questioning of the adequacy, reality 
and propriety of Ava's tease - questioning: the "adequacy" of Ava's 
display of gratitude which, in its irony, undermines its own construction; 
the "reality" of her (Mum's) intentional authorship of this implication; and 
indeed, the "propriety" of Ava's treatment of the serious issues of gift 
giving and obligation with such irreverence. 
It seems to me, that the reciprocal tease, as presented by Mum, is 
particularly well suited to manage teasing utterances. A reciprocal tease 
attends to both the humour and the hostility of the initial tease. At the 
same time, it manages the indeterminacy of the boundary between these 
two messages. This is because it mirrors and matches both of these 
properties of the initial tease. Thus, whatever message can be read into 
the initial tease is countered in the reciprocal tease - serious hostility 
counters serious hostility and light-hearted fun counters light-hearted fun, 
both in appro~riatemeasure. 
In this light, Mum's response to Ava represents an extremely subtle and 
effective management of the interpretative multiplicity she is presented 
with. She cannot be accused of po-facedness, but neither does she 
sacrifice amending Ava's reproving representation of her utterance -
indeed she instead accomplishes a transferral of reproof onto Ava. 
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Following from the above discussion, the laughter that follows this 
exchange, from Dad and Sue in lines 51 and 52, can likewise be seen to 
accomplish a multitude of actions. Firstly, it signals their appreciation of 
the humorous dimension of the exchange. Secondly, it supports and 
promotes a non-serious reading of the exchange, as opposed to a 
serious, hostile interpretation. In this sense it subtly diffuses the hannful 
potential of the latter reading. Thirdly, the laughter may be seen as an 
appreciation of the skill of the participants in disputing this potentially 
dangerous topic in a manner that avoids overt conflict. For example, the 
ability of Ava to raise this topic without causing a breakdown in the 
interaction and the ability of Mum to turn round the implicit accusation of 
transgression onto her accuser in a similarly acceptable way. 
At this point, flowing freely out of the laughter, comes a more serious 
orientation to the issues highlighted in the fonn of Dad's poignant 
question: 
53 Dad: ~ it what you wanted or IlQ1 
Ava then replies to this: 
55 Ava: [yes ifs exactly what I wanted 
Despite his immediately preceding laughter, Dad seriously attends to the 
implication regarding prestation and the family's discretion. Such an 
-- - -'-- - - -- --. 
interpretation fits in well with the conclusions of both Drew (1987) and 
Emerson (1973). Both writers report that speakers tend to respond to the 
serious message of, respectively, teases and humorous introductions of 
forbidden topics. One could theorise that the very ambiguity of Mum's 
retort, regarding the extent to which she is seriously responding to a 
serious message, fails to exploit the opportunity for open familial 
discussion of a topic whose problematic status generally prohibits its 
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introduction. I would suggest that Dad's contribution represents an 
attempt to exploit the opportunity that Mum has forgone. As discussed 
above, Mum's retort instead exploits the ability of a humorous response 
to skilfully manage a humorous quasi-attack. Indeed, Dad's response is 
far more characteristic than Mum's of those found by Drew (1987). In 
fact, his response mirrors very closely the response that Drew presents 
as a key element in his argument - whereby a speaker in one of his 
extracts responds to a tease in a manner that 
displays recognising that the remark was not serious when she laughs ..• 
[However,] that recognition does not prevent her going on to respond 
seriously to the tease (Drew, 1987 p 222). 
In order to unpack the significance of this exchange we again may draw 
upon some of the research and theory conceming gift giving behaviour. 
This time we can turn to the work of Caplow (1984). Examining the ritual 
of Christmas gift giving in the town of Middletown, Caplow puts forward a 
set of "rules" followed by members of the town's community.3 
One of the areas of Christmas gift giving that Cap low comments on, is 
that of selecting gifts. He lists three "rules" governing this, one of which is 
particularly pertinent to our discussion here: 
A Christmas gift should •.• demonstrate the givers familiarity with the 
receivers preferences (cap low, 1984 P 1313). 
In line with this, he observes that the possibility of error in gift selection is 
built into the culture, in that ''the four or five shopping days immediately 
. ~ - ~-. . <--... . .• 
after Christmas are set aside in Middletown stores for-rettirri-o-relCchange" 
of badly selected gifts" (Caplow, 1984 p 1314). He also notes that a 
3 Cap low later problematises the appropriateness of the term "rules" for the practices 
under question, particularly their unarticulated status. 
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social meaning is attached to selection errors - he particularly identifies 
misalignment in gifts between spouses or lovers as being taken as a sign 
. of alienation. 
These observations of Caplow's can be highly useful to our analysis of 
Dad's question: 
53 Dad: is it what you wanted or .QQl 
From this perspective, Dad is conceming himself with the requirement 
that the family "demonstrate" their "familiarity with the receiver's 
preferences". Indeed their gift giving generosity would be greatly 
undermined if their gift turns out to be "badly selected". Like the 
inhabitants of Middletown, therefore, Dad is orienting to the possibility of 
error in gift selection. Furthermore, I would suggest that, like Cap low's 
post-Christmas gift-retuming days, the existence of questions such as 
Dad's in line 53 are evidence that the possibility of selection errors are 
built into our Westem culture. Additional support for this generalisation 
can be found in other examples of research encounters. Observations 
. such as the following have been made by various researchers: 
Respondents constantly asked, 'Is this what you want, stop me talking if 
not' (Measor, 4985 pp 66-7) 
several stopped in mid sentence to ask, 'Is this really what you want?' 'Are 
you sure this is helping you?' (Devault, 1990 p 99). 
However, they are explained using various rather different perspectives. 
For 'example,--Measor (1985) attributes such comments to the self-
indulgence of talking about oneself at length, while Devault (1990) 
attributes them to the surprise of respondents when the research 
encounter tums out to be different from their expectations. Both of these 
conclusions can be considered valid and, indeed, useful. However, it 
presents an interesting altemative to view such comments in terms of 
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participant preoccupation with checking gift appropriateness. Such an 
altemative would suggest a more widespread availability amongst 
participants of conceptions that involvement in research represents gift 
donation - in terms of the special "discretion" they offer to researchers in 
complete disinterest of personal gain. 
Going back to my own data, Dad's question in line 53 may be seen as a 
request for verification that the family are offering a truly useful and well 
selected gift, thereby demonstrating "familiarity with the receiver's 
preferences" (Cap low, 1984 p 1313). At the very least, it can be seen as 
a display that the family are concemed about Ava's gift preferences. 
The final utterance in this section is Ava's reply to Dad's question: 
55 Ava: [yes ifs exactly what I wanted 
This represents a straightforward response to Dad that provides the 
requested confirmation that the family has been successful in selecting 
Ava's gift - Le. that they are giving her what she wants and needs for her 
research. 
Within the above discussion we have explored how and to what ends this 
extract of the talk deals with the research relationship by using some of 
the verbal conventions that normally accompany acts of prestation. The 
important point highlighted by this section of the talk is that the 
participants make relevant the sense that they are engaged in offering 
~ - -- ,,". . ... "-'-'~'''''' -" .- --- . 
the gift of their time and services to the researcher. In terms of the 
arguments explored in Chapter 3 Section D2b, this extract makes explicit 
the participants' active role in co-operating with the researcher - they give 
their co-operation as a gift to the researcher and thus invoke an 
obligation and moral constraint upon the researcher. Once again, 
therefore, the picture of the researcher as skilful expert "doing 
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egalitarianism" is somewhat undermined. Instead the researched are cast 
in the role of generous benefactors of the researcher's dispensation to 
"organise", "direct" and "co-ordinate" the research encounter. 
G NON-INTERVENTION 
The extract under di.scussion in this chapter concludes with the following 
Section of discourse: 
SECTION 11 
(2:44-5; 48-9; 54; 56-8; and 3:1-13) 
44 Mish: 
45 
48 Mish: 
49 
54 Mish: 
56 Mish: 
57 Sue: 
58 Ava: 
1 
2 Mish 
3 
4 Ava: 
5 Mish: 
6 Sue: 
7 
8 
9 Ava:'. 
10 Sue: 
11 Ava: 
12 
13 Sue: 
[WELL THE ONLY WAY 
THAT YOU COULDN'T QQ IT 
[WELL THE ONLY WAY 
THAT YOU COULDN'T DO IT 
THE ONLY WAY YOU [COULD IS TO SIT OUT= 
=AND JUST j§ten and not say anything 
why is it the [(important) thing 
[no no I don't want to 
[this is how I want it to be 
[NO I WAS JUST SAYING that is 
the only way that you could not do that 
yeh 
'cause you ~ to 
I dQnl think (.) 
she wouldn't be ~ to 
she'd be sitting there going [mmm mmm mmm 
. [((laughs» 
[trying to ~ something 
[can you irnagiM then 
(you'd say something that [( 
(you'd never [( ) 
While the interaction discussed as Section 10 is occurring, Mish tries in 
vain twice to make a point 
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44 Mish: [WELL THE ONLY WAY 
45 THAT YOU COULDN'T.QQ IT 
48 Mish: [WELL THE ONLY WAY 
49 THAT YOU COULDN'T DO IT 
However, it is not until the middle of a third attempt, on the termination of 
Section 10, that any response is made to her, despite the fact that all 
three attempts are made in a louder than normal voice. Mish begins her 
third attempt with: 
54 Mish: THE ONLY WAY YOU [COULD IS TO SIT OUT= 
She then continues with: 
56 Mish: =AND JUST !i§.ten and not say anything 
Ava eventually responds thus: 
58 Ava: [no no I don't want to 
1 [this is how I want it to be 
This, however, is framed by Mish as a merely partial understanding of her 
intent, for she protests and reiterates the first half of her comment: 
2 Mish [NO I WAS JUST SAYING that is 
3 the only way that you could not do that 
In doing so, Mish displays Ava's response as only orientated to the 
suggestion of sitting out and simply listening silently. At the same time, 
_. Mish emphasises instead, her formufation of this scenario as a rejected-
extreme option - ''the only way that you couldn't do it". Even here, 
however, when Mish has at last achieved a response - and one which 
requires correction at that - the floor is almost immediately taken from 
her: She is in the middle of her utterance of line S when she is cut off by 
Sue: 
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5 Mish: 'cause you ~ to 
Sue's observation is, that even the possibility of the silent observer would 
be unavailable to Ava - she says: 
6 Sue: I dQnl think (.) 
7 she wouldn't be m to 
8 she'd be sitting th.ere going [mmm mmm mmm 
10 Sue: [trying to ~ something 
Ava not only laughs at this scenario but adds to it simultaneously with 
Sue's continuation: 
11 Ava: 
12 
13 Sue: 
[can you im~ then 
[you'd say something that 
[you'd never [{ 
[( ) 
The latter parts of both of their utterances are then obscured when Dad 
contributes his next utterance - one that will not be analysed here, as I 
have chosen this point as the end of the current extract for analysis. 
The content of both Mish and Sue's scenarios are extremely telling in 
terms of what happens to the research situation where the participants 
are part of the researcher's family. Chapter 3 introduced the question 
formulated by Ribbens (1989) which asked 
how far are interviews different from other sorts of SOCial encounters? In 
particular,. how far and in what ways are they different from friendships of 
the type advocated by Oakley herself as appropriate for feminist research? 
(Ribbens, 1989 p 579) 
As I noted within that discussion (see footnote to Section D1c), although 
my own research does not answer precisely this question of friendship, it 
does provide an in situ exploration of a related issue: how the roles of 
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family member and interviewer differ and in what ways the dual 
performance of both roles might affect an actor's behaviour. 
Mish's conclusion is that in her dual status Ava could only maintain the 
role of non-directive, neutral observer if she were to "sit out and just listen 
and not say anything". Thus, Mish is suggesting that Ava would have to 
resort to the most extreme form of researcher detachment because any 
interaction with the family could only lead to involvement in the content of 
the discourse and a complete abandonment of neutrality. 
Sue goes even further than this, concluding that even this course of 
action would not be possible given the situation. She is saying that, even 
where Ava were to try to be silently non-directive, she would find herself 
fighting this resolution to silence and would not be able to prevent herself 
from becoming involved. 
Both of these comments from the sisters also attend to Dad's formulation 
of Ava's behaviour in Section 8, constructing Ava's oscillation - from 
being in "full flow' (line 19) and ·one of the team' (line 23) to "having a 
little push in one direction or another" (lines 30-1) - as the only available 
option for someone in her subjective position. 
It is extremely interesting to note how the family relationship between the 
. researcher and the researched is presented, at various points in this 
extract, as affecting both ends of the directive/non-directive continuum of 
behaviours. _ Firstly, . the family are _ constructed as responsible for_. 
preventing Ava from overly directive powers in their "normal" interactions. 
The family describe how they would "slap" her "down", "have a go af' her 
and tell her to "shut up" if she displayed outside the research encounter 
the sort of directive behaviour that, by implication, is being tolerated 
within it - a toleration characterised as being treated ''with a little bit more 
discretion", Please note how this supports the observation in Chapter 3, 
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that the following question by Ribbens (1989) should be applied to the 
researched as well as the researcher: 
Are interviews a sort of neutered social encounter, divorced from issues 
relevant to other social situations, so that you accept behaviour in 
interviews that you might expect to challenge elsewhere? (Ribbens, 1989 p 
581). 
This seems to suggest that the usual family protocol for ensuring that no 
single member is overly directive is being relaxed in the current 
interaction. 
Meanwhile, a picture is also painted of how Ava's established family 
relationship would also prevent her from overly non-directive behaviours 
within the research encounter. Here she is described as, in all probability, 
unable to sit silently without intervening in the goings on. Instead she is 
likely to be "sitting there going mmm mmm mmm ... trying to say 
something" and in this way unsuccessfully fighting any resolution to 
silence. 
Thus what counts as "acting as a family member or as an interviewer' is 
negotiated in the course of this conversation. For each role there is a 
construction of what actors are permitted to do and what they are 
dispositionally capable of: family members are allowed their ''twopenneth'' 
- they are slapped down if they step over the line, yet they are also 
incapable of withholding all contribution to the ongoing talk. Meanwhile, 
interviewers are given the discretion to direct others and control the 
.- ." -- ,., ,,~ .. ~. 
situation, yet they are also capable of being silently non-directive if they 
so desire. 
H CONCLUSION 
It is hoped that the above detailed analysis of an extended extract from 
my data has served as the sort of undertaking that Merton (1976) 
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recommended for understanding the skilful interactive work carried out in 
the performance of a social role and the indispensable utility of 
sociological ambivalence in achieving this. As can be seen, the status of 
various behaviours as egalitarian or authoritarian is not clear-cut. In 
addition, we see that egalitarianism can profitably become a topic 
discussed by the participants themselves as part of the research design. 
In conclusion, the central lesson to learn is that the egalitarianism of the 
research relationship will always be an ongoing product of negotiation 
within the research encounter itself, rather than a preordained constituent 
that is solely the property of the researcher to set according to academic 
dictates. In line with the general argument of this thesis, the momentum 
of this product and its foundation in negotiation reflect the rhetorical 
process of which it is a part. In this way, it is the taking up and defence of 
positions in relation to counter positions, on the subject of roles, 
behaviours and relationships which brings these dynamic entities into 
being. 
In the chapter which follows, this defence of positions in the face of 
challenge from counter-positions will be examined as a more overt 
phenomenon. Grounded in an empirical investigation, the pursuit of 
argument for sociable ends will be explored. 
" .. - .-'. 
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CHAPTERS "CHECK FORMULATIONS": 
PREFERENCE ORGANISATION AS RESOURCE - NOT 
CONSTRAINT 
A INTRODUCTION 
. .-.... -" •... 
In Chapters 3 and 5 the discursive construction of the research 
relationship as a social object was examined. In Chapter 3, the arena 
under examination was that of the scientific community, while in Chapter 
5, the research encounter was focused upon. In both of these arenas we 
found that what counted as the researcher's role and as egalitarianism, 
were constructed out of the rhetorical environment in which they are 
topicalised. 
In the academic arena, egalitarianism was seen as a resource to be 
drawn on in making a case for one's own way of conducting research. 
The flexibility and malleability of this r~sQurce was seen to arise from the 
irreconcilability of the norms and counter-norms of the social role of 
researcher. Space was to be found to enact the role in the very 
contradiction these competing norms produced, a space opened up by 
the contentiousness of the academic environment where positions have 
to be justified and warranted. 
When the research encounter itself was examined in Chapter 5, the 
researcher's role was found to resist preconstitution by the researcher 
alone. Instead, it was found that the role was once again constituted out 
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of discussion and debate, this time between the participants to this 
separate interaction. The emphasis in this chapter was upon the 
negotiation of what counts as the role of researcher amongst the 
participants to the interaction. In this negotiation, the social role of family 
member was utilised contrastively in order to map the boundaries of the 
researcher's role. 
In the current chapter, the constructive force of discussion, debate and 
argument will again be addressed. However, a rather different approach 
will be adopted. Here, assumptions concerning the pursuit of harmony 
and agreement by social actors will be contended. Under attack will be 
the conversation analytic work that champions a preference for 
agreement among speakers. The argument to be forwarded in its place 
will demonstrate that the organisation of talk should be treated within 
discourse and conversation analysis, as a resource for the 
accomplishment of social life, rather than as a normative matrix of 
constraint. In this light, the notion of a preference for agreement will be 
re-evaluated and a case will be made for the pursuit of sociability through 
the alternative channel of disagreement and argumentation. 
B CONVERSATION ANALYSIS AND PREFERENCE 
ORGANISATION 
:. 
!he Conversation Analytic proJect is principally concerned with examining 
the stable patterns of structural organisation within conversation. In 
Chapter 2 Section C, the nature of this enterprise was outlined and it was 
observed that the structure known as "preference organisation" had 
received a great deal of attention. The nature of that attention was then 
only briefly alluded to. In this chapter, the controversial question of 
preference organisation will be examined in much greater detail and my 
own position on the debate will be presented. 
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Bilmes (1988) describes CA as 
a structural and not a statistical undertaking ... The object is not to account 
for or to model what participants in particular situations normally do but to 
account for how what they do provides resources and constraints for the 
other participants. (p 173) 
However, this prescription of the Conversation Analytic enterprise is by 
no means universal. Levinson (1983), for example, orientates his 
analysis to "preferred actions", which are exactly the sort of correlationally 
derived behaviour models that Bilmes rejects - described as those 
actions "normally performed in the preferred format" (Levinson, 1983 p 
336). The problem with this focus on characteristic usage, is the way it 
overemphasises conversational structures as normative constraints. 
Heritage (1984), for example, concludes that cultural expectancies and 
patterns of accountability constrain us 
to adopt the institutionalized form regardless of our private desires and 
personal inclinations. (Heritage, 1984 p 268) 
This picture of institutionalised constraints completely ignores the other 
element of Bilmes's (1988) vision - the acknowledgement that 
expectancies are cultural resources. This contrary perspective highlights 
the difference between an expectancy and a prescription for behaviour. 
Prescriptive behaviours limit speakers to only one course of action. 
Expectancies, meanwhile, merely dictate that all behaviours, bar one, 
involve accountability. In this way, alternative behaviours are not only 
available, they gain the vital force of action precisely by their 
contravention or parody of the said expectancies. Therefore, not only is it 
erroneous to derogate cultural expectancies for curtailing individual 
freedom, they should be championed as the source from which 
interpersonal interaction becomes intelligible and thus possible. 
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The following chapter attempts to redress this imbalance and champion 
preference organisation as a resource rather than a constraint. 
1 ARGUMENT AS SOCIABILITY: AN ALTERNATIVE TO 
POLITENESS 
In Chapter 2 Section E, the importance of argument as a form of 
sociability was emphasised. It was found that the pursuit of harmony and 
avoidl,mce of argument has acquired ,an, unexplicated and taken-for-
granted status in conversation and discourse analysis. Such writers as 
Levinson (1983) and Heritage (1984), assume that the only way to 
accomplish sociability is through the harmonising force of politeness. 
However, writers such as Billig (1987, 1989, 1991, 1992, 1993), 
Knoblauch (1991) and Schiffrin (1984) present "argument as sociability" 
as an altemative route to sociable interaction. For example, Schiffrin 
(1984) suggested that social solidarity can be produced out of the 
nonserious and playful handling of conflict, whereby the ability of social 
ties to endure the potential threat of disintegration, attests to their 
strength and resilience. This emphasis on non seriousness as the 
mechanism by which conflict can be successfully managed, also 
highlights the importance of the "humorous mode" of Mulkay (1988) 
(discussed in Chapter 5) to the accomplishment of this alternative route 
to sociability. The significant feature of the humorous mode for the 
current discussion, is the way that it utilises the ambiguous contravention 
of expected behaviours to promote laughter. Here again then, 
expectancies can be seen to open doors to alternative realms of 
meaning, rather than to constrain speakers into a single course of action. 
The alternative route to sociability offered by argumentation, underscores 
the status of organisational structures, such as preference, as resources 
rather than constraints. This is because, not only can speakers choose to 
adopt or accountably contravene shared expectancies, but altemative 
modes, such as argument as sociability, exist as arenas in which their 
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contraventions can be legitimately staged. Moreover, as 
ethnomethodology stresses with its notion of reflexivity (Garfinkel, 1967), 
it is these very contraventions that ongoingly produce, reproduce and 
ratify the alternative modes themselves, as well as the acceptability of 
movement between modes. 
In the current analysis, preference structure will be examined within the 
discursive mode of argument as sociability. In studying an alternative to 
the "normative" mode of interaction which dominates the CA literature, it 
is hoped that this analysis will allow the more universal features of 
preference organisation to be distilled from its merely "normative" 
manifestations. In this way, the properties that render this structural 
phenomenon a valuable resource for accomplishing social business will 
be highlighted and its image as a constraining form of normative dictates 
will be undermined. 
Before I begin this, however, I would like to briefly summarise the original 
"error" of mistaking the "normative" usage of preference organisation for 
part of the structure itself. I believe that much can be learnt both from the 
nature of the error itself, and from the manner in which it was 
identified/constructed. 
2 PREFERENCE FOR AGREEMENT: A GENERAL PRINCIPLE? 
The assumption that speakers pursue harmony and avoid argument 
underscored the very first examination of preference organisation as a 
subject of study. When Sacks (1987) initiated this topic of inquiry, he did 
so by suggesting that conversation includes a "preference for agreement" 
as a "general principle", which he took to be a "formal and anonymous" 
apparatus independent of personal desire or local context (p 54). In an 
attempt to identify this apparatus, Sacks highlighted the importance of 
delay as a mechanism for displaying disagreement with a prior speaker 
as a "dispreferred" option when compared to agreement. He argued that 
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agreements occur "contiguously" (early in the turn) while disagreements 
are typically "pushed rather deep into the turn" (Sacks, 1987 p 58). 
Writers as recent as Buttny (1993) have supported this belief in a 
preference for agreement. 
This notion of a "preference for agreement" was later rejected when it 
was noted that 
Agreement is not invariably ... a preferred next action (Pomerantz. 1984 p 
64). 
Pomerantz (1984) was one of the first to establish that disagreement and 
dispreference are not inherently linked. Pomerantz identified a concrete 
empirical example whereby agreement is actually dispreferred, in 
responses to self-depreciations. She then compared disagreements 
under conditions of agreement preferred with agreements under 
conditions of disagreement preferred (such as after self-depreciations). 
She found that these utterances exhibited very similar features, which 
she termed a "dispreferred turn shape". In this way, the common element 
was identified as dispreference and not disagreement. 
Following this, CA shifted its attention away form merely dispreferred 
disagreement, to an examination of the nature of turn shapes. In doing 
so, they added additional components to Sacks's "delay", thereby 
establishing a set of features typical of dispreferred seconds. In contrast, 
preferred seconds were presented as identifiable through the absence of 
such components .,. (Atkinson c and . Drew,,1979; Levinson,,, 1983; 
Pomerantz, 1984). In this way, a new relationship between preference 
and agreement was established. For these analysts, it became clear that, 
however "normative" a preference for agreement might be, given the 
correct context, as in the case of self-depreciations, the apparatus is 
equally available for displaying disagreement as preferred. 
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3 DIVORCING PREFERENCE ORGANISATION FROM THE 
PURSUIT OF SOCIABILITY 
As I have stated, one of the central aims of this chapter is to carry out a 
similar process of separating the "normative" usage of preference 
organisation from the universal resource. In this case, as I have noted, 
the problematic assumption concerns the role of politeness-as-sociability 
in conversation. Ironically, the same article by Pomerantz (1984), which 
sparked the rejection of agreement as inherently preferred, also 
participated in the adoption of sociability, in the form of politeness, as an 
intrinsic feature of preference organisation. 
Pomerantz argued that preference organisation represents the 
functioning of a sociability norm in conversation. It was via this argument 
that she accounted for instances of a preference for disagreement. She 
concluded, for example, that it is more sociable for a second speaker to 
deny the validity of a first speaker's self-depreciations by disagreeing with 
them, than to attest to the acuity of their judgement by agreeing. 
However, the key figure in proposing sociability as constitutive of 
preference organisation was Heritage (1984). 
Heritage (1984) is a major figure in promoting the unexplicated 
assumption that sociability and solidarity are necessarily achieved 
through agreement and affiliation. This assumption is apparent in his 
treatment of delay. Heritage contends that affiliative actions are produced 
early in a turn, while disafiliative actions are delayed. This leads him to 
conclude that 
the institutionalized timing features of preference design maximize the 
tendency for socially solidary actions to take place. In short, the preference 
system itself is intrinsically 'biased' towards solidary actions (Heritage, 
1984 p 276). 
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However, he assumes without explication that agreements and 
acceptances are affiliative actions, while disagreements and rejections 
are disaffiliative. Heritage also makes the assumption that sociability is 
intrinsically tied up with the pursuit of agreement and harmony, in his 
comments on the nature of accounts. In discussing the "no fault" 
character of typical accountability practices in dispreferred responses, 
Heritage concludes that accounts universally and 
inherently serve to diminish the opportunities for proliferating 
disagreement or contest (Heritage, 1984 p 272). 
As discussed in Section 1 above, and in Chapter 2 Section E, other 
analysts do not agree either that agreement is necessarily affiliative, 
while disagreement is disaffiliative, or that accounts are invariably used to 
avoid disagreement and contention. The most notable authors identified 
as advocating argument as a sociable pursuit were Bil/ig (1987, 1989, 
1991, 1992, 1993), Schiffrin (1984) and Knoblauch (1991). 
For Knoblauch (1991), disagreement affords "a high degree of sociability" 
(p 187). According to Knoblauch, this is produced by the long-term 
affiliative action that disagreement provides for the playful circumvention 
of power asymmetries. Meanwhile, Schiffrin (1984) observes that 
argumentation actively employs competitive discursive structures, yet 
relies upon underlying cooperative and other-protective assumptions. In 
this way, Schiffrin contradicts the conclusion of Heritage (1984) that 
accounting practices maintain social solidarity by serving as "threat- and 
conflict-avoidance procedures" (Heritage, 1984 pp 272-3). Instead, 
Schiffrin asserts that argument promotes sociability by displaying a 
tolerance of conflict through the playful enactment of such conflict -
tolerance made possible by the taken-for-granted level of intimacy of the 
relationship (Schiffrin, 1984 p 331). 
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This contrary assertion draws our attention to the essential availability of 
threat- and conflict-handling procedures in maintaining the social 
solidarity of particularly intimate relationships. 
It should be clear that this challenge to authors such as Pomerantz 
(1984) and Heritage (1984) does not attempt to deny the operation of 
sociability in the apparatus of preference organisation. Instead, it merely 
. a.sserts that sociability can be performed by social actors in very different .. 
ways. As a result, explaining the design of a turn shape in terms of 
sociability tells us little or nothing, when both extreme politeness and out 
and out adversarial verbal combat can be attributed to motivations 
towards sociability. We see that although social solidarity can be 
maintained via conflict-avoidance (cf. Heritage, 1984) sociability can also 
be accomplished through courting the potential disaster of conflict-
threatening behaviour and surviving as a solidary social unit (cf. Schiffrin, 
1984). The lesson, then, is that whatever may "generally" be the case, 
actors are free to recruit preference organisation to perform any 
appropriate action, often precisely by accountably contravening the more 
"normative" usage. 
4 DISPREFERENCE: DIVORCING "RELUCTANCE MARKERS" 
FROM ACCOUNTS 
Viewing preference organisation as a deployable structure, malleable in 
the hands of conversationalists, also occasions a rather different 
treatment of the components that make up that structure. In his attempt 
to "model what participants in particular situations normally do" (Bilmes, 
1988 p 173), Levinson (1983) divided the features of dispreferred 
seconds into four categories: delays, including pauses, insertion 
sequences, and the second category of prefaces - which in turn included 
discourse markers, token agreements, qualifiers and hesitations; 
accounts; and a "declination component" in which the action itself is 
performed, typically in an indirect or mitigated manner. Equipped with this 
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list of features for ticking off appropriate utterances, Levinson was then in 
a position to draw conclusions about the existence of preference 
structure as an institutionalised form. 
Bilmes (1988) also differentiated component features of dispreferred 
seconds. For example, in discussing the "dispreference markers" of 
Pomerantz (1984), Bilmes grouped the first two categories - delays and 
prefaces - under his own heading of "reluctance markers". However, for 
Bilmes this distinction was instituted in order to determine how this 
particular group of "competencies" (Heritage, 1984) functioned. Indeed, 
he directed his discussion only to these features, on the basis that 
accounts. ... may be yet another partially independent phenomenon 
(Bilmes, 1988 p 173). 
I would suggest that this acknowledgement of the partial independence of 
accounts from reluctance markers results from Bilmes's "structural" rather 
than "statistical" approach to CA. Rather than seeing preference 
organisation as some apparatus of constraint, which can be definitively 
captured once mapped out concretely, Bilmes is interested in how each 
individual feature of the structure operates as a resource. 
It is this latter approach that I shall adopt in the current discussion. Such 
a perspective frees us from assuming that the various features of 
dispreference will necessarily co-occur and, moreover, allows us to 
differentiate between them in terms of what they accomplish in a given 
empirical instantiation. What I hope to demonstrate, is that the very 
institutionalisation of the pattem acts as part of the resource itself and 
that the various component parts of this pattem are not interchangeable. 
In particular, accounts are, unsurprisingly enough, orientated to 
accountability in a much more overt manner than "reluctance markers". 
With this more detailed and differentiated approach to the phenomenon, 
we can examine the operation of preference organisation in 
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accomplishing the relatively little-documented discursive mode of 
argument as sociability. 
5 "CHECK FORMULA TlONS": A CONCRETE EXAMPLE 
It has been through the study of my own argumentative data that the 
overgeneralisations spoken of above have come into focus. For, by 
deviating from "normative" conversational patterns, this data has shed a 
questioning light on some of the conclusions· of earlier work. Most 
notably, it questions the usefulness of sociability for explaining the shape 
of preference organisation, and the unfortunate preoccupation of CA with 
the normative usage of discursive devices, rather than with the manner in 
which such devices accomplish the business at hand (both of which were 
the concerns of Bilmes (1988)). This focusing dimension of deviation from 
CA's accepted norms may be related to the status of my own data as 
interaction within a Jewish family. It has been noted that "argument as 
sociability" may hold a special place in Jewish culture (Schiffrin, 1984; 
Tannen, 1989) and thus it may be this subtle shift in normativity that has 
drawn my attention to the overgeneralisations of traditional CA. Whatever 
is the case, our interest here does not lie in possible cross-cultural 
differences, but rather in the simultaneous availability to social actors of a 
variety of institutionalised forms for the accomplishment of their 
discursive business. 
It is my belief that this same argumentative data that has led me to re-
examine some of CA's assumptions, is the very material that is uniquely 
suited to unpacking them. Indeed, as in the work of Pomerantz (1984), 
the introduction of a concrete example will ground the investigation in 
empirical analysis. With this in mind, the examination which follows will 
centre around a phenomenon which has emerged from my data and 
which I have named "Check formulations". Thus, in the tradition of CA, 
disembodied abstract theorising will be put aside in favour of an 
investigation into the practical application of this shift in theoretical focus. 
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"Check formulations" are rhetorical moves by first speakers which, as in 
chess, challenge an opponent to defend their position under threat of its 
defeat. The key feature of this situation, is that the opponent is forced 
cnto the defensive. Thus, although an immense variety of responses are 
available, the frame is set for evasive manoeuvres. This "check" situation 
is achieved in argumentation when a first speaker purposely constructs a 
characteris"tion of the second speaker's, argument that renders a simple 
agreement by the second speaker into a form of surrender of that 
argument. The design of Check formulations also includes an additional 
feature, highlighted by the ambiguity of the term "check". For, the 
rewording of the second speaker's argument is displayed not only as a 
c:-:allenge, but also as a verification or checking procedure, with room for 
::-:e second speaker to confirm or deny this reading of their argument. 
F~rthermore, it is this room for manoeuvre which relates the formulations 
to the "check" rather than "checkmate" scenario in chess. 
Tne distinctive features of Check formulations are their initiation using 
"so" and contrastive stress on a single item. Meanwhile, the responses 
are characterised by acoounts, counter-attacks, and a very directed 
utilisation of "reluctance markers" (Bilmes, 1988). Applying the key 
insights from existing analysis in the literature to date, along with an in-
depth analysis of extracts from my own data, I shall explore both the 
formulations and their responses. 
Check formulations achieve their status as a counter-example for some " .. 
cf the conventional CA conclusions for two main reasons. Firstly, and 
most importantly, they highlight that the synthesis of what has been taken 
as a universal apparatus may merely be the product of an overemphasis 
cn the normative usage of the device. Thus, in calling into question the 
accepted relationship between reluctance markers and accounts, Check 
formulations require us to see that each feature is independently 
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available for communicating preference and that the manner in which 
they are combined is what achieves the desired accomplishments of 
speakers. 
In addition, however, there is a second manner in which Check 
formulations challenge traditional CA assumptions. As a concrete 
example of the discursive mode of argument as sociability, they 
demonstrate that the pursuit of sociability does not constrain speakers to 
act in a certain way. Instead, it can be seen that an organisational 
apparatus, such as preference structure, can be deployed by speakers 
flexibly and skilfully for the accomplishment of their desired interactional 
ends. 
6 CHECK FORMULA TIONS AS INFERENCES 
Schiffrin (1987) carried out a detailed examination of various "Discourse 
Markers" in conversation, dedicating one of her chapters to the uses of 
·so' and because. Schiffrin argues that 
Once we consider background knowledge as 'warrants', and 
interpretations which use background knowledge as 'inferences', we can 
see that the warrantlinference relation creates two shifts in information 
state (Schiffrin, 1987 p 205). 
The first of these, Schiffrin identifies as occurring when previously 
unshared background kri~wledg~ is shared, that is, when a warrant is 
presented. Schiffrin suggests that because is used to mark this first shift. 
The second, inferences, occurs when "newly shared information is used 
as a basis for interpretation of topical talk" and is marked, according to 
Schiffrin, by the use of "so" (Schiffrin, 1987 P 205). 
Most importantly for the purposes of this chapter, Schiffrin discusses the 
outcome of a second speaker displaying their utterances as inferences 
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warranted by the prior utterances of a first speaker. She uses the 
following extract to illustrate this: 
EXTRACTS1 
Zelda:They live in the Northeast 
Debby: Oh okay. So you have a lot of family up in the Northeast. 
(Schiffrin, 1987 P 215) 
Schiffrin argues that, by marking her formulation with "so", Debby 
presents it as an inference warranted by Zelda's information. Schiffrin 
concludes that, in marking one's inference thus - as warranted by a first 
s;::eaker - second speakers can shift (at least some of the) responsibility 
for its accuracy to first speakers. In addition, the upshot of this shift is to 
return the floor to the first speaker for confirmation that the inference is 
legitimate. 
Schiffrin then goes on to outline how such a discursive device can be 
utilised for "challenges in interpersonal arguments" (p 216). For this she 
uses the following extract of data: 
EXTRACTS2 
Freda: a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
Jack: e. 
Freda: f. 
Jack: g. 
Freda: h. 
Jack: i. 
j. 
See we had no men teachers in there. 
We had somebody come in the - in the assembly, 
and y'just eh he wore a pair of pants. 
and everybody was so excited. 
Well nobody paid attention !'what was said then. 
Maybe not! hhhhh 
So aca demically wasn't so hot, was it? 
No. 
Their mind wasn't on what uh ... it was all about, then. 
I mean this is the point I was trying fmake. 
(Schiffrin, 1987 P 216) 
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Jack first elicits an agreement from Freda in line f. He then uses "so" to 
mark his next utterance as an inference warranted by Freda's own 
admission. This effectively returns the floor to her to legitimate the 
inference. Indeed, were she to dispute the inference she would risk 
appearing inconsistent, for the inference has been rendered jointly her 
responsibility by being displayed as following logically from her own 
warrant. Schiffrin concludes that 
the division of responsibility created by a joint warrant/inference pair can 
strengthen a challenge by forcing one's opponent either to admit a self-
contradiction or concede a point (Schiffrin, 1987 p 216). 
It is this "joint warrant/inference pair" that I have labelled a "check 
formulation" and which I shall explore in the following analysis. 
C "CHECK FORMULATIONS": AN ANALYSIS OF SOME 
EMPIRICAL EXAMPLES 
1 A "CHECK FORMULA TION" AND ITS RESPONSE 
Let us now turn to an example from my own data. This exchange occurs 
in the midst of the second tape of family interaction. The subject of 
conversation immediately prior to this extract has been concerned with 
typical "sides" taken up within the family's arguments. 
EXTRACT 1 
(2/1217) 
45 Ava: 
46 
48 Mish: 
49 Mum: 
50 Mish: 
51 
52 Ava: 
53 Mish: 
54 Sue: 
55 Mish: 
usually (.) Mum (.) likes to sort of (.) 
[Mum agrees with Dad 
no [well Mum's got much Qgtter 
[I like being 
since she's been doing her ~ege thing 
Mum's got much= 
=so it was Qill!? [that she agreed with Dad 
[more 
[much better at what: 
=no:yes 
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56 
57 
58 Sue: 
1 Mish: 
because she wasn't confident 
in her Q'ml opinion 
yeh [now she is 
[now Mum's confid[ent 
In line 52 of this extract, Ava makes the following Check formulation: 
52 Ava: =so it was !lalI? [that she agreed with Dad 
As in Extract S2, Ava begins her formulation with "so", thus marking it as 
an inference warranted by Mish's utterance in line 48, A further 
observation by Schiffrin (1987) is also pertinent to this utterance. In 
discussing the use of oh in clarification sequences, Schiffrin states that 
Clarification is also requested when B either repeats or questions a portion 
of A's prior utterance with rising intonation and contrastive stress on the 
repairable (Schiffrin, 1987 p 79). 
In line 52 Ava questions a portion of Mish's earlier utterance, using rising 
intonation and contrastive stress on "bad?". However, this does not 
appear to be a simple case of a request for clarification via the 
identification of a repairable. It appears more as a request for elaboration 
via the identification of what might be termed a "problematic premise": in 
stressing "bad", she identifies "better" (line 48) as questionable. Sacks 
(1987) pointed out that ongoing disagreement is often portrayed as an 
issue of misunderstanding. In this light, the more similar a challenge is to 
a simple matter of repair, the less disruptive will be the conflict of opinion. 
Thus, while the "so" inference mimics a helpful participation in the joint-
construction of an idea, the contrastive stress mimics straightforward 
repair - a case of mistaken word choice. Put together, these two features 
display a benign appearance of mere misunderstanding, while 
accomplishing an adversarial questioning of the underlying validity of 
Mish's original "warrant". It is in this sense that the dual status of the 
"check" displays its subtlety, representing not only the challenge of the 
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chess-player's "check" but also the tentative request for verification 
associated with the more generalised reading of "checking" behaviour. 
In this way, Ava's challenge has two parts: Mish is established as 
(partially) responsible for Ava's inference (like Freda in Schiffrin's 
example); meanwhile, the inference in question is explicitly constructed 
as problematic. Thus, an issue of simple responsibility becomes an issue 
of accountability for a questionable conclusion. This, in effect, renders 
any disputation of the inference by Mish a form of self-contradiction. Mish 
is therefore caught in a double bind: she cannot support the inference 
without potentially undermining her ongoing argument; and she cannot 
refute the inference without potentially contradicting that same argument. 
Tnis, however, is not a "checkmate", it is merely a "check", for Mish has 
at her disposal a whole army of response designs that can be creatively 
marshalled into her evasive manoeuvres. 
In Extract 1 Mish makes the following response to Ava's Check 
formulation: 
55 Mish: 
56 
57 
=no:yes 
because she wasn't confident 
in her Q:tLD opinion 
Pomerantz (1984) examined in her analysis utterances in which 
agreements and disagreements occur within the same turn, despite their 
obvious contrastive natures. Pomerantz categorised such utterances as 
dispreferreds which act so as to display reluctance to disagree with a 
prior speaker. This categorisation was based on two observations. Firstly, 
focusing only upon examples in which a disagreement is prefaced by an 
agreement marker, Pomerantz insisted that 
such tum shapes are used for disagreeing rather than agreeing 
(Pomerantz, 1984 p 75). 
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Secondly, Pomerantz argues that when agreement and disagreement 
components co-occur in a response, both components are 
characteristically weak in nature. Although she uses as part of her 
argument the circular proof that because they occur together they are 
thus weak forms, she also notes, more helpfully, that strong 
disagreements are characteristically "an evaluation that is directly 
contrastive to the prior evaluation" while the weaker types 
are formed as partial agreements/disagreements: as qualifications, 
exceptions, additions, and the like (Pomerantz, 1984 p 74). 
In this way she concludes that 
The disagreements that occur in the agreement-plus-disagreement tums 
are not the strong type, that is, same reierent-contrastive evaluation 
construction (Pomerantz. 1984 p 74). 
The utterance of lines 55-57 does not appear to fit into the pattern 
identified by Pomerantz. Firstly, in Mish's response, a disagreement 
prefaces an agreement, rather than vice versa. Secondly, neither the 
agreement nor the disagreement component are in the weak form 
Pomerantz identifies. Indeed, in exploring self-depreciations as an 
exemplar of agreement dispreferred, Pomerantz observes that such 
negations as "no' and ohm_mho are often produced as the first component 
in responses to self-depreciations. She offers these as examples of overt 
disagreement which attest to their status as preferred next actions. I 
would suggest, therefore, that the disagreement preface "=no:" provided 
by Mish, should be viewed as an immediate and strong "same referent-
contrastive evaluation construction" (Pomerantz. 1984). It is only after 
this that the contradictory "yes" is voiced, which again occurs in a strong 
format. 
I suggest that it would be a mistake to view Mish's "=no: yes" as a 
"reluctance marker" (Bilmes, 1988). Rather, it would seem that the strong 
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disagreement is used precisely to display the antithesis of reluctance. 
The point is, that any delay would be read as a display of reluctance. 
Therefore, when immediate and unconstrained objection to the pejorative 
implications of the inference is performed along with an extended "0:", its 
stark contrast to a pause does tangible social business. The message 
appears to be, that the possibility of being read as reluctant should be 
avoided at all costs - even if the cost is overt self-contradiction, as occurs 
here with the forceful negative being countered with an equally adamant 
"yes". I would therefore suggest that the disagreement preface here acts 
as a marker to display the impulsively unheeding avoidance of a 
dangerously implicative pause. 
This "no:yes" does not, of course, occupy the entire turn, for it is followed 
by an account. In traditional CA, accounts are viewed as 
a recurrent and rcutine component of dispreferred seconds (Potter and 
WethereIJ, 1987 p 84). 
They figure in both Levinson's (1973) and Heritage's (1984) lists of the 
characteristics of dispreference. However, as noted in the introduction to 
this chapter, Bilmes (1988) has reservations about whether or not 
accounts should be viewed separately from the other components of 
preference organisation. I believe that this response by Mish exhibits 
empirical support for this reservation. If the above analysis is correct and 
the utterance does not include any reluctance markers, but rather 
displays "not doing" reluctance, then its co-occurrence with an account 
becomes significant. 
I would like to suggest that the particular situation in which second 
speakers find themselves following Check formulations, has a major 
effect upon accountability. Knoblauch (1991) suggests that contradictions 
make conditionally relevant a more extensive treatment of the 
contradicted item (Knoblauch, 1991 p 173 ). Conditional relevance is 
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seen to be created out of the tension between the contradicting and 
contradicted utterances. This not only problematises them, but requires 
what Jacobs and Jackson (1981) term an "expansion", in which a second 
tum converts (part or all of) a prior tum into the topic for a third tum. 
According to Knoblauch, these expansions take such forms as 
arguments, backings and warrants. 
Further.· to this, Knoblauch observes that contradiction is not· only 
achieved by overt gainsaying. It is also accomplished via "calling into 
question" (Knoblauch, 1991 p 174). This he defines as 
a question which does more than just require an answer. It requires 
justification afthe preceding utterance (Knoblauch, 1991 p 174). 
From these insights we can conclude that "more extensive treatment", 
"expansion" and "justification" are dimensions of accountability. This 
means that in Extract 1 the Check formulation, in "calling into question" 
Mish's prior statement, renders both agreement and disagreement 
accountable. Indeed, it is only through an account that the argument-
undermining threat of either choice can be avoided. In this case, the. 
account is offered as a warrant which recasts agreement with the 
inference in a morally defensible format. 
56 Mish: because she wasn't confident 
57 in her QYi!l opinion 
In this way the "checkmate" of simple agreement or disagreement is 
evaded. 
Before we tum to a second example we should note Sue's contribution in 
line 58: 
58 Sue: yeh [now she is 
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This is important for the extract which follows because here Sue casts in 
her lot with Mish in the discussion, a position which she goes on to 
support. Finally, Mish overlaps this utterance with a very similar 
conclusion: 
1 Mish: [now Mum's confid[ent 
As a result, both sisters simultaneously make the same point. This 
establishes/displays that they are in a relationship of alignment in the 
argument which follows. 
2 A SECOND EXAMPLE 
This extract of data is followed by another example of a Check 
formulation - the talk continues with: 
EXTRACT 2 
(2/12/8) 
2 Ava: 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 Mish: 
9 Sue: 
10 
11 
[but the fag that 
we're still a QM family 
andallto~er 
is partly because Mum supports ~ (.) 
so its (.) so this is a ~ thing 
that she [now doesn't support 
[no they support each lltb.er (.) 
no well its ok 
for Mum to disagree with him ~ 
rcause we're lllI individuals 
In this extract Ava begins by accounting for her problem with Mish's 
argument: 
2 Ava: 
3 
4 
5 
[but the fag that 
we're still a ~ flIrnily 
and all tolmlher 
is partfy because Mum supports OM (.) 
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She does this by establishing Mum's responsibility for the family's 
intactness as a "fact" - and thus irrefutable - brought about by her support 
of Dad (cf. Potter, 1996). In lines 6-7 Ava then makes a Check 
formulation marked by the use of "so" and the contrastive stress on 
6 
7 
so its (.) so this is a gQQQ thing 
that she [now doesn't support 
The effect of Ava's prefacing account of lines 2-5, means that her 
inference in lines 6-7 becomes much more than a mere reiteration of the 
earlier inference (line 52). This is because, the prefacing account makes 
the following premise: that Mum's support of Dad in the past was crucial 
to the family's history of unity. To then follow this premise with a 
rewording of the earlier Check formulation - with its questioning overtones 
- implies a counter-inference from the premise: that were Mum's 
behaviour to change and instead fail to support Dad, family disintegration 
would follow. The prefacing account can therefore be seen as an 
alternative warrant that points to exactly the opposite inference to that of 
the Check formulation - that it is good, not bad, for Mum to agree with 
Dad. Thus, by following such a counter-warrant with a repeat of the 
previous inference, Ava adds additional strength to the questionable 
nature of Mish's original warrant (line 48). 
Irf.I!omerantz's (1984) examination of self-depreciations as an example 
of disagreement preferred, in addition to the use of negations such as 
"no" and "hm-mh", another example of the "range of forms" in which "self 
depreciations are overtly disagreed with" are disaffiliations such as ·Oh: 
that's ridiculous· (Pomerantz. 1984 pp 86-7). Pomerantz explains that 
A speaker may disaffiliate with a prior critical assessment by proffering an 
assessment that makes no claim of access, that is, by proffering a critical 
assessment of the prior talk (Pomerantz. 1984 p 87). 
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I believe that Mish's response to Ava in line 8 unites both these features. 
8 Mish: [no they support each Q1b,er (.) 
Not only is "no· the first component, but this utterance critically assesses 
Ava's formulation. By insisting that Mum and Dad mutually support each 
other, Mish disaffiliates with Ava's suggestion that it is only Mum who 
supports Dad and not vice versa. Thus Mish's response mirrors quite 
closely the format identified by Pomerantz for disagreement as a 
preferred second. 
Meanwhile, Sue's response exhibits the complimentary format of 
agreement dispreferred. 
9 Sue: 
10 
11 
no well its ok 
for Mum to disagree with him now 
rcause we're all individuals 
Here we find an exact reversal of the heavily documented "yes, but" 
marker and partial disagreement (Pomerantz, 1984; Maynard, 1985; 
Schiffrin, 1984, 1985). In this case, a "no" is softened by the discourse 
marker "well", and then followed by a partial agreement, in lines 9-10, 
and an account for this in line 11. The "yes, but" phenomenon is 
acknowledged to display that the disagreement which follows only 
-
contradicts another speaker in some minor way that does not signify any 
real difference of opinion. In this utterance by Sue, the reverse is 
attempted. Here, the agreement which follows her "no well" is displayed 
as only agreeing with Ava in some minor way that does not signify any 
real coincidence of opinion, while the prior bone of contention remains 
alive. Billig (1989) notes that the "yes, but" mode of disagreeing can be 
utilised, not only to minimise disagreement, but in other circumstances, to 
avoid the ending of disagreement in a resolution that concedes one's 
sovereign opinion. Billig asserts that, in his data, a speaker's use of "but I 
still maintain ..... in response to the opinion of another speaker, signals 
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"her wish not to let the matter rest in agreement" and therefore "that her 
own subjectivity remains intact and unpersuaded" (p 213). I would 
suggest that a similar avoidance of agreement occurs in Sue's utterance. 
In this way, the discursive mode of argument as sociability can be 
maintained and Sue can agree without loosing her overall position in the 
dispute. 
As explained in the previous example, Check formulations ensure that a 
simple disagreeing "no" would hazard undermining one's argument, thus 
creating a self-contradiction. Meanwhile, a simple "yes", or even a ,. 
softened agreement, as displayed here, would have morally pejorative 
implications,l Both of these responses therefore become accountable. 
Thus, Sue circumvents the peril of the "check" situation by incorporating 
, 
an account into her response (line 11). 
This account targets the un uttered counter-inference spoken of earlier, in 
which it is implied that any change in Mum's behaviour from supporting 
Dad would hazard a dissolution of the family. In her response, Sue does 
not dispute the premise that equates a history of support with family 
unity. Instead, by bringing in a new variable, she argues for a qualitative 
difference between the historic and current situations. She argues that 
Ava's implied inference does not follow because "~" things are 
different "'cause we're all individuals". In this way she deftly avoids any 
disruptive implications for the argument she has supported. At the same 
time, however, she is able to agree with Ava's first premise (lines 2-5) 
-~ ..• -.. . .... -.- _ ... --- ----,._- "",.- -- . ----" -
which portrays Mum in a good light. Put another way, the "no well" and 
partial agreement, followed by an account, allows Sue to temporarily and 
provisionally agree with Ava, while ensuring that the underlying 
disagreement continues on. 
1 Note that this argument has become Sue's concern both by her signalling of support for 
it in line 58, and via her current involvement in the dispute. 
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As in the first example, therefore, the responses (of both Mish and Sue) 
to Ava's Check formulation begin with an unmitigated "no". In addition, 
Sue's response combines this "no" with "well" and an accounted-for 
agreement which justifies her argument and calls Ava's into question -
implying that Ava's inference is based on an outdated premise. Here 
again, we find unexplicated delay is strenuously avoided following the 
Check formulation, while the importance of the account is rendered 
paramount. 
Once more therefore, Ava's interlocutors successfully employ the 
resources of preference organisation to ensure that Ava's "check" fails to 
achieve a "checkmate". The important observation, which cannot be too 
much reiterated, is that this success results from the members' minute 
discernment (however unconscious) as to the relative appropriateness of 
the various resources available, and the flexibility with which they can be 
deployed. Thus, institutionalised forms and normative usages do not 
constrain these actors, but instead open up a mutually accessible space 
within which complex social business can be enacted. 
3 . A THIRD EXAMPLE 
Ava's ongoing challenge to the views of her sisters takes the form of yet 
another example of a Check formulation. The exchange continues as 
follows: 
- --_.-- _ .. _------
EXTRACT 3 
(2/12/8) 
12 Dad: 
13 Sue: 
14 
15 Ava: 
16 
17 Sue: 
[you feel that it was part 
and we're Qkt enough to make 
you (.) [she 
[soyou~ 
she wasn't an ~ndividual bem 
[she she 
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18 
19 
20 
21 Mum: 
as a ruu:ent 
the parents should gjways stick together 
and be consistent 
~ they should 
In line 12 Dad makes his first contribution since the beginning of this 
interaction between the children, saying: 
12 Dad: [you feel that it was part 
This would appear to be the first overt display that the exchange is being 
enacted in front of a significant audience. It is my opinion that the multi-
party nature of this discussion is highly consequential for the talk, 
particularly in terms of alignments and self-presentation. For, when there 
are a number of participants in an exchange, conflicts of opinion with one 
member of a multi-party exchange simultaneously represent coinciding 
opinions, and thus alignments, with other members (cf. Kncblauch, 1991. 
See also the discussion of line 21 below). In uttering the above, Dad 
changes from passive observer to participant in the discussion. However, 
he does not opt to take sides, he instead contributes to the co-
construction of the exchange as a presentation for the parents of beliefs 
about them. He merely probes Sue with "you feel that" and thereby 
underlines the opinion status of the contributions as opposed to any 
factual status. 
This utterance is not initially taken up by Sue, who continues with: 
13 Sue: and we're Q[d enough to make 
However, in line 14 Sue changes personal pronoun and pauses: 
14 you (.) [she 
This may be interpreted as an acknowledgement that her argument is 
simultaneously directed towards Ava and towards her parents. 
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In the cut and thrust of the argument, this slight hesitation allows Ava to 
intercede with her third Check formulation in lines 15-16. 
15 Ava: [soyou~ 
16 she wasn't an [individual befQm 
Again the warrant for the inference is displayed as the words of her 
interlocutor. In this case the stress on "befQre," marks Sue's stressed 
"now' in line 10 as a "problematic premise" . 
. Sue's response represents yet "another complex handling of a Check 
formulation: 
17 Sue: 
18 
19 
20 
[sce she 
as a Q£[ent 
the parents should always stick together 
and be consistent 
There are a number of noteworthy features of this utterance which reveal 
its skilful accomplishment of a balance of social actions. To begin with we 
see that the utterance is displayed as a continuation of Sue's 
explanation, interrupted from line 14: she connects the "she" of line 14 
with a repeat of "she she" in line 17. However, Sue then changes tack a 
little: convertin~r"she" to "as a pment". This allows her to continue as if 
merely progressing with her interrupted point, and yet to integrate into her 
ongoing account a response both to Dad's query in line 12 and to Ava's 
Check formulation. 
By generalising to "parents" Sue achieves a threefold coup. Firstly, she 
resolves the dilemma of speaking either to Mum and Dad using "you", as 
in line 14, or to Ava, as in "she" in lines 14 and 17. Secondly, she 
addresses some of the problematic status of the discussion as an 
examination of Mum's behaviour, by generalising to "parents" as a whole 
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- thus a personal attack is converted into a general statement on 
parenting. What is more, in targeting "parents' and saying that they 
"should always stick together and be consistent" rather than focusing only 
on the behaviour of "mothers" she echoes Mish's "no they support each 
other" (line 8), in disaffiliating with Ava's "Mum supports Dad" (lir1e 5). In 
Mish's disaffiliation, Ava's utterance is cast as suggesting that the 
support between the parents is only one way and is rejected on this 
basis. In lines 19-20, Sue affiliates with Mish's orientation to a process of 
mutual support between their parents. Rnally, in emphasising "QaIent" 
Sue addresses the moral accusation in Ava's check formulation - that 
Mum's independent status as an "individual" is being denied. Introducing 
..... 
the equally legitimate social role of "parent", one that is generalised and 
ungendered. and linking it to an extreme case formulation - "always" -
(Pomerantz, 1986), Sue deftly parries the moral slur of suggesting that 
some of the family were not previously (acting as) individuals. In this way, 
although this utterance is displayed as the resumption of an ongoing 
point, it also acts as an account designed to deal with Ava's most recent 
Check formulation. 
Thus, in Sue's response, an orientation to accountability is displayed 
without the overt employment of an account. Instead, the emphasised 
"~ent", with all the business it accomplishes, along with the extreme 
case formulation which follows, vindicates the earlier components of her 
argument from moral objection. Meanwhile, there are in this response no 
mark~_rs _of~itl1er_~II!~I1C:?_ teJ_ ag~ or disa!l.ree with Ava. If ?.l1ything, 
-- ,- - -- -.-
reluctance is shown instead, towards ..flaving again to respond to .011.e of _ 
Ava's Check formulations - its accusation IS attended to but not its 
formulation. Therefore, although this response is very different from the 
other two as regards reluctance and accountability, I would suggest that, 
even more than in those examples, this utterance fails to be adequately 
accounted for by either a preference for agreement, sociability, or 
traditional preferred and dispreferred turn shapes. Again the "check" 
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situation promotes a situationally appropriate employment of available 
resources, which, for a third time, escapes a checkmate! 
At the end of this extract Mum makes her first contribution to the 
exchange: 
21 Mum: ~ they should 
Like Dad in line 13, this overtly displays that the parents have been an 
audience before (and for) whom the discussion is being performed. 
Unlike Dad, however, Mum offers her support for one of the points being 
made and therefore, in a sense, for one of the opposing sides. Indeed, as 
Knoblauch (1991) asserts, markers of agreement do not merely establish 
local coalitions between speakers, they also position speakers with 
regards to one another. In this way, explicit agreement with one speaker 
brings with it the hazard of being disagreed with by another speaker, 
where that other has been engaged in disagreement with the first. This 
leads Knoblauch to conclude that 
the series of disagreements establishes a dialectical relation of speakers in 
terms of proponents and opponents .... the utterances of each speaker are 
located on one side or the other (Knoblauch, 1991 p 185). 
This contribution by Mum is, I believe, pivotal in the exchange, for it 
heralds a major change in Ava's subsequent turns, as will be discussed 
in the following section. 
4 A COUNTER-EXAMPLE 
In the three examples examined above I have identified a phenomenon 
called Check formulations in which "so" and contrastive stress is utilised 
to engender the need for a defensive response from an interlocutor. It is 
exceedingly opportune that not only does the exchange include three 
Check formulations, but they are in tum followed by a contrasting 
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example. With the aid of this fourth extract, I would like to demonstrate 
that an inference using 'so" and warranted by information from another 
conversant, can characterise "confirmation requests" (Schiffrin, 1987) as 
well as Check formulations. The aim of this will be to establish the unique 
properties of Check formulations through contrast with a counter-
example. 
EXTRACT 4 
(2/12/8) 
22 Ava: 
23 Sue: 
24 
25 
26 
27 Ava: 
28 Sue: 
29 Dad: 
30 
31 Ava: 
32 
33 
34 Sue: 
35 Mum: 
36 
37 
oh ~ [absolutely its ltlQlli1erful 
[while the children are growing lJI2 
and ~ what you dkI 
and when l1Ql!l you we're old enough 
to make our [mw. decisions 
[oh I see 
it does[n't matter if she 
[and when you're out of 
[s 
[so now it doesn't matter 
if they disagree 
[and we ~ them disagree 
[if she has a different opinion (.) yeh 
we ~ arJY.way we disagreed when 
even when you were little 
but just not in fiQnt of you 
In line 22 Ava makes a threefold, extremely strong, and emphasised 
agreement. What is more, this utterance begins with "oh'~ 
22 Ava: oh ~ [absolutely its ltlQlli1erful 
Schiffrin (1987) examined the features associated with utterances 
employing "oh" as a "Discourse Marker", suggesting that 
Oh occurs as speakers shift their orientation to information (p 74). 
It is my belief that this utterance marks a shift in Ava's orientation to the 
counter-argument being made and furthermore, that it is not mere 
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coincidence that this shift occurs immediately after Mum's casting of her 
support in favour of that counter-argument. 
Overlapping with this exclamation by Ava is more of Sue's ongoing point. 
She continues initially with: 
23 Sue: [while the children are growing J.IU 
However, her next line marks a change to directly addressing her parents 
- in the "you" form: 
24 and ~ what you dkI 
This is also, I believe, a response to Mum's entrance into the discussion 
in line 21. As in the earlier hesitation and change of person to "you" in 
line 14, which follows Dad's contribution, the conversion of these key 
observers into active participants is consequential for the subsequent 
talk. What is more, the direction of their support is highly influential. In 
sanctioning Sue's argument with "course they should", Mum clearly gives 
support to this point. Thus, while Ava's response is to change her 
orientation to that argument, Sue is able merely to include her parents in 
her address and then simply to continue on with that favoured 
proposition. Indeed, without pause or hesitation Sue finally concludes her 
poinf: 
25 and when rurtl you we're old enough 
26 to make our !llll'!l decisions 
After this, Ava again makes another exclamation using "oh": 
27 Ava: [oh I see 
2 This is only the conclusion of a point retrospectively, because of what follows. 
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Schiffrin (1987) states that the repair process is accomplished 
by first identifying a repairable, and then integrating the repair into 
discourse as a basis for further response (Schiffrin, 1987 p 81). 
According to Schiffrin, ·oh" can be used for both identifying and 
integrating activities. In Extracts 1, 2 and 3, I argued that Ava identified a 
"problematic premise" in each case - the Check formulation version of a 
repairable - by the use of "so" and contrastive stress. If this is the 
"identifying" stage of a problematic premise, then it can be argued that 
the above instances of "oh" mark a phenomenon similar to the second 
stage in the repair process - "integrating" that information. Indeed, the 
example Schiffrin uses to illustrate the above point includes one of her 
participants mirroring Ava's line 27, and saying "Oh I see" (Schiffrin, 1987 
p 81 Extract 17). 
Taken together, I would suggest that Ava's two exclamations using "oh" 
signal a change in her relationship with the positions presented by the 
other speakers. For this reason, the inference in lines 31-2 takes on a 
very different status to that of the earlier Check formulations, despite the 
fact that it too begins with "so". However, there is also a more 
fundamental dissimilarity - a feature of the inference itself that identifies it 
as different. 
Schiffrin (1987) cautions us not to assume that all questionings are 
"clarification requests", but that some may be "confirmation requests" (p 
80). She distinguishes these on the basis that only the former contain 
contrastive stress on a repairable item. In Extract 4 Ava's inference does 
contain a stressed item, _ "~": 
31 Ava: 
32 
33 
[so now it doesn't matter 
if they disagree 
[and we ~ them disagree 
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However, "~" is unlikely to be a repairable, or rather a "problematic 
premise", in the sense that there is no contrasting counterpart in the 
counter-argument with which it can be matched - unlike "hrui" versus 
"~tter"; "SQ.Qd."-plus-negative versus "~tter"; and "be[Qm" versus "LlQYi". 
To summarise, Extract 4 shares a number of the features of the Check 
formulations of the other extracts: it is an inference marked by the use of 
"so"; it is warranted by information that the second speaker proffers; and 
confirmation by the second speaker is implicative. However, in this 
inference, there is no "problematic premise" identified in the second 
speaker's prior utterance. As a result, unlike in the Check formulations, 
the inference does not identify component parts of the second speaker's 
argument as morally questionable, thereby undermining that argument. It 
is my contention that this is the crucial feature of the Check formulation, 
the feature which makes both agreement and disagreement accountable. 
We should therefore look to the responses to the inference in Extract 4 in 
order to see whether accountability is oriented to differently in the 
absence of a problematised premise. 
Let us look at Ava's confirmation request in the context of the 
surrounding talk: 
28 Sue: 
29 Dad: 
30 
31 Ava: 
32 
33 
34 Sue: 
-
it does[n't matter if she 
[and when you're out of 
[s 
[so now it doesn't matter 
if they disagree 
[and we .sM them disagree 
[if she has a different opinion C.) yeh 
In line 28 Sue says: 
28 Sue: it does[n't matter if she 
Meanwhile, Dad begins an utterance which he then leaves half unsaid: 
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29 Dad: [and when you're out of 
30 [s 
It appears that these two utterances form the components from which 
Ava's clarification request is created. She recycles the "it doesn't matter 
if from Sue and transforms Dad's "and when you're out of s[ight]" into 
"and we ~ them disagree" as a candidate completion of Sue's 
utterance in line 28. 
Sue overlaps the final line of Ava's utterance with: 
34 Sue: [if she has a different opinion (.) yeh 
Taken side by side the mirrored contributions of the two sisters are the 
following: 
Sue says: 
28 Sue: it does[n't matter if she 
34 Sue: [if she has a different opinion 
Meanwhile, nestled within this is Ava's: 
31 Ava: 
32 
[so now it doesn't matter 
if they disagree 
As I have stated, Ava's line 31 is a rewording of Sue's line 28. Then Ava 
continues with line 32, which is then reworded immediately by Sue in line 
34. Taken alone this appears to be a joint production by Sue and Ava 
(Edwards and Middleton, 1986) in which Ava displays her transformed 
. alignment - she now signals support of Sue's position. However, in 
addition, Ava continues her utterance with line 33: 
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33 [and we ~ them disagree 
Here, as have said, she incorporates a new dimension from Dad's 
contribution - about the observed status of the parents' disagreement. 
This extra point is then acknowledged by Sue, following a pause, in line 
34: 
34 Sue: (.) yeh 
In this second part of her utterance, Sue makes a short, unembeJlished, 
explicit affirmative in response to Ava's "confirmation request". The 
important feature to note in this utterance is the clear absence of an 
orientation to accountability. If it were not that the first section of this 
utterance overlapped the additional component initiated by Dad, one 
might be tempted to assume that this preface served as an account for 
the "yeh". However, this overlap and the similarity between Ava's "if they 
disagree" and Sue's "if she has a different opinion" - indicating a kind of 
joint completion of the item - would caution against such a reading. 
Mum's response also contains an explicit "yeh" with no pause or delay 
marker: 
35 Mum: we = iIlWYay we disagreed when 
36 even when you were little 
37 but just not in frQot of you 
In this case, however, it is embedded between "we" and "anyway" and 
followed by a continuance of the utterance. Ani~po.,!ant question to ask 
here, is whether the remainder of this utterance represents an account 
for this agreement. I believe it does not and that indeed, the design of the 
utterance is such that it orients to an avoidance of such a reading. 
If the preceding elements of "we" and "anyway" were deleted, Mum's turn 
at talk would look very much like an account for agreeing with Ava's 
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inference: n ••• yeh ... we disagreed when even when you were little but 
just not in front of you". However, I believe that these two elements have 
a crucial part to play in preventing the utterance from acquiring the status 
of an account. In my opinion their role is to establish the utterance as 
independent of an agreement with Ava. 
The initiation of the utterance with "we" displays ''yeh'' as an insertion: as 
if into a point that had already been constructed prior, not only to its 
utterance, but to Ava's inference in lines 31-2. Meanwhile, "anyway" 
appears to act as a discourse marker of the sort examined by Schiffrin 
(1987) - its role here being to lend emphasis to the establishment of "yeh" 
as an interruption. Indeed, Levinson (1973) observes that 
a term like anyway ... seems to imply that an utterance prefaced with it is 
relevant to the proceedings in some more direct way than an immediately 
preceding utterance (Levinson, 1973 p 162). 
In this way, by using "anyway" and presenting "yeh" as an interruption, 
Mum signals to her audience that her contribution be taken on its own 
merit, not merely as an account which flows from and justifies her' 
agreement with Ava. What is more, in doing so, it displays that an 
account for the agreement is unnecessary and thus, that no orientation to 
accountability is appropriate. How different this is, therefore, to the 
responses which follow the earlier Check formulations, in which 
accountability is the most central feature. 
D ARGUMENT AS SOCIABILITY REVISITED 
Pomerantz (1984) observes that 
Though sociability, support, and solidarity often involve the participants' 
agreeing or at least not overtly disagreeing with one another, there are 
nonetheless circumstances in which sociability and support are 
accomplished by disagreeing (Pomerantz, 1984 p n). 
187 
It is my contention that the extracts under examination represent 
concrete examples of such circumstances. In particular, this data can be 
seen to contradict the assumption of Heritage (1984) that preference 
organisation inherently involves the pursuit of harmony and agreement by 
social actors and their avoidance of conflict and disagreement. 
To begin with, we can recall Heritage's position on delay in preference 
organisation. According to Heritage, agreements are affiliative and 
disagreements are disaffiliative. In the former case, the likelihood that 
agreement will occur is maximised by its early production in a turn, while 
in the latter, delay allows for the possibility of disagreement to be 
obviated, therefore allowing for the likelihood of its occurrence to be 
minimised. However, in the responses to Check formulations, 
disagreement is not delayed and thus the likelihood that disagreement 
will occur is not minimised. Instead, it is the likeliness of agreements 
which is minimised by delay. However, I have argued in this chapter that 
this does not mean that social affiliation and solidarity are thereby 
minimised. Rather, social affiliation and solidarity can be accomplished 
precisely via sociable argument of the kind represented by my data. 
With regard to the assertions of Heritage concerning accounts, a similar 
picture emerges. The accounts occasioned by Check formulations do not 
act so as "to diminish the opportunities for proliferating disagreement or 
contesf as Heritage suggests (Heritage, 1984 p 272). Quite the contrary 
- these accounts are precisely the mechanism whereby ongoing 
disagreement can be pursued and the finality of the ·checkmate" can be 
averted. 
From the above discussion we can see that social solidarity, or 
sociability, is an extremely important factor in the design of utterances, as 
was concluded by Pomerantz (1984) and Heritage (1984), but that the 
manner of achieving this social action is not set as that ·characteristically" 
188 
performed by the "politeness" mode of sociability. Instead, actors have at 
their disposal alternative modes of speaking which open up rather 
different pathways towards sociability - exemplified here by 
argumentation, but humour may be another example. I would also like to 
caution that anti-sociability should not be forgotten as a social action that 
can also be accomplished via these same discursive tools. Moreover, 
although such a deployment of the resources is perhaps not as 
"normative", it is the very ,possibility of such. a. utilisation' that· gives' 
sociable argumentation its threat-handling status and humour its threat-
mimicking one. 
I would also like to make one additional explorative excursion'into the 
role of argument in sociability. I believe that it would be helpful to at least 
tentatively explore the factors which allow "argument as sociability" to 
take place. Knoblauch (1991) suggests that sociable argument depends 
on the ·conventions" identified by Gumperz (1982), which develop out of 
social networks. Knoblauch puts forward the sorts of families that cherish 
"informal discussions" as examples of such networks. Meanwhile, 
Schiffrin (1984) implies that these "conventions" might be culturally 
specific phenomena, by suggesting that the deployment of argumentation 
for the accomplishment of interacticlnal business other than conflict 
,-
resolution, may be culturally specific. According to Schiffrin, although it is 
. . . . . . 
unlikely to be unique to (Amerfcan) Jews, sociable argument may be 
more pervasive within their culture. Such conclusions would tend to 
attribute the argumentation that occurs in my data, which is exemplified in 
.. _ ,- ... _"--~,-C'"_,,,~.-=.:-_,~ __ . " __ r.-~ __ """,,"-.~--.r;_ _ __ • ~ ___ h __ '''' __ '''_ 
---"the extracts discussed above, to family ·convention'" or to Jewishness, ... ---
depending on the author. However,. [ befieve that other factors may have 
their influence. 
One such factor might be the peculiarity of the research environment. It 
,-. . -
might be that taking' part in this particular _ research prefect frees the 
participants from the. more usual dangers that disagreement' presents to 
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sociability (recall the special dispensations available to participants in the 
research relationship discussed in Chapter 3). Indeed, it could be that the 
participants are displaying their sociability precisely by going along with 
Ava's request thatthey argue for her. 
Finally, a further influence upon the relationship between argumentation 
and sociability may have been the multi-party dimension of the 
interaction. As discussed earlier,. the multi-partednessof the recorded 
interaction is highly consequential with respect to alignments. For, as 
explained, when there are many independent actors involved, alignments 
with one participant represent disalignments with others in a "dialectical 
relation" composed of two "sides" (Knoblauch, 1991 p 185). Once 
established, such a dialectical relation will mean that any disagreement 
with an interlocutor will simultaneously be an agreement with some other 
or others who make up the "opposing side". At first this observation 
appears to temper the divisive status of disagreements - lending them 
dimensions of consensus and harmony. However, it should also be noted 
that, to the same degree, agreement with a fellow conversationalist within 
this environment simultaneously accomplishes the disputatious 
disharmony of disagreement with someone else! 
The various factors of convention, culture, research context and multi-
. ". .'. . . 
partedness discussed hele are unlikely to be either mutually exclusive or 
.... an exhaustive list of the possible influences on the relationship between 
argumentation and sociability. The point of this discussion is merely to 
. -.. •. -iad~~~~~~~:"of· th~~p~t~nti~1 ing.;iJ~ri~~rn '-i1~~;'i~ing ~~h~n-tl,e;:~=-2--"-
institution of argument as sociability is called upon and (re-)called into 
being. 
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E CONCLUSION 
In the above analysis and discussion I hope to have demonstrated that 
preference organisation exists as a resource for conversationalists in 
such a way as to allow them to accomplish- their inte~ctional business •. It 
is the mechanism by which subtle nuances, of timing and justifiCation, 
communicate to interlocutors messages that transcend the words used, . 
so as to enact skilful maho.euvres in the management of social life. In this' 
vision of conversational structure, normative uses and -expectations do 
not act as constraints on individuals, but instead allow unarticulated 
assumptions to enable mutual intelligibility. Speakers can simply utilise 
the myriad resources available in order to weave whatever tapestry of 
meaning and action they might desire. What is more, the skill involved in 
such accomplishments does not require conscious choice. It is only in 
retrospective analyses such as this one that the social actions performed 
by talk are rendered so explicit 
. - . 
-
" .. 
, '-" ... ~ 
..... 
. ----.'-"'-- '-'---'~"-'" --_." ... " .-~ -- -.--~."",' -._ ... -. 
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CHAPTER 7 "ARGUING 'THE FAMILY' INTO BEING": 
LOCATING RELATIONSHIPS IN TIME AND SPACE 
A INTRODUCTION 
... -
In Chapters 3 and 5, two arenas of social interaction were examined for 
the ways in which the institution of Research can be seen to be "talked 
into being" (Heritage, 1984). It was observed that contention and rhetoric 
are central in this process, whereby a space is opened up and explored 
between competing opposites. The argument developed was that the 
institution comes to exist ongoingly as this process of exploration 
progresses and that it is the very irreconcilability of the various 
contradictions that ensure its continuation. In Chapter 6, meanwhile, a 
concrete example of disagreement and contention was focused upon, in 
order to redress an unfortunate imbalance in CA towards 
overemphasising harmony and agreement in social interaction. In the 
current chapter, a second social institution - "The Family" - will be 
examined for how it is constructed in interaction. Again it will be seen that 
disagreement and rhetorical opposition are the mechanisms by which the 
institution takes form. 
1 ACCOMPUSHING THE INSTITUTION OF 'FAMILY' 
One of the central interests of this thesis is in the ongoing and local 
accomplishment of social institutions. Following the teachings of 
Ethnomethodology and the CA of institutions, the underlying belief is that 
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institutions arise out of constitutive actions which reflexively produce and 
reproduce what counts as the institution in question. Within this Chapter, 
relevant elements of two notable sources of this type of analysis will be 
isolated. These will then be integrated into the analysis of how the 
institution of "Family· is brought into being in the extract under scrutiny. 
The sources in question are, Heritage (1984) and Holstein and Gubrium 
(1994), each of which adopts a very different approach to this process. I 
will ·therefore present a brief idea of each analysis in order to highlight 
their salient points of distinction. 
Holstein and Gubrium (1994) look at members' usage of the discursive 
category "family", in order to examine how in its very articulation, this 
institution is brought into being - or, in their own words, 
how the abstract entity "family" is locally conditioned, used and interpreted 
to be a social object - a "thing" in its own right (Holstein and Gubrium, 1994 
p 233). 
As described in Chapter 2 Section E, the focus of these authors is upon 
the rhetorical instantiation of social objects. They claim that institutions 
such as the "family" are brought into being as a result of argumentatioh 
and dispute. This conclusion arises from their belief that it is the 
accounts, definitions and justifications produced in response to 
challenges that create and perpetuate institutional realities . 
. Heritage (1984), meanwhile, was engaged in an attempt to identify 
the steps whereby the society hides from its members its activities of 
organization and thus leads them to see its features as determinate and 
independent objects (quoted from Garfinkel, 1967'p 182, in Heritage, 1984 
p197). 
The most relevant analysis within Heritage's work, in terms of my own 
current concern, consists of an examination of the local production of the 
institution of education. This analysis is very different to that of Holstein 
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and Gubrium ten years later, because, not only is there no mention of the 
institutional category "school" in his data, but the analysis is concerned 
precisely with how competent members, including the reader, are able to 
infer such an institution from the available discourse - without it being 
explicitly referenced. Heritage bases his theoretical position on the tenet 
that 
the production and· recognition of actions is- dependent upon the parties 
supplying, and trusting one another to supply, an array of un stated 
assumptions so as to establish the recognizable sense of an action (p 
180). 
In this case, the 'unstated assumptions', or "background assumptions' 
(Gariinkel, 1963) concern how the institution of education is conducted. 
2 THE CHALLENGED AND THE ASSUMED 
In this chapter, I will attempt to amalgamate these two enterprises. As in 
Holstein and Gubrium's (1994) analysis, one of the central claims of this 
chapter will be that it is the environment of contention and dispute that 
leads to the co-construction of the argumentative behaviour and role 
relationships of the family members. At the same- time, following Heritage 
(1984) I aim to catalogue how the institution of "family' is brought into 
being in my extract, despite the absence ofafly reference to the category 
-- -
"family' itself. 
In this chapter it will be seen that, while the nature of the arguments, 
category entitlements, interrelationships, activities etc. of the C members 
are rhetorically constructed within the argumentative arena of the 
interaction, the entity ''family'', in contrast, takes form in the very absence 
of challenge. It is the unarticulated consensus as to the existence of the 
institution that forms a common foundation for the discourse itself. 
Furthermore, it is in this way that the interaction is at one and the same 
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time, talk within the institution of family and talk which brings that 
jnstitution into being. 
It is in this endeavour that my analysis most fundamentally makes a 
departure from that of Holstein and Gubrium (1994). For, these authors 
extend their examination to include members' use of the category "family' 
to describe relationships other than those of biological lineage. Giving 
examples such as the use of. the terms "brother" and "sister" by 
fraternities/sororities, prison inmates and street gangs, these authors 
conclude that in 
connecting family, domesticity, responsibility, caring, sharing and the like. 
family discourse articulates a configuration of concern that relates what we 
think. know and feel about our social relations (Holstein and Gubrium, 1994 
p 235). 
What is implicit in this observation, is that members utilise what is 
commonly understood about "family' in order to accomplish connections 
between it and the social relationship in question (e.g. between prison 
inmates). Indeed, it is only by drawing upon such cultural resources that 
these authors are able to compile the listing that begins the quotation 
above. In contrast, I am interested in looking at a collective oriented to .aa 
"family' to see how such common understandings are produced and 
sustained. Within this framework, it is the project of this chapter to 
highlight the ways that ''family'' is brought into being without it being 
articulated - the ways in which its implicit assumption can be inferred 
through what is vocalised. 
3 THE EMERGENCE OF FAMILY: ACCUMULATIVE EVIDENCE 
Heritage (1984), in summarising Garfinkel's (1967) "Agnes study' and its 
reflections upon the social construction of gender, commented that, 
it is surprising to realize the extent to which gender differentiation consists 
of a filigree of small-scale, socially organized' behaviours which are 
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unceasingly iterated. Together these - individually insignificant - behaviours 
interlock to constitute the great public institution of gender as a morally-
organized-as-natural fact of life (Heritage, 1984 p 197). 
It is by appropriating a similar warrant, (see also Smith, 1978) that I argue 
in this chapter for the underlying efficacy of the category "family". As with 
the institution of gender, I believe that it is the accumulation of individually 
unremarkable actions that, when added one to another, make up the 
instantiation of the institution of "family" in my data. On the strength of 
this argument for the cumulative effect of interlocking instances, I will 
treat each individual example as evidence for my position, even though, 
taken in isolation, each may be underminable. This strong line on the 
issue appears to me the only way to avoid unnecessary apology and 
repetition of the premises on which my analysis is based. 
In the identification of these multiple examples I will draw fundamentally 
upon the work of two theorists. Firstly, the work by Sacks (1972) on 
Membership Categorisation Devices. Secondly, that of Schegloff (1972), 
on indexical expressions, in particular, locational formulations and their 
systematic co-selection with other types of formulation. In addition, 
attention will be drawn to the use and interpretation of pronouns for the 
articulation of implicit and explicit alignments and delineations· (cl. 
MOhlhausler and Harm, 1990; Fowler, 1993). With the aid of these 
analyses, I hope to show how the category (or device) ''family'' becomes 
inferred (by competent members of a discursive community) from the 
categories, actions, formulations, pronouns etc. that speakers employ. 
One could liken the process by which "family" emerges out of these 
mechanisms, to the actions of a mime artist creating a box around 
themselves with the gesticulations of their arms. In every gesture which 
maps the boundary between free movement and immobility, the mime 
artist describes the dimensions of their containment and brings that form 
into being. In the case of my data, we can conceive how rhetorical 
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, .. ' .. - ..... 
opposition functions in the place of muscular opposition as the 
mechanism for the artist's movements: as a "joint" enterprise on the part 
of all the participating members. With this analogy we can then observe 
how, just as the path of the artisfs limbs describes the form of the unseen 
enclosure, so do the sub-categories, pronouns and related formulations 
map by inference, the form of the unarticulated, yet fundamentally 
assumed, institution of "family'. 
Meanwhile, in the ongoing analysis of the extract, the mechanism of 
contention and dispute (the rhetorical opposition mentioned above) will 
be shown to motivate the description of the behaviour, roles and 
interrelationships of the family members. Amongst the issues that come 
into dispute in the extract and, as a result, come to be explored, 
described and thereby brought into focus are: the question of continuity 
and change in the family's behaviour and role relationships; challenges to 
the possible illegitimacy of certain behaviours within the interaction; and 
questions of generalisablitiy from one member to another that trace the 
dimensions of their interrelationships. 
In this way, the analysis of this chapter will attempt to catalogue the way 
in which the concrete articulation of social objects arises out of 
disagreement, while tacit agreement allows abstract, unstated 
.. 
assumptions to operate for the promotion of mutual ~nderstanding. 
B THE FULL EXTRACT 
This chapter will concentrate upon an extended extract of data in a 
sequential manner, similar to Chapters 5 and 6. The extract in question is 
the following: 
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(Tape 1 Side A Section 2) 
1 Ava: does that still continue are ~ still= 
2 Sue: =the arguments don't continue 
3 Ava: some of the arguments 
4 are arguments that go M and M and M 
5 Mum: no 
6 Ava: that there are always [the same arguments 
7 Sue: [well tho yeh 
8 but you're not at IlM1lt 
9 so they don't (.) 
10 ' , --, - so they don't continue= ' 
11 Mum: =we DON'T AR[gue 
12 Sue: [we don't argue 
13 [very much 
14 Dad: [so they must have been :tllY then 
15 Mum: we dis~ [things (.) 
16 Ava: [ its all my? fault 
17 Mum: but we don't ar[gue 
18 Dad: [!n!.Lst have been 
19 Mum: W it was all your fault= 
20 Dad: ='cause [we don't ~ those arguments now 
21 Ava: [you wouldn't [you wouldn't 
22 Mum: [that's right 
23 Sue: no [that's right 
24 Ava: [( was) that then 
25 Sue: we don't ar[gue very much do we 
26 Mum: ~ in the Qio1ment 
27 Sue: we have a ve-a occasional arguments 
28 when we get a bit ratty with each other (.) 
29 and somebody says something like (.) 
30 that the other person takes ex~tion to 
31 they said it in the wrong ~ or something 
32 don't we (.) 
33 but that's about i1 we don't actually (.) 
34 we don't argue like we used to argue 
35 when we were l<hiklren 
36 Ava: yeh I suppose [so .' -' ..
37 Sue: [when they argued with us ;;~. 
38 'cause we're altults [now 
39 Ava: [so VVHEN DO YOU THINK= 
40 Mum: [yeh 
41 Ava: [=you stopped arguing like that 
42 ::. Sue: ",'0, when you two [Jmto~': _ - ,-" 
43 Mum: [when you two left 
44 All: ((laughter)) 
45 Ava: or could it~that(.) 
46 just after we reached [about the age of= 
47 Mum: !Mlchel!e comes home (.) 
48 Ava: =about. 18 
49 Mum: mind you= 
50 Ava: [( ) 
51 Mum: [=when Mjchelle comes home 
52 she has a good old argument doesn't she. 
53 Sue: Mish always starts arguments when liM comes home= 
54 Mum: =oh yes [she always does 
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55 Ava: ~rs not fair to ar (.) 
56 to say t she does things like [that 'cause she can't: 
57 Mum: [oh she QQES. 
58 Ava: =hold her own Ilrui 
59 Mum: she still does 
60 Ava: well she'll (.) «laughs» 
61 ·she won't be very pleased· 
62 Mum: irs lD.lll [though 
63 Dad: [well phone her up and tell her 
64 [((coughs» 
65 Mum: [and she comes home 
66 and then she then she says 
67 oh sorry afterwards (.) 
68 ·she didn't mean ir 
69 Ava: andl~(.) 
70 Sue: no you do as well 
71 Mum: yeh you do as well 
72 Ava: oh thanks 
73 Sue: I think irs just a question of 
74 more people being around (.) 
75 Mum: yeh 
76 Sue: and the fact that 
77 you two are more independent [now 
78 Mum: [thafs right (.) 
79 [you're used to a bit: 
80 Sue: [you've got your own way of living 
81 Mum: =lli li leading your own ~ 
82 Sue: and that when you come back here 
83 irs difficult to fit in (.) 
84 Mum: and then you have to fit into 
85 the Il.arent~ role 
86 and it doesn't [sort of ~ 
87 Sue: [yeh 
88 we've discussed this already me and Mum 
89 we've gQ1 our own theories haven't we 
90 Mum: yeh 
91 Ava: so you Sue do fit in 'cause you were here 
92 Sue: 'cause [I live here all the lii:M= 
93 Mum: [well SHE'S NEVER 
"94 Sue: [=1 never go out 
95 Mum: [she's aDJUSTED we've adjusted to each other 
96 I a~ that Suzanne's an Mult (.) 
97 Ava: don't you accept J:m an adult then 
98 Mum: (0.4) yes I think I do 
99 but:£Ql.l don't accept 
100 : thatt accept that you're an adult _ . 
-- .. -- .~. 
101 Ava: «laughs» 
102 Sue: yeh that's that's what we were ~ing isn't it (.) 
103 Ava: do you think even JlllYl? 
104 Mum: yes 
105 Sue: well maybe you more than [Mil;helle (.) 
106 Mum: [pER~more 
107 Sue: Michelle ~n't (.) 
108 Michelle doesn't think that 
109 Mum and Dad think ofJll:ras an adult (.) 
110 Mum: mmm (.) Mfinitely not (.) 
111 [but the WAY SHEca 
112 Sue: P don't eveil know 
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113 
114 
115 
116 
117 
118 Dad: 
119 Sue: 
120 All: 
121 Sue: 
122 
1 don't even know whether 
rag thinks I'm an adult or not (.) 
I think Mwn does 
but I don't know whether rag does 
dayou? 
you have your mments 
see 
((laughter)) 
just as wellll1clll think that 
'cause I'd be wnmg 
C THE ARGUMENTS 
1 ARGUMENTS AND 'US' 
Prior to this extract, the members have been discussing some of the 
topics that they ·used to argue abouf, variously presented as what 
happened ''when you were young" or "when I was at school". At this point 
Ava asks: 
1 Ava: does that still continue are ~ still= 
In this utterance, Ava questions the actions of a collective of actors 
referred to as "we". Terms such as these are known amongst logicians, 
linguists and conversation analysis as "indexical expressions", that is, as 
terms whose referent alters according to context (Levinson, 1983 p 45-
96). The linguists Miihlhausler and Harre (1990) lament that 
English is poorly equipped with indexical expressions for people (p 32). 
However, they also note that 
", -" .. '~."--. - ,-' .. - .. 
One of the most striking finds has been the general f1exibifity and 
multifunctionality of English we ••• Given the right functional and contextual 
factors, we can be used to encode any of the six persons that are 
distinguished in English as in: 
28 1st 
sg. 2nd: 
3rd: 
We are not interested in the possibility of defeat 
We want to eatourdindins now 
We had damp panties again at playgroup 
1st We are underpaid and overworked 
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pI. 2nd: We will hear in this lecture ... 
3rd: We won the First World War 
(MOhlMusler and Ham~. 1990 p 1nl 
In their search for a "common core" meaning of "we", MOhlhiiusler and 
Harre (1990) find great difficulty with this flexibility, which leads them to 
conclude that only given the "functional context" of a particular usage can 
its meaning be divined (p 172). 
Amongst Discourse Analysts, however, this flexibility and the ambiguity 
that it produces, is something to be celebrated as one of the strengths of 
indexical expressions for the accomplishment of rhetorical business. 
Although. in any given case, "background assumptions" (Garfinkel. 
1963). or common knowledge. renders most of the near infinite number 
of possible referents inapplicable. the flexibility of the indexical 
expression remains paramount. This flexibility means that speakers retain 
the option to deny the appropriateness of any referent featured in the 
subsequent uptake by others, thus enabling them to deploy that very 
ambiguity for the accomplishment of rhetorical business. 
In investigating indexical expressions, Schegloff .(1972) took a special 
interest in a sub-category of such terms, which he ealled "Ioeational 
proterms": for example "here" or "there". Schegloff postulated that when a 
loeational proterm is used, members are required to perfolTl} a "Ioeational 
analysis' in order to make sense of them. In the case of personal 
pronouns, it would follow that members are required to carry out a 
"membership analysis' (Schegloff, 1972) in order to discover to whom the 
.. ,~:...- ----- - -, ... ~.- - .-. ~--.. ... . . 
speaker is referring. Within the data under examination, we find 
numerous uses of indexical expressions, which require the other 
interlocutors to discover who or what is referenced. Here, I believe, is one 
way in which the implicit eategory of "family" ean be discovered to be 
operational in the extract What I hope to show within my analysis, is that 
the maximal set from which subsets of "we"; "you"; "they"; somebody"; 
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"people" etc. are drawn, is that of the nuclear family - Mum, Dad, Sue, 
Ava and Mish. This will become apparent from the interlocking 
accumulation of the "filigree of ..• individually insignificanf instances in 
the data (Heritage, 1984 p 197: See Section A3), whereby: all of the 
individuals from this set are explicitly named; explicit reference to others 
outside this limited group are absent; and, who is being referred to via 
such indexical expressions is displayed as understood without problem, 
questioning .!?.r .LJ!1ce~.i!1ty. It sh~uld ~e n~~e.d. in parti~ular that the. 
alternative maximal set made up of only the current interlocutors - i.e. 
Mum, Dad, Sue and Ava, but D.Q1 Mish - although feasible in the first 40 
lines of extract, must be rejected in view of later developments. This is 
not to say that the referents of the various indexical expressions of the 
extract are concretely fixed by the implicit mobilisation of "family" and 
thus shorn of their rhetorical advantage in terms of ambiguity. What I am 
suggesting, rather, is that the flexibility they afford for the 
accomplishment of discursive business depends as much upon the 
"background assumption" of a maximal set of "family", as on the 
ambiguity over which sub-set of family is being utilised. 
Narrowing the focus again to the specific indexical expression "we", it is 
useful to consider what kind of "membership analysis" (Schegloff, 1972), 
speakers need to carry out in order to determine a concrete referent. 
Within the current analysis, one of the most significant distinctions that 
hearers must make is between what linguists call the "inclusive" and 
"exclusive" "we" '(Leech and Svartvik, 1978; MOhlhausler and HaITE~, 
'1990; Fowler~1993). The "inclusive we" includes the addressee as well 
as the speaker, along with any number of other individuals. The 
"exclusive we", meanwhile, includes the speaker and one or more other 
individuals, but not the addressee. The next problem for the hearer is to 
determine who else Of anyone) is included in the reference, and on what 
basis. 
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One of the "most prominent features of we" identified by MOhlhausler and 
Ham~ (1990 p 178), was its usage in signalling solidarity. These writers 
posit that the use of "we", as opposed to other altematives, "introduces a 
bond with hislher interlocutors" and that, as a result of this, "other 
persons are brought into an obligation pattem" (MOhlMusler and Harre, 
1990 p 178). MOhlMusler and Ham~ conclude from this that the 
speaker's responsibility is reduced by this means. However, I would 
suggest that this is- not necessarily the case,as· speakers might actually· 
take on a greater responsibility with the use of "we" - for example, when 
using "we" in the place of "you". Despite this point of disagreement, we 
will see in this analysis how this bond of solidarity, made available by the 
use of "we", is ubiquitously applied to align and disalign family members 
as part of the many gestures in which "family" is given form. 
Let us retum to the first utterance of the extract: 
1 Ava: does that still continue are ~ still= 
We see here that Ava presents "we" as a self-evident category of 
persons. The unproblematic status of such an assignment is then ratified 
by the uptake which follows - in displaying no concern with that choice of 
expression. However, Ava's question concerns whether there is a 
temporal continuity in a given element in the behaviour of this "we". Here 
again she utilises an indexical expression, in this case "that". In contrast 
to the unproblematic standing of "we", "that" is treated by Sue as 
inadequat:~y.~efere~ti~1. This treatmenti~ accomp~is~e~ in the following: 
2 Sue: =the amuments don't continue 
It should be noted that Sue's contribution is initiated before Ava has 
finished her question. It is thus a misprojection in response to the TRP 
after "continue" (Sacks et ai, 1978). In emphasising that "the arguments 
don't continue", Sue not only makes explicit what was ambiguous in 
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Ava's indexical use of ''that'', she also draws attention to that ambiguity. 
Asa result, she hints at the existence of other, unspecified, aspects of 
shared behaviour amongst the unproblematised entity "we". 
I would suggest that the contrastive treatment of these two indexical 
expressions draws upon and works up the "background assumptions" 
(Garfinkel, 1963) "which speakers trust one another to implement" 
(Heritage, 1984 p 154) during interaction. While. "that" is represented as. 
in need of clarification, "we" simultaneously gains stature as a referent 
shared by the participants. As I proposed in the introduction to this 
analysis, I take this shared understanding, unneedful of explicit 
elaboration, to involve the referent "family". Given this premise, I would 
suggest that Sue's attention to the delimitation of what does nQ1 continue, 
engenders a space for other aspects of "family" to endure. In this way, I 
believe that Sue's utterance is one that contributes to the 
accomplishment of "family" in two ways. 
On the one hand, the concrete specification of "the arguments" as 
discontinued, rejects the appropriateness of any universal claim about 
the discontinuity of family practice, thereby establishing "family" as an 
enduring entity. In other words, Sue takes care to clarify the "background 
assumptions· that Ava trusts her hearers to implement, so as to ensure 
that continuity is not rejected on a general basis, with regards to the 
family .. On the other hand, the redundancy of making any specification as 
to the referent of "we", confirms Ava's trust that, as competent members, 
. - . the hearers·~will implement ·the implicit ·and ·necessary· "background 
assumption· that "family" is operative in her utterance. This, I would 
suggest, is the first example of "family· being accomplished in the data-
without being explicitly referenced and because it is not explicitly 
referenced. 
Ava's next utterance, is as follows: 
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3 Ava: some of the arguments 
4 are arguments that go Qll and Qll and lID 
Here, Ava provides an uptake of Sue's explicit reference to "the 
arguments" as the activity under examination and thereby ratifies Sue's 
choice of this behaviour as appropriate for her (Ava;s) reference to "that" 
in line 1. However, this utterance does much more. It initiates an 
explor:ation of the nature the family's arguments which characterises most 
of this extract. 
A central concern of this chapter, along with examining the implicit 
operativeness of the institution of "family", is the detailed cataloguing of 
how the environment of argumentation is the medium in which social 
objects take form. As discussed in the introduction to this chapter, this is 
the key inSight to be taken from the work of Holstein and Gubrium (1994). 
Talking specifically about the entity "family", these authors postulate that 
Challenge and response bring family into focus, producing an object to be 
daimed, contested and interpretative/y reconstructed (Ho/stein and 
Gubrium, 1994 p 239). 
In this section of the data, "arguments" are the matter that is brought into 
focus via challenge and dispute, rather than "family". As pointed out 
above, "family" is not itself contested. In the analysis of the first part of 
the extract, I aim to highlight how the nature of the family's "arguments" is 
fleshed out as a result of the contentiousness of the interaction. 
- --_.-. ,.,-. ", ..... ' ...... ,---""'.' " .. , - -,-.-," 
."'- - .... -"" --, - -, 
__ '_ •• _. _ 4 ___ ._ ...... ' .... '"'-~ __ ••• ....,., ..... " _. ,_- _~_ ..... __ , __ .... _ .... -<.~_-~' -. ,~._'.w 
In lines 2 and 3, Ava offers a characterisation of arguments. This 
definition does not merely arise out of the blue but, rather, is contributed 
as a contrasting opinion to that given by Sue. Sue asserts that "the 
arguments don't continue",. while Ava's description presents "some of the 
arguments" as occurring persistently over time. This persistence is 
articulated through the repetition of "on" in ·on and on and on". Again this 
205 
emphasis on continuity highlights the shared and ongoing history of the 
interrelationships between the actors in question. As will be seen, what 
comes under dispute does not concern the existence of a shared history 
amongst the referenced parties. It concerns the existence of changes in 
the interrelationships between them. What then gets fleshed out in the 
argumentative arena is the ongoing and endUring identity of the entity to 
which they all belong - that is, the "family'. 
At this point Mum contributes a "no" in line 5, which denies the 
applicability of Ava's description to the matter at hand. This leads Ava,}o 
.'" . 
further formulate her version of the family's arguments with the following: 
6 Ava: that there are always [the same arguments 
What has been established, therefore, in these first few lines of the 
extract, is a disagreement with regards the continuity of arguments within 
the family. Ava appears to be looking for agreement that such a 
continuity exists. However, this is not forthcoming from either Sue or 
Mum. 
2 WHO'S AT HOME?: THE FORMULA TION OF PLACE 
In line 7, Sue displays dispreference by way of an agreement preface (cf. 
Pomerantz, 1984; see Chapter 6): 
7 Sue: [well tho yeh 
After this, Sue goes on to expand her denial of continuity in arguments, 
by describing a juncture which divides the historical and current 
situations: 
8 Sue: 
9 
10 
but you're not at ~ 
so they don't (.) 
so they don't continue= 
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In this utterance the entity "home" is made relevant as a locational 
formulation which separates the past and present configurations. This 
further formulation of "the arguments' merits a detailed examination: 
Schegloff (1972) examined in detail some of the mechanisms by which 
place is formulated in conversational practice. His primary observation 
wasJhat,when reference is m.ade to a location, although numerous ways ... _.,. 
exist to refer to it, not all of these may be considered "right". This led him 
to examine on what grounds particular terms are selected. 
One of Schegloff's main observations was that, in a piece of discourse, 
numbers of terms are often "co-selected" so as to "go together". The key 
point of such "co-selections" is that they should not be viewed merely as 
fitting the topic at hand, but as the tools which actually constitute that 
topic. In addition, Schegloff pOinted out that the use of locational terms is 
not restricted to the formulation of place but, rather, that place terms are 
often used to accomplish formulations such as occupation, "stage of life" 
and activities. In illustrating the second of these, Schegloff utilised the 
following extract: 
A: 'MIen did this happen? 
8: 'MIen I was in Junior High School. (2) 
(GTS 11, 23) 
(Schegloff, 1972 P 313). 
Furthermore, when examining the relationship between selections. of .... 
. . _. .. ~_._, _ , __ -'-:-:.-..,. ........... _,~-"'.-.;;._ ...... _.F' '. __ "", .. . 
location and membership identifications, Schegloff concluded that "co-
selection" could be seen to take place between these two types of 
formulation as well as within them. To illustrate his conclusion, he again 
drew upon the above example, suggesting that 
It may be in the light of this co-selection that we should appreciate that the 
use of "Junior High School" to answer ''When did this happen- in (2) above 
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is followed by the introduction into the story of characters formulated as 
"principal" and "teacher" (Schegloff, 1972 p 337). 
Let us now apply these insights to the utterance in question. In line 8 of 
our extract, Sue formulates place using the term "home", in order to mark 
the temporal juncture at which "the arguments" discontinued. Just as 
'When I was in Junior High School" was used to answer 'When did this 
happen" in Schegloff's example, "you're not at home" is used by Sue to 
..... -'. ..' . explain why "the·arguments don't continue'!. This utilisation of a locational 
index to delineate both a temporal juncture and a mode of activity (the 
. arguments), is neither accidental nor irrelevant. Instead, it is a highly 
consequential rhetorical move. It "creates the relevance" (Schegloff, 1972 
p 337) of a whole set of attributions that can be (and, as we shall see 
below, some of which are) subsequently used to link the location of 
members "at home" (or not) and the continuation or discontinuation of 
arguments. 
Amongst the business that Sue's "you're not at home" accomplishes are 
two different, but not mutually exclusive messages. Firstly ,the one that is 
picked up most extensively in the talk which follows, concems Ava's part 
in those arguments. That is to say, without her "at home" there are no 
arguments of the nature being delineated. We shall go on to see the 
uptake on this message later. In addition, however, there is also a 
second potential message concerning what Edwards and Potter' (1992) 
termed "category entitlements", Potter (1996) explained that "category 
entitlements" occur when 
-
-- .. ~,------ --"'~-"-~-'- .- .~-.'--
Certain categories of actors are treated as entitled to know particular sorts 
of things, and their reports and descriptions may thus be given credence 
(Potter, 1996 p 28). . 
In Sue's reference to Ava's not being at home, I believe that there is a 
denial of Ava's "category entitlemene' to make claims about the family's 
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arguments, on the basis that she cannot know what behaviour still 
continues "at home", because she is not now there. 
In both of these messages the centrality of "home" to family practice is 
made paramount In the first message, the absence of a family member 
from home is presented as transforming the nature ,of the family's 
interaction. Meanwhile, in the second, a family member's absente from 
home.- r.evokes -their category .. entitlement to assess . that interaction.· I 
would suggest that this is an example of the local accomplishment of 
what Holstein and Gubrium J1994) posit to be oneofJhe most 
"prominenf of the many "signs from which family is constructed", to wit: 
the use of aspects of family's household location to signify the domestic 
order assumed to reside within (Holstein and Gubrium, 1994 p 241). 
Here again, then, we find, in the tracing of the entity "home" a 
simultaneous, but implicit delineation of "family". 
3 "WE DON'T ARGUE" - YOU DO 
Agreement to Sue's statement that ''the arguments don't continue" is 
forthcoming from Mum in the definitive 
11 Mum: =we DON'T AR[gue 
. In this utterance, Mum utilises. the indexical pronoun "we" to describe the 
collective of actors who "don't argue". Again, as in line t, the hearer is 
" . '-.- ,- ,'. ~.-- . .-~. ,- - >~-'-' ' _. -::,,,~.,":- .. --.- •• -, .• -~.-~- .•• -,----.- _ .• -,'"._ •• -
expeCteCifo"discover-tCl'·who-;n--.;e;;-.:efers.-What paitiesareth~reby 
referenced is intricately interlinked to the discursive action of the 
utterance. This statement disagrees with Ava. Therefore, in order not to 
contradict itself, "we" must; at the very least; exclude Ava. At the same 
time, Mum is agreeing with Sue's assessment that "the arguments don't 
continue". thus making relevant the assumption that Sue is included in 
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the referent "we". Given this, the extrapolation follows that Mum supports 
Sue's implicit formulation of a collective within the family of those who are 
still "at home" - a group which includes Mum, Sue and Dad, but which 
excludes Ava and Mish. All this is, however, left inexplicit and therefore 
un constraining in terms of opportunities for its subsequent deployment in 
the unfolding rhetorical arena. 
Interestingly, Sue_verifies this agreement by echoing Mum's words,. but, 
-
significantly, she tags on a mediating clause in line 13: 
12 Sue; [we don't argue 
13 [very much 
At this point, Dad offers the following contribution: 
14 Dad; [so they must have been ~ then 
In this statement we find Dad making explicit the very distinction that was 
so flexibly ambiguous in Mum and Sue's utterances discussed above. 8y 
emphasising ~", and addressing this directly to Ava, Dad specifies, 
that ''we'' who "don't argue" must, at the very least, exclude her (however, 
ambiguity still persists as to whether Mish is included - see the discussion 
of lines 42-3 in Section 5 below). Furthermore, taken as a whole, Dad's 
utterance represents an example of where the relevancy (discussed 
above) created by Sue's ''you're not at home", is subsequently deployed 
further along in the conversation. In this case, Dad draws upon the 
message in Sue's utterance, that Ava's leaving home caused a difference .. 
• • __ .--." ,.' "'-.-.-" ••• " •• -''',"", •• - •• -- •• ,. - ---_ ••• -.--- •• " .-•• -". ---_ ••••• ".> ".-_.'-' 
in the family's interaction. He does this by using that implication to make 
relevant a causal attribution for the arguments - that they "must have 
been" bm: fault What is again significant here, is that this extraporation of 
"you" from the established category . "we", once more requires the 
assumption of the "family· as the set from which all sub-sets must be 
composed. 
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Ratification also figures highly amongst the accomplishments of this 
utterance. To begin with, the utterance provides a ratification of Sue's 
original assessment that the juncture "you're not at home", when applied 
to Ava, appropriately explains the change in the family's behaviour. At the 
same time, it ratifies Mum and Sue's claim that those still "at home" no 
longer argue, through an uptake of the previous talk, which attributes the 
initiation of arguments to·Ava; In doing so Dad aligns himself as a third' 
voice in the collectivity of those who "don't argue" (and, not incidentally, 
of those who have remained "at home"). This means that, as in Mum's 
utterance of line 11, by forming just the sort of agreement being attested, 
it exemplifies that claim. 
However, Dad's utterance is not only active in its uptake and ratification 
of what has gone before. It is also responsible for introducing agency into 
the discussion. For, Dad is directly attributing to Ava (and possibly Mish -
again see page 228) personal responsibility for causing these 
"arguments". Drawing once more upon the work of Drew (1987), as 
discussed in Chapter 5, I would suggest that this attribution amounts to a 
tease of Ava, on the grounds that it is formulated as such an- extreme 
attribution. Drew (1987) and later Mulkay (1988), observe that teases are 
often extreme formulations of another's actions, and here we have a 
conclusion displayed as rejecting all possibility of doubt and all other 
altemative representations of the link between being "at home" and the 
continuation of arguments. As with the majority of humorous discursive 
actions, it is important to recognise' thatthe tongu9-1n.:(;heekquaiitY-iJf the- :~ 
tease in no way detracts from the serious business of the utterance, but 
on the contrary, is more likely to enhance such business by permitting the 
safe introduction of problematic material (Mulkay, 1988; see Chapter 5). 
Mum, meanwhile, expands the meaning of her intimation that the relevant 
collective "don't argue", by explaining that: 
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15 Mum: we dis~ [things (.) 
17 Mum: but we don't ar[gue 
This is not the first time within the data, that a distinction is made 
between "argument" and "discussion·1• Once more, the delineation of 
arguments as social objects involves the staking of a contrary claim and 
accomplishes delicate business in the presentation of self and ingroup. . 
Around this contribution, Ava engages with Dad's attribution of line 14, by 
reformulating it into an accusation that she is entirely and uniquely at 
"fault": 
16 Ava: [ its all my? fault 
What is particularly interesting here is that Ava does not outrightly dispute 
the attribution of blame to her. For, to do this would be to exemplify all too 
clearly the accusation being established - if she were to argue overtly at 
this point this would count as in situ evidence that she is the cause of 
arguments. Instead, she uses the format of what looks on one level to be 
an avowal of blame. However, by incorporating a questioning tone, Ava 
sets up a challenge to the elements of accusation and personal attack 
associated with the attribution, perhaps implying that such behaviour is in 
violation of the family's norms. I would suggest that here we have an 
example of Holstein and Gubrium's (1994) element of "caring" being 
drawn up0!1 ~s o,!1e of the pa~meterso!flimily p~,~~e-:.one might~~y ~. . 
that Ava's response to the tease is to highlight how close the others are 
getting to the implicit boundary within which family should be enacted -
whereby the "caring' relationship of "family' becomes jeopardised by 
, Almost the first subject discussed on Tape 1 of the data concems this very question, 
which is subsequently taken up at various points in the ensuing discussion (See 
Appendix 1). 
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accusatory behaviour. It is important to see, however, that this boundary 
is one that Ava brings into being as she speaks, rather than being 
something pre-existing and 'out there'. Furthermore, it is a boundary 
whose subsequent status depends upon confirmation or rejection by the 
other participants. 
It is also notable that, in characterising the attribution as an illegitimate 
. move, Ava does not attend to the humorous element of the tease; In . 
Drew's (1987) terms, this is a response which attends only to the hostile, 
serious element of a tease, while ignoring its humour. Furthermore, it is 
only via Ava's use of "my' that Dad's "you' is explicitly fixed in the 
singular. The effect of this is to exclude, at this point, the option of 
including Mish in the reference. This, I believe is all part of Ava's 
representation of the tease as extreme, and therefore potentially 
dangerous and illegitimate. 
Dad's response to this provides an uptake of Ava's questioning tone: 
18 Dad: ~havebeen 
At the same time, however, by reiterating the message of the earlier 
conclusion, it continues the tease. This response to Ava is then agreed to 
.. . -.-
by Mum in the form of an almost exact echo of Ava's words: 
19 Mum: W it was all your fault: 
Mum's wholehearted embrace of Ava's extreme'~case formulation 
(Pomerantz, 1986) signals even more clearly that a tease is taking place 
and displays her collaboration in this endeavour. By emphasising the 
humorous nature of this exchange, Mum thus ensures that no boundaries 
have been violated, and furthermore, that none will be (see below). 
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The whole position is then further reinforced with the follow-up reasoning 
by Dad 
20 Dad: ='cause [we don1 ~ those arguments now 
In all. the contributions of Dad and Mum in the above exchange 
accomplish. through their teasing format, both a humorous and a serious 
message. As with many applications of humour in conversation. they 
utilise the "ambiguity as to the true seriousness of their message. in order 
to successfully occupy the borderland between lighthearted fun and the 
serious introduction of hazardous topics of interaction (Mulkay. 1988; see 
also Chapter 5). What is more. the teasing exaggeratedness of their 
treatment of individual responsibility for arguments, actually closes down 
the avenues by which that issue might be considered seriously. 
Paradoxically, I would suggest that Dad and Mum accomplish the 
evasion of a potentially contentious and disruptive issue by their very use 
of exaggeratedly contentious and disruptive formulations. 
In the next few lines of data, the collective contributions of the 
interactants continue on with the alignments that have been locally 
produced: 
21 Ava: 
22 Mum: 
23 Sue: 
24 Ava: 
25 Sue: 
26 Mum: 
[you wouldn't [you wouldn't 
[that's right 
no [that's right 
[( was) that then 
we don't artgue very much do we 
!I& in the Qintment 
Here we find a display of solidarity between ''we" who "don't argue" - not 
. only in form and content but also via collaboration in the tease - and the 
contrasting disagreement of that ingroup with the (teased) outgroup of 
"you" who "muse', logically, bear the "faulr'_ In line 21, Ava begins an 
utterance overlapping with Dad's of line 20, and when repeated, also 
overlapped by Mum's "thafs right". The uptake by the others on this 
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abandoned start, treats it as a defence or protest. For, not only does 
Mum further corroborate the assessment in line 22, but Sue's echo is 
prefaced by a "no" of disagreement with Ava. Ava's unclear contribution 
of line 24 can be seen as a change of tack towards explicitly questioning 
the attribution, but there is no specific uptake to this utterance. Instead, 
Sue reiterates her earlier formulation with: 
. .25 SUEl: we don't arfgul;! very much do we 
This, Mum overlaps, with a summary metaphor of the situation within the 
family, and continuation of the tease, whereby Ava is the "fly in the 
ointment". In this representation, Ava is cast as the single disruptive 
element in an otherwise harmonious environment. As in the earlier 
contributions towards the tease, it is precisely by excessively overstating 
Ava's responsibility that serious entry into the matter can be precluded. 
4 MINIMISING ARGUMENTS: ACCOMPLISHING AUGNMENT 
Following the above, Sue offers a description of the arguments to which 
she has been referring: 
27 Sue: 
28 
29 
30 
31 
we have a ve-a occasional arguments 
when we get a bit ratty with each other (.) 
and somebody says something like (.) 
that the other person takes ex~on to 
they said it in the wrong ';/gJ. or something 
Within this explanation, Sue does a lot of work to bring her mediated 
foimulation, ''we don't argue very much" (my emphasis), into linewitli-the 
definitive conclusions made earlier by Mum and Dad. Namely, ''we don't 
argue" (Mum, line 11) and ''we don't have those arguments now" (Dad, 
line 20). In doing so she is able to explain away any apparent 
misalignment with Mum and Dad that might interfere with the united front 
being talked about and brought into being. She does this, as we shall 
see, by presenting the arguments in question as infrequent, trivial and 
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unintentional. Once more, it should be pointed out that this formulation of 
the family's behaviour is no mere neutral description. It is a rhetorical 
move within an arena of contention which contributes to the drawing up 
of allegiances and oppositions. In this way, in line with the insights of 
Holstein and Gubrium (1994), it is the atmosphere of dispute and 
challenge that occasions a clarification of the family's arguments as 
social objects. 
One of the first things to be noted in this description, is its 
accomplishment of minimisation. In line 27, the infrequency of the 
arguments is worked up with the use of "a ve-few occasional". The choice 
of "a bit" to describe "ratty" in line 28, is similarly minimising. However, 
"ratty" has additional rhetorical effectiveness, in the following sense: to 
describe "somebody" as "ratty" is to utilise a mundane, colloquial term 
with no overtones of extraordinariness or major significance. What is 
more, this term is a hearers descriptor. Thus, unlike alternatives such as 
angry or malicious, it explains nothing about internal states or intentional 
harm, being restricted to describing how a speaker comes across to an 
audience. In this way, no profound reason is being established for the 
behaviour, delivery is the only variable being formulated, and in this way, 
delivery is formulated as the significant variable. 
In line 29, minimisation is accomplished by what Edwards and Potter 
(1992), and later Potter (1996) have termed "systematic vagueness". 
Highlighted in both analyses, is the rhetorical value of vague descriptions 
- --- -in evading opportunities -for -rebuttal. For -example, ~Potter . (1996) ,_c ___ c,,_ • ~ 
examines the following description by a client during relationship 
counselling: 
8 there was an episo:de, with (.) a I212ke, (.) 
9 in a pub, y'know? 
10 And /m: having a few drinks and ~in' 
(Potter, 1996 p 37). 
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In his analysis, Potter alerts the reader to the speaker's use of the 
causality-neutral term ·episode"; minimal particulars, as in ·pub" and 
"bloke"; the colloquial idiom "messin"; and the mitigating adverbial "a 
few". He then goes on to highlight the subtlety with which the discursive 
business of this description is accomplished, by pointing out the extent to 
which such global formulations are "robust against undermining" (p 39). I 
would suggest, however,- that -there is an additional element to such 
examples of "systematic vagueness". It appears to me, that systematic 
vagueness also carries implications of exemplification. Despite the 
specificity of this unique occurrence, the choice of global formulations 
projects the feeling that it could have been am!. "bloke" in am!. "pub", after 
any number of "drinks" of am!. description and am!. one of a variety of 
innocent forms of "messin'". Thus, while to give details implies that those 
details matter, these global formulations equally imply that the details of 
the case are immaterial. 
We can now apply these insights to Sue's description. While her 
"systematic vagueness" is effectively "robust against undermining", even 
more significantly, it both plays down the significance of the behaviour at 
issue and minimises the opportunity for negative causal attributions about 
actors. In line 29, the speaker in question is "somebody", while what they 
said is ·something like", followed by a pause and change of tack, which 
displays the unimportance of actually supplying examples of what that 
·something" might be "like". 
Line 30 then expresses the change of tack mentioned above, which 
represents a shift of focus to the recipient of the ·something" being said. 
This recipient is described as "the other person", again a vague and 
unspecified individual, who "takes exeption to", not what is being said, but 
the ~ ·something'" is said (line 29). How it is said is also presented -
being "the wrong ~ or something"', Once more, systematic vagueness 
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is employed in the use of "or something", but in addition an unspecified 
sense of "wrong" in the behaviour is established. 
Looking at the description in an overall way, we see that Sue formulates 
the manner in which a verbal contribution is made and/or heard, as the 
causal factor in arguments. The subject matter, meanwhile, is presented 
as a subordinate and largely irrelevant concern. Furthermore, when each 
individual_ c_hoice of term and modifier is added together, the picture 
produced is the very opposite of dramatic: the arguments are "mlt!" and 
'occasional"; the participants are 'somebody" who gets a "bit ratty" and 
"the other person" who "takes exception"; the issue under contention is 
"something like" something else which is never gone into; and the 
offending manner of delivery is nothing more harmful that saying 
something "the wrong way or something". Thus, minor upset is being 
displayed as infrequently occurring, between indefinite actors, on 
jnexplicjt subjects, as a result of unremarkable fluctuations in mood and 
sensitivity of delivery. Moreover, the disharmony that this causes is also 
presented as "wrong" and accidental, thus indicating that harmony is the 
successfully prevailing norm accomplished by the actors in question. 
In the above, I have emphaSised that Sue establishes in her description 
an indefiniteness about who are the actors involved in the arguments. 
However, as I have suggested previously, the set from which this 
·somebody" and "the other person" are to be drawn is severely delimited 
by the "we" established earlier in the extract - the subset from the 
- collectivity of "family" who are still "at home": that is, Mum, Dad and Sue .. _-, 
Despite all of the careful work performed by Sue in this description, one 
of its effects could be considered as rather ironic under the 
circumstances. As discussed above, the teasing nature of the extreme 
case formulations (Pomerantz, 1986) employed by Dad and Mum, evade 
serious examination of the issue of responsibility. In contrast, Sue's 
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solicitous representation of the family's current manner of arguing, turns 
the question of whether or not it is "all" Ava's "fault" into a defensible 
position. In this way, Sue's earnest construction of a low-key, no-fault 
mode of arguing, actually opens up the closing accomplished by the 
exaggeratedly disruptive and contentious formulations of the tease. It is 
this then, that paves the way for the serious, difficult and disputed 
deliberations about responsibility that characterise the middle section of 
the extract. '-'--,' , 
5 CHILDISH ARGUMENTS AND THE TIME FACTOR 
After characterising arguments in the above manner, Sue goes on to 
introduce an alternative formulation of the temporal juncture in the 
description of arguments, This is achieved by contrasting the description 
she has established of the current make-up of arguments, with its 
historical counter, on the basis of what Sacks (1972) called "stage of life", 
Sue says: 
33 but thafs about it we don't actually (.) 
34 we don't argue like ~ used to argue 
35 when we were l:flili1ren 
37 Sue: , [when they ,argued with us 
38 'cause we're aaults [now 
.. At~is point, i believe that the analysis undertaken by Sacks (1972) 
- provides an excellent insight into what is being accomplished in this 
,_ utterance_ Therefore, I feel that a detailed and extended summary of the 
- -
relevant aspects of his analysis is worth undertaking here. Furthermore, 
once outlined, later references to this project of Sacks's will become 
intelligible. 
One of Sack's most famous examinations was that of the two sentences 
produced by a child under three: 
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The baby cried. The mommy picked it up (Sacks, 1972 p 216). 
Sacks undertakes to explain how and why he, and the majority of his 
readers, hear in this that the ~'mommy" in the second sentence is the 
mommy of the "baby" in the first. 
In order to do this he introduces the concept of a "membership 
. _. . . . . .' 
categorisation device" (henceforth MC-device). Which he defines as 
any collection of membership categories ... which may be applied to a 
population ... so as to provide, by the use of some rules of application, for 
the pairing of at least a population member and a categorization device 
member. A device is then a collection plus rules of application (Sacks, 
1972 pp 218-9). 
He then goes on to observe that the terms "baby" and "mommy" are 
categories in a collection whose MC-device is "family", a device which 
also includes an undefined, but by no means infinite, number of other 
terms (e.g. children, child, parent). Following this observation, Sacks sets 
out two rules of application for these devices: 
Firstly, his Economy rule states that a single category from an MC-
device is recognisably an "adequate reference" (for example, the use of 
"baby" or "children"). A second ConSistency rule holds that, if an 
individual in a population is described using a category from a certain 
MC-device, then that or other categories from the same MC-device may 
be applied for subsequent individuals. For example, the use of "baby" or 
·children" makes relevant such categories as "mcimmy' "daddy' or 
"parent". 
Sacks then observes that a term may exist as a category within several 
different MC-devices - for example, "baby" belongs both to the MC-device 
of "family" and what Sacks calls "stage of life" - and that although any two 
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or more categories might be "combinably" referential, they are not 
necessarily so. Thus a "baby" might fit the categories of both "family" and 
"stage of life" but a person may still be referred to as someone's "baby" 
and yet might occupy the category of "adult" within the "stage of life" MC-
device. At this point Sacks introduces a "hearer's maxim" to explain that, 
if two or more population members are described using different 
categories (e.g. "baby" and "mommy") that ~ be heard as coming from 
the same MC-device (e.g. family), then "hear them that way'~ (Sacks,' 
1972 p 220). 
A further step in unpicking the reading of these two sentences, involves 
identifying that some MC-devices are what Sacks calls "duplicatively 
organized". This means that the categories in some devices can be 
partitioned into units, so that multiple instances of appropriate categories 
tend to be grouped according to units, rather than simply according to 
category. His example is that 
one counts not numbers of daddies, numbers of mommies, and numbers of 
babies but numbers of families (Sacks, 1972 p 220-1). 
In this way, individuals who are partitioned into such units can be seen as 
'coincumbents' of that unit. This observation leads him to formulate 
another hearer's maxim: given a population that has been categorised so 
as to form an MC-device with "duplicative organisation", if that population 
"can be hearer as forming a unit of 'coincumbents' - "Hear it that way" 
(Sacks, 1972 p 221). Sacks's proviso is that some pattems of categories 
cannot be heard as forming a unit - where, for example, only a set 
number of incumbents from a certain category applies, and yet that 
number is superseded. For example, regarding the device "family", many 
"children" "can be hearer as 'coincumbents' of a unit. However, if many 
"mommies" are presented, they will not be heard as members of the 
same unit. 
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At this point, Sacks goes on to explain his concept of "category-bound 
activities". By this he means that there are some activities that are taken 
as being done by certain categories within an MC-device. Sacks gives 
the example of the activity of crying and its boundedness to the "baby" of 
the "stage of life" MC-device. An additional observation that is important 
here, is that some MC-devices consist of "positioned" categories. "Stage 
of life" can be seen to be one of these, having "baby", "child", "adult" etc. 
as hierarchically organised categories within it. The combination of 
category-bound activities and positioned categories, renders certain 
.... '~:~ 
activities degrading when applied to categories that are "up" the hierarchy 
from the category to which they are bound (e.g. an older child accused of 
crying on no valid provocation). Meanwhile, others are seen as praising 
when applied to categories that are "down" the hierarchy (e.g. a "baby" 
being observed not to cry on provocation). 
Following this, Sacks postulates another hearer's maxim: that if an 
individual is categorised by an ambiguous category - one pertaining to 
two or more MC-devices - and is described as carrying out an activity that 
is category-bound to one of those devices, then hear at least that 
device's category to apply. 
It is therefore, via this maxim combined with the first hearer's maxim 
presented above, that we understand in "The baby cried. The mommy 
picked it up." that the "baby" refers to both the category in the MC-device 
of "family" and that of "stage of life". 
With the aid of this extensive analysis by Sacks, we can retum to our 
current extract of data. At this point, the utterance under our scrutiny is 
the following: 
34 we don't argue like G used to argue 
35 when we were l<bili1ren 
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37 Sue: 
38 
[when they argued with us 
'cause we're Mulls [now 
In line 35we find the category "children" being applied by Sue to a group 
of individuals referred to as ''we''. Again, the hearer is presented with the 
problem of identifying to whom this refers. As with ~acks's example of 
"baby", the term "children" can fit into both the MC-device of ''family'' and 
that of "stage of life".. However, in this utterance, the construction is 
"when we were children", which uses the past tense. Regarding this, one 
thing we know for certain is that Sue, the only referent of ''we'' that is 
unambiguous because she is the speaker, still occupies the category of 
"child" from the MC-device of "family", (Le. she is still Mum and Dad's 
"child") so that she would not refer to herself in the past tense, if 
employing this understanding of the term. We can conclude from this that 
her use of "children", here, is employing the "stage of life" MC-device. 
Furthermore, going back to the work of Schegloff (1972), in this utterance 
a "stage of life" construction is being used to formulate an activity. Thus, 
the "stage of life" ''when ~ were children" is used to distinguish a 
particular configuration of the activity to "argue". Meanwhile, in Sacks's 
(1972) terms, whatwe have here is a category-bound activity. 
In his article, Sacks's attention is primarily focused on already existing 
shared understandings of activities. For example, he points out that in 
some cases, identifYing an activity as pertaining to an individual can 
mobilise such cultural understandings so as to "hint at" the category to 
. which' they belong"~(Sacks, :;1972' ii223)."lri thel l1otesrelatingto this 
section of his discussion, Sacks quotes Fischer and Fischer (1963), who 
remark on the frequency with which parents make 
remarks like 'only babies do that You're not a baby' (Fischer and Fischer, 
1963 p [undocumented]. Quoted in Sacks, 1972 p 223). 
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However, I believe that Sacks has omitted from this examination the pro-
active use of activities, sa as to bind them to categories far discursive 
ends. Such a perspective allows us to see that the parents in Fischer and 
Fischer's study are rhetorically binding certain activities to the category 
"baby" sa as to discourage their children from displaying them beyond a 
certain age. Thus, Sack's example of the activity "crying", although 
biologically speaking, equally available at all "stages of life", becomes 
.• ', ·category"bound to the category of "baby" .as, a cultural accomplishment. 
In other wards, this category-binding occurs through an accumulation of 
individual instances in which speakers bind "crying" to the category 
"baby", in similar ways to the Fischer and Fischer quotation above. 
With this extension of Sacks's reasoning at hand, if we return to the 
utterance "we don't argue like we used to argue when we were children", 
we see that it is in the very utterance itself that the construction of 
category-boundedness is accomplished. Within this utterance, a unique 
understanding of "argue" is being established as bound to a particular 
category ("children'1 in the MC-device "stage of life". What is mare, it is 
the explicit contrast of these ·childish" arguments with the family's current 
arguments, that defines the features of this category-bound variety. In 
other wards, to the extent that the family's current arguments have been 
presented as infrequent, minimal and accidental, ·childish" arguments are 
characterisable, by inference, as (antithetically) frequent. extensive and 
intentional. It is also notable, that a great deal of work is put into 
explicating a definitive set of circumstances that uniquely allow 
"'-arguments to currently occur. 'In' contrast, the historical arguments . 'are 
describable simply as ''when we were children" - establishing that merely 
being children was enough to precipitate argumentation. Furthermore, 
the absence of any subsequent query or problem with this lack of 
account by the others, ratifies that what is addressed here is a piece of 
common knowledge about the behaviour of children. 
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One question that arises, however, is how we understand the term "we" 
not to refer to Mum and Dad in this utterance. The first important factor is 
the emphasis on 'E", which marks a change in the configuration of the 
category - a shuffling of personnel to which the category ''we'' applies. 
Prior to this utterance the "we" thus far established, consists of those who 
"don't have those arguments n'ow" because "you're not at home". This 
configuration therefore excludes Ava as the addressee "you" - it is 
.therefore.an ,"exclusive 'we'~ (Leech and Svartvik, 1978; MUhlhausler and 
Harre, 1990; Fowler, 1993) - and includes only those still "at home" - i.e. 
Mum, Dad and Sue. In marking the shift in referents, I would suggest that 
a new "inclusive" configuration of , 'we" comes into being, which includes, 
at the very least, Sue, as the addresser, and "you" - Ava - the addressee. 
What is more, I would suggest that the collection of these two parties in 
the reference "when we were children", then allows for that formulation to 
represent a common temporal descriptor as well as one of "stage of life". 
By this I mean that, being of a similar age and having shared very closely 
the "stage of life" called "childhood", ''when we were children" can 
represent for Sue and Ava the same period of time. This means that, 
while Mish may possibly be included in the formulation, also having been 
a child within the referenced time period, (see page 228), Mum and Dad 
are excluded, being of a different generation. One might even hazard the 
postulation of a Sacksian "hearers maxim" to the effect that if a "stage of 
life" can be heard as a common time period then, hear it that way. 
Moreover, Sue follows the above reference with the utterance: 
37 Sue: [when they argued with us 
Here, she introduces a category of ''they" in contrast to ''we'', Drawing on 
Sacks's (1972) consistency rule, we can conclude that this second group, 
by berng contrastive to "children", is heard to refer to some group 
occupying a different "stage of life" during that time period - e.g. "adults", 
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It is at this point, I would suggest, that the exclusion of Mum and Dad 
from "we" is made concrete, as they are brought in as the most logical 
referents for the contrastive category "they". Again, what makes Mum 
and Dad the most logical referents here is, I would suggest, the implicit 
mobilisation of the category "family" to delineate the maximal set from 
which the categories "we" and "they" are drawn. 
Sue then completes her description with:. 
38 'cause we're adults [now 
In this utterance, the same group who "were" categorised as "children" 
are clearly heard to be referenced again to be "adults now". Again, those 
who were adults throughout the time period from then until now are 
excluded from the reference. 
To summarise the above, the characterisation that results from Sue's 
utterance involves a temporal juncture that is worked up on the basis of 
the contrasting meanings of what it is to "argue", depending on whether 
the parties involved are "children" or "adults". Significantly, verification of 
this characterisation is requested, both in the "do we" of line 25 and the 
"don't we" of line 31, and is forthcoming from Mum-in Iine4P, with a 
.. . .. _ . .:.. .• ' .... -. "'.' 
. ,,. 
40 Mum: [yeh 
In its very agreement, this again supports the earlier declaration that "we 
. do'n't -arguevery-muchi': In dOing-so· it establish Eis -that wha6riighf have 
been seen as a point of disagreement - Sue's "very much" mediation of 
"we don't argue" - has been successfully brought into a status of 
agreement Again, therefore, this is no incidental description of the world, 
but, as with all formulations, it is designed to do discursive business. In 
this case, at least a part of such business is the workfng up of a rhetorical 
alliance with Mum and Dad. 
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Ava's response to this extended description is the following: 
39 Ava: [so WHEN DO YOU THINK= 
41 Ava: [:=you stopped arguing like that 
One point of note in this utterance is that the question is asked of ''you'' 
.... rather than ''we''. As a result;"Avi:Cadds· her Qwnpafticipation to the 
construction of a ''we'' from which she is excluded. However, even more 
significant is the manner in which this utterance picks up on a version of 
the story being wtold about changes in argumentative styles. This 
utterance of Ava's responds to Sue's explanation that changes in "stage 
of life" - going from being 'children" to being "adults" - are responsible for 
the temporal juncture under discussion. As will be seen from the 
utterances which follow, this is a clear alternative to the earlier locational 
explanation, regarding being or not being "at home". 
Mum and Sue reply to Ava with, 
42 Sue: when you two ~ 
43 Mum: [when you two lmt 
In these two utterances we see the very clear use of another indexical 
expression - "you two". Once more, no problems arise regarding what this 
expression refers to. On the contrary, Mum's exact echo of Sue's words 
gives the impression that their meanings are entirely correspondent. This, 
: "' .• "', '_"".,_ .... _ •• ,' •• '_"' .. -_". " .... ..; '_ -_'"l...... ..""""",",-,_. ,.,._.~ • .,.-.. " .' .,.~'" .",,- ,,_~. ,. _~,'. ,~' ~".'-.,-" ~_" • .."."",, ____ • ___ ;'7:' ':-,,""-~"'- ... " '" --.: 
I would suggest; fsagain"beciIlJse-oflhemcibilisaticin-ofthe"underlYing --. 
assumption of "family"-. For, while the indexical expressions identified 
earlier could feasibly be interpreted as drawn from the limited set of 
conversationalists, namely Mum, Dad, Sue and Ava .:. for the first time 
here, the absent family member - MislT - is. the only possible candidate for 
inclusion. It is my belief that this sudden fnclusion ofMish into the 
discussion, and later examples of a similar phenomenon, highlights the 
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fact that Mish has been available for inclusion in many of the indexical 
expressions of the previous 40 lines. In other words, the unchallenged, 
unqueried inclusion of Mish at this point reveals that the eategory "family" 
has continually been at least' potentially operative throughout the 
discussion so far. Thus, the bracketed observations that I have made 
about the possible inclusion of Mish into earlier references, such as "so 
they must have been you then" (line 14), and "like we used to argue 
when we' were children" (lines 34-5), can be seen as similarly available' 
for the participants all along. On this basis, I conclude that the maximal 
set for indexieal pronouns in the extract is the nuclear family, as opposed 
to the participants in the current interaction. 
"You two" is, however, not the only indexical expression utilised in these 
utterances, for we also have the term "left", In this case, the indexical 
expression comes from the sub-category, mentioned earlier, which 
Schegloff (1972) called "Iocational proterms" (p 318). Schegloff 
concludes that, because such terms refer to a location which shifts 
according to its context of use, members are required to perform a 
"Ioeational analysis' in order to make sense of them. In this ease, hearers 
are expected to locate what is "left" as the family "home" of the earlier 
discussion (e.g. line 8 "but you're not at home"). In this way, despite the 
recent construction of the change in family arguments as a "stage of life" 
phenomenon, these tandemed utterances reformulate the juncture back 
to Sue's earlier explanation, recharacterising it as a loeational 
phenomenon. There are, however, three additional elements of note in 
,thisforriiulatio;'~ i=iiStii." wtiiie;ibutyoli'rellot 'atho;;;e;;-{ii~e-8fform~iate~ . 
home as a place one can be in or not, ''when you two left" depicts home 
as a foeal reference point that ean be "left" (and later, in lines 47 and 51, 
ean be retumed to). Secondly, the explicit inclusion of Mish in the 
reference. Thirdly, this deployment of a locational formulation to explain 
the change in arguments reinvokes its previous usage. In doing so, I 
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would suggest that it reintroduces the earlier conclusions about 
responsibility and blame (see Section 3). 
In line 44 there is general laughter. For an explanation of this we need to 
contrast the attribution of responsibility achieved in the above responses 
(by Sue and Mum) with that implied in the question (by Ava) which 
elicited them. As mentioned above, Ava's question, "so when do you 
- think you stopped arguing like thaf (lines 39 and 41), actively participates' 
in working up the attribution of responsibility to "stage of life". However, 
the responses it provokes, re-introduce the attribution of responsibility to 
Ava's (and this time, also Mish's) absence from home. In a reflexive 
manner, the laughter which then ensues, both establishes the 
significance of the blame-avoiding element in Ava's question and, at the 
same time, responds to the humorous way in which it backfires. 
In the manner described by Drew (1987) and discussed at length in 
Chapter 5, despite acknowledging the humour by joining in the laughter 
in line 44, Ava then goes on to address the serious matter at hand, in 
trying to reinstate Sue's "stage of life" explanation of lines 33-5 and 37-
38: 
45 Ava: or could it~that(.) 
46 just after we reached [about the age of= 
48 Ava: =about 18 
6 MICHELLE'S GOOD OLD ARGUMENTS: ACCUSA TlON AND 
.. , .. ,. "-' .-",.,-,-' .... :';:.."...,. .... ~,'- -.,.' ", '.-. ... ",. ,..,.- ,.,.:-.~,:-, 
RESPONSIBIUTY --,-.~.-
Around and overlapping with the above utterance Mum begins a new 
point with 
47 Mum: [M!chelle comes home (.) 
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She then interrupts herself, in order to establish the positioning of this 
contribution in terms of the former talk. Thus she inserts the marker. 
49 Mum: mind you= 
Following this, she reiterates her previous phrase, with the addition of 
''when'', in line 51 and then continues in line 52: 
51 Mum:· - . [=when"Mjcheije comes home 
52 she has a good old argument doesn't she. 
It would appear that the insertion of "mind you" acts as a proviso. 
However, the point being made by Mum does not undermine the united 
stand being taken. Indeed, without refuting that the "home dwellers" 
"don't argue", Mum is able to postulate that although they "stopped 
arguing like that" when Mish and Ava "left", this type of argument occurs 
again "when Michelle comes home". 
This utterance by Mum merits detailed dIscussion. To begin with, the 
theme of responsibility appears again as in lines 14, 16, and 18-24. This 
time, however, the blame is apportioned to Michelle. This is the first time 
in the extract that Mish is explicitly named, rather than inferred from a 
pronoun. Even more clearly, we see how Mish has been available as a 
candidate referent for any assessments made about home, arguing, 
children etc., because of the implicit assumption of "family' by the 
interlocutors. Secondly, the relevance of the loeational index of "home" is 
reiterated. Again, as in the formulation "when you two left", the referel1~e . 
_ ~~~.,,~:,;,~, ..... _'- •• ;~-." ...... o_ ........ ""_ ••••• _____ ....,-, ___ .~_ ..... ".'·' .... -,.~..,..'c_""._·. ___ =-,~.;.~.~-_', • -•. - - ,.- ___ 0_ '_._'_ 
is not merely to being "at home" but to when Mish "comes home". As 
mentioned before, home is here firmly loeated, not only as the current 
location of the talk, but also as the unmoving, foeal point which "family' 
members may leave, and come back to. .. 
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A third point of note is the way that these two factors combine in relation 
to the earlier tease of Ava. On the one hand, this focus on Mish as 
responsible for arguments exonerates Ava from the sole blame 
established by the tease. On the other hand, the description is of what 
occurs "when Michelle comes home" and is inextricably linked to the 
perpetrator not living "at home" - a status also attributable to Ava. By 
inference then, Ava remains somewhat implicated in this description . 
. ~ '".' .:..... ..- ,- ., . 
Another significant factor is the manner in which the utterance constructs 
only Mish as having "a good old argument". The action is thus displayed 
as performed by a single individual, rather than resulting from a multi-
party exchange. Such a representation of these arguments, in obscuring 
any involvement in them by the "home dwellers", avoids any contradiction 
with the earlier construction that they "don't argue". A further point of note 
is the characterisation of the arguments in question as "good old" 
arguments. I would suggest that this adjectival phrase accomplishes a 
great deal of business. Not only does it work up the arguments as bona 
fide, rather than spurious, but it implies that Mish is both dedicated to, 
and in receipt of pleasure from, arguing. What is more, the phrase "good 
old" carries the connotation that the arguments in question are non-
threatening and familiar, rather than in any way dangerous to the family. 
Thus, the message is not one of conflict or threat, but of potentially 
threatening conduct made manageable and almost traditional within the 
family (see also Chapter 1). Finally, Mum's use of a question tag, as with 
Sue's earlier ones (lines 25 and 32), attempts to co-opt agreement and 
' •. , solida~ty fr9m the others. .' .,.' 
Sue's response to this is to offer a second assessment of strong 
agreement 
53 Sue: Mish always starts arguments when ~ comes home= 
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In line with the work of Pomerantz (1984), Sue displays strong agreement 
via a more extreme formulation of Mum's assessment. By using "always" 
to strengthen Mum's reference to regularity, "arguments' and Michelle's 
homecoming are not merely displayed as linked, but as universally 
concurrent. Meanwhile, she strengthens the dimension of responsibility 
by saying Michelle actively "starts arguments", as opposed to merely 
having them. This agreeing second assessment is then further affirmed 
.. and emphasised by a reciprocal agreeing second assessment from Mum, 
enthusiastically initiated at the instant Sue completes hers. 
54 Mum: =oh yes [she always does 
Ava overlaps this utterance with an objection as to the legitimacy of these 
assessments of Mish's behaviour: 
55 Ava: [ifs not fair to ar (.) 
56 to say t she does things like [that 'cause she can't= 
58 Ava: =hold her own JlaIt 
An important observation about this challenge is that it in no way disputes 
the relevant parties' "category entitlement" (Edwards and Potter, 1992) to 
make such assessments. Ava does not say that it is unfair to judge Mish 
because Mum, Dad and Sue are unqualified to make such judgements. 
In fact, it is the absence of this line of dispute which helps to work up the 
category entitlements of these speakers to make such assessments. 
:. -__ • • •• co.- .~. ._"" ~ ~-. ~ _., 
What Ava instead bases her objection upon,·is Mish's absence from the 
current interaction.. In this way, the locational index is again made 
relevant to the family's interaction. Ironically, Ava's representation implies 
that, by Michelle not being at home, the remaining family members are 
free to establish a full agreement that Mish starts arguments when she 
does retum home. The implication is that,. were she to be present for the 
discussion of this topic, she would be in a position to "hold her own part'. 
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and presumably "start" an argument against this characterisation of her! 
Again, in this objection, Ava attempts to highlight one of the boundaries 
of acceptable behaviour within which "family" practice should be enacted: 
those attacked should be available to "hold" their "own part". Once again, 
this delimitation of family practice arises out of the environment of claims 
and counter-claims which is characteristic of disagreement and 
challenge. 
The significance of Ava's challenge to the legitimacy of making 
assessments of a person in their absence does not, however, end here. 
Instead it represents an excellent example of the manner in which an 
utterance acquires meaning through the subsequent uptake of other 
interlocutors. In this utterance and that of lines 60-1: 
60 Ava: well she'll (.) ((laughs)) 
61 ·she won't be very pleased· 
Ava posits, firstly, the unfairness of not being present to defend oneself, 
and latterly, displeasure, as in~ices on which the ongoing assessment 
procedure should be considered illegitimate. The discursive action which 
this performs is then retrospectively formulated via Mum's uptake in lines 
57, 59 and 62: 
57 Mum: [oh she QQ6 
59 Mum: she still does 
62 Mum: - ifs mm [though 
In these utterances, Mum emphatically espouses the truth of the 
assessment made of Mish. These utterances act so as to subordinate the 
relevance of Ava's questions of unfairness, presence for dispute and 
displeasure, to the transcendental operativeness of indisputable truth. In 
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this way, as in the "empiricist repertoire" identified by Gilbert and Mulkay 
(1984), Mum's formulation implies that 
The reporter becomes a passive responder to the requirements of the facts 
(Potter, 1996 p 34). 
The message, it would appear, is that such behaviour is very much within 
the remit of family practice, within which it is only one's duty to make 
truthful assessments of other members, however unflattering they might . 
be. 
However, Mum accomplishes more than this. By initiating this uptake of 
the challenge, Mum frames Ava's objection - on the basis of Mish not 
being able to "hold her own part" - as a stand against the validity of the 
assessment. In doing so, Mum establishes that the assessment is so 
undeniably true as to be robust against the rigours of any defence 
against it - making Mish's presence to "hold her own part' irrelevant. 
However, in addition, this response treats Ava's objection as a challenge 
to the truth of the assessment In doing so, it treats Ava as actually 
"holding Michelle's part", as it were, and mounting a defence on her 
behalf, rather than merely acting as a neutral adjudicator of the legitimacy 
of assessment-making behaviour. Knoblauch (1991) wams that 
"mediators ••• run the risk of being disagreed with" (p 185), and from one 
perspective, this is what occurs in this exchange. Ava can be seen to be 
setting herself up as a neutral mediator by challenging the legitimacy of 
Mum's accusation of Mish. Mum, however; does not let her get away with 
_ ..... , ____ .• ___ ... ______ ,_-~ __ o:.&......:.:_. 
.. r 
such a move, and instead treats Ava's utterance as a partisan defence of 
Mish. 
In this way, the alignments of "home dwellers" and "home reaverslt. are 
. -
again being established -Ava is positioned by this exchange as aligned 
.. . ... .;:::.. . 
with Mish in chaffenging the assessment,. while Sue and Mum·s co-
produced assessment equally aligns them in opposition~ ~urthermore, the 
contribution by Dad which follows, completes the accomplishment of 
alignment amongst the "home dwellers": 
63 Dad: [well phone her up and tell her 
This works by furthering Mum's argument and extending the counter to 
Ava's challenge. What is more, by suggesting that Ava phone up Mish 
rather than anyone else, it aligns these two objectors with one another 
. ... . .'. . 
and as outsiderS to the'ingroup or assessors: .' ., ,. 
Aside from signalling his alignment with Sue and Mum, Dad's contribution 
in line 63 represents the first direct uptake on Ava's challenge to the 
legitimacy of their assessment procedure. In this utterance, Dad suggests 
that a report of the current interaction should be communicated to Mish 
via a phonecall. In doing 50, he displays himself as openly welcoming 
such an occurrence and any input from Mish which might ensue. In this 
formulation therefore, Dad displays that things would be no different if 
Mish were available to "hold her own parr. Meanwhile, by displaying his 
comfortableness with such a scenario, he signals that the current 
behaviour is no reason for guilt and that he is happy for Mish to learn of 
the assessments being made about her. Thus, both the suggestion of 
secrecy- which Ava has implied is illegitimate as a. family practice - and 
-.. -.. 
, that of. unwillingness to face a defence, are attended, to and rejected • 
. ) Dad's contribution i:lfso lends a,kind of support to Mum's identification of 
the importance of truth to the ongoing behaviour. This is in the sense that 
..._ Dad does not instructAva to "ask" Mish about the proceedings,. but rather: ~- .... -- ---
- ::' .-..... -,- .,.._,' ..... ---", -,. -. -. -. ---.. ~..,..----.......:..,:-~~ ".--~.--~--"'-
to "tell he ..... In other words to report these words of truth. as opposed to 
calling for Mish to comment upon a matter of opinion. What is more, this 
construction of the transcendental status of truth reinforces Mum and 
. .. . 
Dad's fundamental and indisputable "category entitlement:' (potter. 1996) 
to make such assessments. 
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Mum's description in lines 65-8 further establishes Mish as the 
perpetrator of arguments on her return home: 
65 Mum: 
66 
67 
68 
[and she comes home 
and then she then she says 
oh sorry afterwards (.) 
°she didn't mean it' 
In line 65 Mum begins her utterance by reiterating that Mish "comes 
home". She then follows on immediately to describe the process of 
apology which then occurs. The effect of this discursive organisation is to 
create a significant absence of any reference to the arguments that 
presumably elicit the said apology. This absence is significant in that it 
suggests that Mish's homecoming and the instigation of arguments are 
co-constitutive, so that the mention of only one - Mish's homecoming -
counts as an establishment of the other. This ellipsis of any mention of 
the arguments, treats the exchange just prior to it as having resolved all 
contention about the link between them and Mish's homecoming. In 
doing so without provoking further dispute it thereby accomplishes that 
resolution of dispute. 
Of equal rhetorical importance in this utterance, is the establishment that 
what does occur "afterwards" is that Mish says "oh sorry" and that "she 
didn't mean it". In this way, Mum uses Mish's own words in reported 
speech to ratify a position of responsibility or blame (cf. Wooffitt, 1992). 
Mum presents Mish as admitting responsibility herself in a pseudo-
quotation of apology and denial of any intention to harm. It is also notable 
that no apologies or intentions are expressed on behalf of others. In this 
way, the apology takes on the status of an acknowledgement of sole 
responsibility for the arguments in question. 
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7 AND WHAT ABOUT AVA?: RESPONSIBILITY SHARED 
At this point Ava challenges this description of sole responsibility by 
asking/stating 
69 Ava: and I dQn1? (.) 
I believe that this discursive action reveals much about the manner in 
which the relationships between the family members are produced and 
reproduced. This utterance represents a form of implicativeness that is 
accomplished within the family. It appears from this action, that when 
assessments and formulations are made about one family member, their 
relevance to other family members can be rendered implicative. This 
should not be seen as an automatic occurrence, but as one that can be 
worked up by members for the purposes of both enacting "family" and 
making an argumentative case. With regards to the former, the 
establishment of parameters of comparison and contrast between the 
various family roles represents a part of the mechanism by which those 
roles are brought into being, along with the relationships between them. 
Meanwhile, in relation to the latter, the implicativeness of the assessment 
of one family member for the description of another can be seen to arise 
out of the argumentative context. In this instance, the discussion of 
Mish's blame for arguments is marshalled by Ava as a warrant in her own 
case, and a counter to that being made against her. In other words, the 
implication which Ava derives from the assessment of Mish accomplishes 
rhetorical business. 
In this example, Ava draws a conclusion from the establishment of sole 
blame on Michelle accomplished by Mum. This conclusion is that: if Mish 
is solely responsible for the arguments, then she herself cannot also be 
responsible. This would mark a point of difference between the two 
parties, who, as discussed above, have been actively aligned together in 
237 
the interaction both in its content (e.g. "you two" in lines 42-43) and its 
pattern (the blaming of Ava for arguments in lines 14-20, followed by the 
blaming of Mish in lines 49-68 ). Although Ava phrases her utterance as 
the statement of a conclusion, its intonation marks it as a question. I 
would suggest that the alignment that has been worked up earlier is 
made implicative in this utterance in the form of a "calling into question" 
(Knoblauch, 1991 p 174; see Chapter 6). What is highlighted is the 
contradictory status of Mish's sole responsibility as a case of contrastive 
behaviour between the aligned pair. In other words, what has been 
worked up in the interaction is a basis of comparison between Mish and 
Ava - the "home leavers" - and of contrast with the "home dwellers". The 
sole responsibility of Mish for arguments then becomes an issue that can 
undermine the sameness of Mish and Ava's behaviour. 
The response to this "calling into question", which firmly reinstates the 
alignment of Ava and Mish, is then forthcoming from Sue and echoed by 
Mum in full agreement: 
70 Sue: no you do as well 
71 Mum: yeh you do as well 
An additional consequence of this question and answer sequence is to 
further ratify the establishment of Mum and Sue as adjudicators of the 
behaviour of Ava and Mish. This is because Ava's "calling into question" 
requests an additional assessment from them, thereby attesting to the 
saliency of such assessments and their "category entitlement" to make 
them (Edwards and Potter, 1992). 
Ava's response to this assessment is 
72 Ava: oh thanks 
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This utterance communicates a great deal about the manner in which the 
assessment is received by Ava. Firstly, the use of "oh" signals a change 
of state (Schiffrin, 1987: see Chapter 6) indicating some element of 
surprise, as though such a response were unexpected in some way. One 
could hypothesise that, due to the ongoing production of a similarity 
between Mish and Ava, the surprise does not come from having that 
similarity reaffirmed here. Instead, if one looks to the nature of the rest of 
the utterance, a more valid reason for the surprise could be hazarded. In 
this utterance, Ava thanks Sue and Mum for making this assessment of 
her. However, the tone of voice in which this show of gratitude is 
delivered is one of irony. Thus, Ava is parodying a show of gratitude in 
order to communicate that she is neither happy, nor grateful for being 
accused of the responsibility for starting arguments. Given this 
interpretation, the surprise communicated by the "oh" marker becomes 
intelligible as signalling the unexpectedness of an accusation which 
promotes displeasure in its recipient. I would suggest that this 
communication of surprise and displeasure again represents a 
delineation by Ava of legitimate family practice, once more mobilising 
Holstein and Gubrium's (1994) "caring" dimension to call into question 
accusatory behaviour against her. Support for this interpretation may be 
found in the nature of the utterance which follows it. 
It is my belief that the next utterance demonstrates some of the 
mechanism by which the family avoid conflict and disharmony in their 
interaction. In the preceding segment of talk, an apportioning of 
responsibility and blame is carried out, firstly in the semi-humorous 
exchange of lines 14-23 and later in the more serious accusations of 
lines 42-72. During these exchanges, the feelings of unfair judgement 
and displeasure are talked of by Ava in 
16 Ava: [ its all my? fault 
55 Ava: [it's not fair to ar (.) 
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56 to say t she does things like [that 'cause she can't= 
58 Ava: =hold her own wIt 
60 Ava: well she'll (.) ((laughs)) 
61 ·she won't be very pleased· 
They are also displayed by her, as explained above, in 
72 Ava: oh thanks 
D LOCATIONS, ROLES AND STAGES 
1 "BEING AROUND" 
At this point in the data, the story of personalised blame is abandoned by 
Sue. In its place, and significant for its contrast with the former product, 
Sue works up an alternative formulation that is highly generalised and 
depersonalised, situationally based, and privileges no particular subgroup 
within the family. This shift away from responsibility also heralds a 
change in topic, from the question of arguments, to that of changing roles 
and behaviours. 
The utterance in question is as follows, and merits detailed discussion: 
73 Sue: 
74 
I think it's just a question of 
more people being around (.) 
Firstly, Sue initiates the utterance with "I think", which characterises her 
contribution as an opinion. This can be contrasted with the work that has. 
been performed earlier using unqualified statements of fact and an 
insistence on objective truth. Secondly, Sue utilises the term "just". I 
would suggest that this term has a dual action. Most importantly, in the 
sense of 'solely', it offers itself as the only valid explanation, providing a 
candidate replacement for the earlier explanation involving responsibility 
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and blame. However, because "just" also contains resonances of the 
term 'merely', it can be seen to play down the significance of this whole 
matter on the scale of things. 
A third point of note concerns the use of "more people", which 
accomplishes in its "systematic vagueness" (Edwards and Potter, 1992; 
Potter, 1996), an absence of targeted blame on individuals. Finally, the 
invoking of "being around" again brings the spatial relationship between 
the parties into focus. However, in contrast to the home-centredness of 
earlier invocations, this description does not explicitly locate "people" in 
relation to the specificity of "home". Instead, what they are "around" is left 
"systematically vague" and thus implicit., According to the context, this 
reference must be to a bounded location within which five people become 
a crowd. As a result, this choice of term does not entail the privileging of 
certain statuses that the earlier uses of "home" promoted for example: 
the privileging of home-dwellers/owners over others who "left", and 
subsequently "come back". This formulation of affairs is then agreed to by 
Mum, again establishing a consensus of opinion between her and Sue. 
The rhetorical organisation of this utterance is designed to halt the 
accusatory thrust of the discussion that Ava's "oh thanks" has called into 
question, and to re-establish deliberations within the "caring" confines of 
familial harmony. In this way, Sue's words can be seen as a strategic 
retreat from one of the boundaries of family practice and therefore, as 
participation in the construction of that boundary. Unlike Ava's earlier 
attempts to delineate legitimate assessment procedures about family 
members, it appears that this time, her identification of a boundary has 
been corroborated. 
What is more, this contribution by Sue completes the transition in the 
topic of the discussion which began with the explicit connection of Mish 
with the practice of argumentation. As we have seen, the first part of the 
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extract is centered around the nature of arguments, with the 
interrelationships of the family members playing a subsidiary role. In the 
remainder of the extract, the question of family roles and relationships 
becomes the topic of the conversation, and that of argumentation 
recedes into a less central issue. We will see therefore, that it is the roles 
and relationships of the family members that is now fleshed out and 
brought into focus within the cut and thrust of disputation (cf. Holstein and 
Gubrium, 1994). 
2 A PROBLEM WITH ROLES 
Following this carefully managed diffusion of conflict, Sue contributes the 
continuation of her point, whose content does not possess quite the 
neutrality of the above. However, for a different reason, it can also be 
seen as conciliatory. Sue continues with 
76 Sue: and the fact that 
77 you two are more independent [now 
I read this utterance as conciliatory because it is a public attribution of 
independence to Ava and Mish. This is contrastive to the earlier 
establishment of the two as responsible for "childish" arguments, on the 
grounds that it represents another "category-bound activity" (Sacks, 
1972) - this time hinting at the category of adulthood. Notice that the said 
independence is presented as a point of indisputable "fact" rather than a 
belief. This is an important detail within the atmosphere of alignment and 
agreement that has been established between the "home dwellers". For, 
if this accord is to be kept up, neither Mum nor Dad can voice overt 
disagreement with this "fact". Thus, Sue can act almost as a 
spokesperson for her aligned group and can use this status to balance 
the more negative attributions about the outgroup with something akin to 
"praise". This is very similar to the "praise" that Sacks (1972) spoke of 
when observing the effect of attributing a category-bound activity to 
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members of a category, hierarchically positioned beneath the category to 
which that activity is bound. In the current case, the hint at adult 
categorisation serves to support the earlier assertion that Ava and Mish 
are "adults now" (line 38) and to counterbalance the derogatory import of 
constructing their argumentativeness as category-bound to "children". 
Sue is successful in co-opting agreement from at least one member of 
her established alignment group - i.e. Mum. For, with this utterance 
begins the joint establishment by the two of a description of Ava and 
Mish's predicament in relation to the matter under discussion. Firstly the 
general situation of their "independence" is more fully detailed: 
78 Mum: 
79 
80 Sue: 
81 Mum: 
[that's right (.) 
[you're used to a bit= 
[you've got your own way of living 
=11i li leading your own ~ 
Mum begins by overt agreement with Sue in line 78. She then goes on in 
line 79 to reword the point (overlapping with a similar reiteration by Sue in 
line 80) which she completes in line 81. Following this, "home" is again 
formulated as a significant factor in family life. 
82 Sue: 
83 
84 Mum: 
85 
86 
and that when you come back here 
it's difficult to fit in (.) 
and then you have to fit into 
the J;!arent-~ role 
and it doesn't [sort of ~ 
To begin with, Sue's line 82, by bringing in "when you come back here", 
establishes retrospectively that the independent lives being described 
must refer to what occurs outside of "back here" (at "home"). It should be 
noted that the term "back here" in this utterance is another example of 
the sort of "Iocational proterms" which Schegloff (1972 p 318) talks of. 
Also crucial in this utterance, however, is the way in which line 83 
establishes that the requirement for Ava and Mish is to "fit in", and that 
their outside lives make this "difficult". The notable factor in this choice of 
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phraseology is that the necessity to "fit in" is set up as a given. This 
impression is supported and strengthened in Mum's reiteration, in this 
case that they "have to" fit in. Mum also furthers the point by describing 
what Mish and Ava "have to fit into" - "the parent-child role" - before 
explaining the difficulty expressed by Sue as the fact that this role 
"doesn't sort of suit". 
This formulation of the "parent-child role" is highly significant. It implies 
that there is a type of "category-bound activity" related to the interactive 
behaviour between two categories of an MC-device. This suggests that 
there is a whole group of activities undertaken by each category which 
occur when the two interact with one another. In addition, Mum is stating 
that independent lives and the "parent-child role" do not "suit" each other. 
This presumably implies that the activities involved in leading 
independent lives are in some way irreconcilable with the "category-
bound activities" related to the "parent-child role". Furthermore, this 
reference to the "parent-child role" invokes these categories, from the 
MC-device "family", as pertinent to the discussion at hand. Again, 
therefore, we find the implicit mobilisation of "family" as a fundamental 
resource for making sense of the interaction. 
Following this, Sue makes an agreement with Mum: 
87 Sue: [yeh 
She then goes on to explain that: 
88 we've discussed this already me and Mum 
89 we've gQt our own theories haven·t we 
Here we have another case of alignment being accomplished in the 
interaction. In this case, a new formulation of "we" is introduced - an 
exclusive "we" that explicitly references Sue and Mum. This first line 
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therefore accomplishes an exclusion of the original addressee (Ava) , 
while the second ends with the question tag "haven't we", which switches 
to an inclusive "we" and thus addresses Mum. The content of the 
utterance, meanwhile, displays the existence of preestablished theories 
arising out of prior discussion between Sue and Mum. The implication 
here also relates to the broader content of the current conversation, 
hinting that a special availability for discussion and the formulation of 
unified theories is made possible by the fact that these two members are 
still "at home" and thus "around" each other. In line 90, Mum produces 
the solicited agreement to Sue's question tag. 
At this point, Ava draws a conclusion about Sue's comparative status in 
relation to those of Ava and Mish. From the ongoing discussion, perhaps 
from the implications analysed above, as much as the explicit allusions to 
Ava and Mish's independent lives, Ava offers the following conclusion for 
comment 
91 Ava: so you Sue do fit in 'cause you were here 
This is affirmed by Sue, with Mum's help 
92 Sue: 
93 Mum: 
94 Sue: 
'cause [I live here all the !iJ:ru1= 
[well SHE'S NEVER 
[=1 never go out 
Furthermore, Mum goes on to explain how this fitting in has been 
maintained, by stating that 
95 Mum: [she's aDJUSTED we've adjusted to each other 
96 1 ac~ that Suzanne's an lldult (.) 
This utterance is notable for the changes it displays in who is the active 
party in the adjustment. Mum begins by saying that Sue has adjusted, but 
repairs this into the statement that "we've adjusted to each other". Then, 
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however, Mum makes another change, this time giving herself the active 
status in her claim to "accept that Suzanne's an adult". 
3 BEING AN ADULT: A MA TTER OF ACCEPTANCE 
Ava immediately seizes on this second transformation, to ask 
97 Ava: don't you accept rm an adult then 
The importance of this question is twofold. Most straightforwardly, the 
prior discussion has established both a unique position for Sue and an 
avowal that Mum accepts her as an adult. This then prompts Ava to 
question whether being accepted as an adult is also unique to Sue. 
Again we find the implicit mobilisation of assumptions about the 
relationship between the subjects under discussion. In this case, it would 
appear from Ava's question that the assessment of Sue's adulthood has 
implications for Ava's adult status. Put another way, Ava's utterance 
brings such an implication into being. As with her question of line 69, Ava 
draws an implication from the assessment of a sister so as to carry out 
rhetorical business in terms of her disputed, potentially "childish" 
behaviour. 
At a more fundamental level however, this question addresses the active 
status of Mum in the avowal. The point is that attention has moved to 
Mum's agency, and thus responsibility. Significantly, the talk is of 
accepting others as adults, rather than of whether others gm in fact 
adults. Mum says that she accepts that Sue §. an adult, thus closing off 
any debate about that fact. In asking the same question of herself, and 
notably using the negative, Ava claims the status of also objectively .b.eing 
an adult, but of questioning whither Mum accepts her as such. The result 
of this is to imply responsibility to Mum for the established difficulties in 
fitting in, as a result of her not accepting the "fact" that Ava is an adult. 
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Yet again we see that the detailed organisation of an utterance has 
significant rhetorical import. 
This move is however, turned directly on its head by Mum in the following 
response 
98 Mum: 
99 
100 
(0.2) yes I think I do 
but Y.Q!.I. don't accept 
that I accept that you're an adult 
After a pause in line 98, attributable to Mum because of the direct 
address to her (Sacks et ai, 1978) and possibly used to display 
consideration of the point, Mum says "yes" and then signals some 
deliberation with "I think". This openness to the possibility of doubt is not 
then extended to Mum's representation of Ava's thought processes. For, 
appropriating the entitlement to inform Ava of her own inner states, in 
lines 99-100 Mum proclaims that Ava is the one responsible for a failure 
to accept a reality. In doing so, Mum deftly avoids the implied blame 
imputed to actions of hers and places that blame directly back on Ava. 
Ava's response here is interesting - she laughs (line 101). As noted by 
Drew (1987), spending an entire turn in laughter prevents a speaker from 
addressing the serious business of a prior utterance. This means that by 
only laughing, Ava misses (or possibly forgoes) the opportunity to 
respond to Mum's counter-blaming, effectively abandoning her attempt at 
holding Mum responsible. Indeed, we shall see below how her next 
response adopts a very different position to that of blaming Mum. 
Prior to the utterance in question, Sue contributes with the following 
agreement with Mum 
102 Sue: yeh that's that's what we were .saying isn't it (.) 
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Within this utterance, Sue supports Mum's reversal of the finger of blame. 
Sue reformulates the issue under discussion as involving Ava's failure to 
accept Mum's categorisation. In this way it is reiterated that Ava, rather 
than Mum, has created the problem. Ava then makes the reply alluded to 
above: 
103 Ava: do you think even llQW? 
This response verifies Mum's status of judge over her thought processes. 
It does not challenge Mum's reversal of responsibility but, rather, accepts 
that point seriously. What it does do, however, is something very subtle in 
the management-through-disagreement of the relationship between 
them. Within this question, what exactly the indexical expression "now" 
refers to is ambiguous: whether just the part of the exchange within this 
extract; the "now" established by the novel experience of the research 
relationship; the generalised "now" of current maturity, rather than, for 
example, a year or so ago; or some other configuration. One possible 
reading, is that the "now" refers to the very moment of speaking, in which 
the lack of petulance and disagreement with Mum's representation of 
affairs may be seen to display "adult" behaviour. Ironically, it could also 
be said that the acceptance of Mum's legitimacy to judge what the 
speaker is thinking represents a slipping into the "parent-child role". It is 
not the analyst's task here, however, to make a decision about the 
meaning of "now", which DA would emphasise, is just as ambiguous for 
partiCipants as analysts and therefore "does" ambiguity as part of its 
discursive action. What we can see, however, is a "calling into question" 
(Knoblauch, 1991) of Mum's conclusion but in a non-confrontational and 
ambiguous' manner. 
In the above analysis I have represented Ava's utterance of line 103 as a 
"calling into question". However, Mum's reply makes no uptake of this: 
104 Mum: yes 
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Instead, it retrospectively constructs the utterance as a simple question 
and (without hesitation, mediation or account) affirms her conclusion of 
lines 99-100. In this way Mum further solidifies her "category entitlement" 
to assess the thought processes of her daughter: she has made an 
assessment; she is given the opportunity to amend that assessment in 
connection with the possible affects of an ambiguous "now"; and she 
chooses instead, to strongly reaffirm that assessment in its entirety. 
Sue, however, responds to the "calling into question" of Ava's utterance, 
with 
105 Sue: well maybe you more than [MidJelle (.) 
Here, Sue marks her response with "well" and mediates it with "maybe", 
before making a comparative, rather than absolute judgement. In my 
opinion, these aspects combine in order to display an only minimal 
disagreement with Mum, while at the same time an acknowledgement 
that Ava's behaviour "now" has at least some bearing on Mum's 
assessment. Furthermore, the comparative dimension of this utterance 
accomplishes two additional discursive moves. On the one hand, it 
converts the action of accepting adult status from being something that is 
an all or nothing, to something that one can exhibit "more" or less of. 
While at the same time it represents the re-emergence of the difference 
being constructed between the behaviour of Ava and that of Mish. This 
latter accomplishment is highly consequential for what follows after 
Mum's line 106, as we shall see. First, however, we observe that the 
agreement by Mum which follows again reinforces the strong alignment 
between herself and Sue: 
106 Mum: [PER.I::IAES more 
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This is because it represents a mediation of her former "yes" in view of 
Sue's response to the same question. It is significant that this agreeing 
second assessment displays the opposite of those elements identified by 
Pomerantz (1984) that indicate strong agreement. Rather than producing 
a more extreme assessment, Mum emphasises the "perhaps", thus 
accomplishing an agreement with Sue but an only partial reversal of her 
earlier assessment. 
Looking back on the pattern of the interaction, we see that the first part of 
this extract focuses on Ava's responsibility for arguments. The brief 
mention of "you two" (lines 42 and 43) shifts the focus to Mish's 
behaviour. This is then followed, in response to Ava's "and I don't?" (line 
69), by an analysis of the two sisters as one. At this point, as mentioned 
above, Sue's utterance of line 105 reintroduces the distinction between 
the behaviour of Ava and Mish, by making a comparative statement. This 
is then followed up with the reinforcing explanation that 
107 Sue: 
108 
109 
Michelle ~n't (.) 
Michelle doesn't think that 
Mum and Dad think of hru: as an adult (.) 
In line 107 Sue declares categorically that "Michelle doesn't". After a 
pause, what "Michelle doesn't" do is then clarified, in lines 108-9: she 
gives no credence to the fact that both Mum, and now also Dad, "think of 
her as an adult". Again the positioning of the emphasis in the utterance 
highlights its contrastive status, in this case "00" as contrasted either 
with what Sue does or Ava "perhaps" does. 
Of particular significance in this utterance is the potentiality for 
realignment it offers. This display of contrastive behaviour by Mish may 
be seen to shift the boundary that has been locally established between 
Sue and the other two, so as to realign Sue and Ava together and 
separately from Mish. Meanwhile, Dad is reintroduced, following the 
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temporary narrowing of focus on Mum and Sue - ''we'' - versus Ava and 
Mish - "you two". Here, an alternative alignment is formulated between 
Mum and Dad. 
Mum's agreement with this assessment begins with a simple "mmm" and 
is then reinforced: 
110 Mum: mmm (.) ~finitely not (.) 
This latter part of the utterance is an example of the strong agreeing 
second assessments observed by Pomerantz (1984). Mum then 
continues with: 
111 Mum: [but the WAY SHE ca 
However, she is interrupted at this point and does not go on to complete 
this utterance. 
4 WHAT ABOUT DAD?: A QUERY/CHALLENGE 
The interruption mentioned above comes from Sue in the following form 
112 Sue: 
113 
114 
115 
116 
117 
[I don·t even know 
I don't even know whether 
Qgd thinks I'm an adult or not (.) 
I think M.Ym does 
but I don't know whether Qgd does 
22 you? 
Sue begins her contribution in line 112 with "I don't even know", which 
she then repeats but with a change of emphasis so that "1" is stressed, 
before continuing with "Dad. thinks I'm an adult or not". Here, Sue is 
highlighting a possible point of difference between Mum and Dad. What 
has been constructed previously is that Mum thinks of her as an adult 
and that she, unlike Ava, "accepts" that Mum thinks this. Here, Sue 
points out that the case of Dad is not so clear. Indeed, she reiterates 
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even further the point she is making, by stressing that she thinks ".Ml.I.m 
does" but repeats again that she doesn't know "whether Qru:I does". I 
believe that this restatement of the point may arise out of Dad's failure to 
respond after the TRP of line 114 (Sacks, et ai, 1978), neither does he 
come in at any point during that reiteration, which I believe, elicits the 
direct tag question of line 117 
117 !:IQ you? 
In other words, I would suggest that Sue's utterance is not merely a 
statement about her beliefs, but rather, represents an inquiry into Dad's 
assessment of her, that begins indirectly. In the absence of an 
appropriate response it is then converted into a direct query. This does 
produce a response from Dad, as follows 
118 Dad: you have your II!Qments 
This reply is one that merits detailed examination. First of all it is 
important to understand the context in which this query is pressed. Sue's 
adult status has been extensively established over the course of the 
preceding talk: in self-declaration (''we're adults now", line 38); as a given 
in Mum's pronouncement of her acceptance of this fact ("I ac~ that 
Suzanne's an .adult", line 96); her ongoing joint analysis with Mum of the 
behaviour of her siblings during much of this extract; and as a contrast to 
the working up of doubt about the entitlement of those siblings to such a 
category assignment (lines 98 to 111). The consequence of this clearly 
established membership of the category "adult", is that it places the 
responsibility upon Dad to produce further ratification of it. After such a 
strong working up of Sue's adulthood, were Dad to acknowledge an 
opposing opinion, this might be seen as a shortcoming of his judgement, 
rather than a threat to Sue's status. 
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Despite the above, Dad's response does not fill the slot neatly prepared 
for it by Sue. Instead he employs humour to accomplish some alternative 
discursive actions. The reply of "you have your IllQments" is highly 
ambiguous, as befits a humorous quip (Mulkay, 1988). At its least 
derogatory, this comment communicates that Sue has moments during 
which adult status is not merited. In such a reading of the comment, Dad 
largely goes along with the locally established assessment of Sue as an 
adult, but communicates some reservations about this. On the other 
hand, equally communicated is a more derogatory reading which says 
that Sue only has occasional moments during which she merits the status 
of adult, this presumably means that the rest of the time she still acts like 
a "child". In this reading, Dad is disagreeing with what has been 
previously established. 
An important factor in understanding this utterance is that Sue has asked 
for an assessment from Dad. If we combine the insights of Edwards and 
Potter (1992) and Sacks (1972) we can conclude that this request from 
Sue addresses Dad's "category entitlement" (Edwards and Potter, 1992) 
to make assessments, according to his membership of a category that is 
hierarchically "positioned" above her own within the family. The 
implication is that Dad's "category entitlement" permits him the option to 
warrantably contradict the local establishment of Sue's adult status. This 
however, would entail a disagreement with Mum, with whom much verbal 
construction has gone into building an alignment. Furthermore, such a 
contradiction between those parties qualified to judge would undermine 
their "entitlement" to do so. For, only one of them could be correct, 
meaning that the other would be in error of judgement. Such a situation is 
exploitable by Sue. It means that she can be virtually assured that Dad 
will ratify the assessment that she is an adult, for she has set him up. 
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However, Dad utilises the momentum of the "category entitlement" that 
Sue has conveniently introduced, and with the nifty side step and left 
hook of the humorous counter, Dad launches his coup de grace. 
Let us consider briefly how it is that this move functions. I would suggest 
that its effectiveness resides in the strength of the expectation of a 
positive reply and the ambiguity of whether the "moments" refer to the 
presence or absence of the attribute. Thus, for example, in a scenario 
where a young child asked "Do I act like an adult?" the response "you 
have your moments" would not carry the same humorous overtones. This 
is because, being considered to have moments of adulthood, is praise for 
a young child, while only having moments of childishness would be 
unrealistic praise. The question "Am I an adult?" from an ambiguously 
positioned teenager would also be less humorous. A positive reply would 
count as praise, while a negative one would be merely neutral, - the 
partial response of this extract would then become a bit of both. In the 
case of this extract, however, after the strength with which Sue's adult 
status has been established, a positive response becomes expected, and 
a negative one would be derogatory. Furthermore, a derogation might be 
particularly unexpected after the strong alignment that has been 
accomplished between Sue and Dad over the course of the extract. Here 
is where the ambiguity of humour operates, in the form of a potential but 
deniable insult delivered against expectancy. Similar opportunities for 
humour can be seen to arise in situations with alternative attributes under 
like conditions - where there was a strong expectancy for a positive reply 
and a negative response would be derogatory. Given an appropriate 
context, examples include such questions as "Do you think I'm 
faithful/tactful/reasonable?" coupled with Dad's reply of "You have your 
moments". 
Sue's immediate response to Dad is: 
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119 Sue: see 
This would appear to formulate Dad's reply as evidence to support her 
earlier expression of doubt as to Dad's acceptance of her status as adult. 
I would suggest that there is an element of accusation in this response, 
which draws on her locally established entitlement to the category and 
Dad's requirement to support this (as discussed on the previous page). 
Following this, all, including Sue, break into laughter. This would appear 
to represent acknowledgement both of the joke itself and of the skill with 
which Sue's move was countered and neutralised by Dad. Yet again, we 
also find the phenomenon discussed by Drew (1987) in which the 
interlocutor who bears the brunt of a joke or tease, responds to the 
serious matter at hand as well as the humour. In this case, Sue responds 
not only with "see", which precedes the laughter, but also with lines 121-3 
below, which follows it: 
121 Sue: just as well I QQn1 think that 
122 'cause I'd be l!i[Q[Jg 
On the face of it, this utterance reiterates Sue's attempt with "see" to 
establish that Dad's response justifies her reservations about whether or 
not he thinks of her as an adult. However, it does much more than this 
from an analyst's perspective. This utterance is one that I believe 
displays great insights into how "family" is accomplished. 
In lines 112-117 we see Sue expressing doubt about Dad's perception of 
her "stage of life", and as discussed above, although she twice displays 
doubt, this does not elicit a response until she asks the direct question 
"do you". The indirect framing of the original question is then drawn upon 
in this final utterance of the extract under examination. That framing was 
as a thought process already existing inside Sue's head, which is then 
constructed as justified: while Sue is able to say that Mum considers her 
255 
an adult, she is unable to be so sure of Dad. As a result of Dad's reply, 
she is shown to be correct in taking care over generalising Mum's 
viewpoint to Dad. In declaring her earlier doubts as justified, however, 
Sue transforms them into a more definite form. In the original 
presentation, Sue contrasts what she thinks about Mum with what she 
"doesn't know" about Dad, but in this utterance what she "doesn't know" 
becomes something she "doesn't think" about Dad -because, if she did, 
she would be "wrong". 
The manner in which Sue presents this final conclusion (in terms of the 
current analysis) provides us with one of the clearest displays in the 
extract of the ongoing process by which the relationships within the family 
are constructed. The presentation of this utterance is as of a mere 
voicing and verification of pre-existing doubts and conclusions. However, 
it is at the same time an in vivo demonstration of the very process by 
which doubts arise, circumstances are tested, and conclusions are 
drawn. What is happening in the moment by moment unfolding of the 
interaction is the very process being discussed as if already existing. On 
the one hand, Sue's deduction is presented as a reified entity, that Dad 
has verified. On the other hand, however, Sue is actually, at the precise 
moment of speaking, initiating a deductive process by questioning Dad 
about his thoughts. In this sense, Dad's communication is not merely a 
verification, but an imparting of new knowledge. Equally, therefore, Sue's 
final response is not merely a warranting of her original conclusion in the 
light of verification, it accomplishes the act of concluding. 
In this view, the communications occurring in current time are actually 
affecting the entities that are presented as intransigent. Status positions 
are actively being changed during the interaction but are referred to as if 
unchangeable and pre-set. It is this ongoing construction that I believe 
also takes place earlier in the exchange between Mum, Ava and Sue in 
lines 97-106. Thus, while Ava's "do you think even now" in line 103 is, as 
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discussed above, ambiguous, one possible interpretation is that the 
ongoing construction of family is causing changes in current time. If so, 
then the "now" may refer to the utterance in which it is actually spoken. In 
this case it can be seen to point to the handling of, not merely the current 
interaction, but the precise communicative exchange, as evidence of 
Ava's "competent membership" of the category "adult" (cf. Schegloff, 
1972 p 325). This idea would rest on the choice by Ava to respond with 
such a question rather than make some form of denial which might be 
considered petulant, and therefore "childish". In both of these examples, 
we can see the ongoing process by which family is accomplished, yet we 
also see that part of that accomplishment is its treatment by members as 
a stable and unchanging entity at anyone time, which nonetheless can 
be contrasted strongly with what it used to be like "when we were 
children". 
E CONCLUSION 
Within this analysis I hope to have shown how the instantiation of family 
takes place in an environment of disagreement and dispute. What count 
as arguments, what causes them, who thinks what of whom, are issues 
that are all addressed within an atmosphere of accusation and defence in 
the first part of the extract. Later in the extract, the same atmosphere 
promotes a detailed exploration of the interrelationships, roles and 
theories about one another that are characteristic of the family members. 
Meanwhile, this atmosphere is continually saved from degenerating into 
conflict by the use of warning, mediation and humour. What counts as 
family per se, does not come into question in this extract (or indeed, 
within any part of the data). Yet, I hope to have demonstrated some of 
the mechanisms which rely on an implicit assumption by the speakers 
that they, and Mish, are part of a delimitable entity which I have 
continuously referred to as "family" in this analysis. As discussed in the 
introduction to this chapter, the operativeness of "family" is an elusive 
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matter to demonstrate. This is precisely because the argument being 
espoused here is that "family" is one of those assumptions that the 
speakers trust one another to apply to the discussion and, therefore, its 
very inarticulateness is an essential part of its operation. As asserted in 
the introduction, I hope that this chapter has highlighted the contrasting 
effects of explicit disagreement and implicit agreement in the organisation 
of social life. In the case of the former, social objects are brought into 
focus but never definitively captured, while the latter allows assumptions 
to remain unfocused and yet imputable for the accomplishment of social 
business. 
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CHAPTERS CONCLUSION 
A THE ARGUMENT SO FAR 
1 ARGUMENT, FAMIL Y AND RESEARCH: AN INTEGRA TION 
The main thrust of this thesis has been to advocate an argumentative 
perspective to the discursive analysis of social life. In this enterprise, the 
research process and, to some extent, the thesis itself, have been 
highlighted as rhetorical arenas, in addition to the interactions of the 
family from which data werecollected. This reflexive emphasis draws 
attention to the argumentative dimension of the research process and 
integrates such observations with the analysis of argumentation in the 
family. 
In some senses, Chapters 3, 4 and 5 might be considered to focus more 
on the academic enterprise, while Chapters 6 and 7 deal with the family. 
However, Chapter 4 is both a forum for the discussion of the rhetoric of 
methodology and a presentation of the method adopted in dealing with 
argumentation in the family (as well as the research debate over power). 
Chapter 5 also bridges the two arenas, in providing a discussion of the 
relationship between the two institutions - a discussion which is the topic 
of the data extract as well as the topic of the analysis. Similarly, Chapter 
6 not only stands as an analysis of an argumentative device in family 
interaction, but also takes part in an argument between academics over 
the preference for agreement in conversation. Meanwhile, the 
259 
examination of "family" as an institution in Chapter 7, participates in the 
academic debates over institutionality as locally constituted and again, 
over the importance of argumentation in social interaction. In this way, it 
should be evident that the argument of this thesis and the argumentation 
of the family and academic community are intricately interwoven and 
ongoingly constructed as the text unfolds. 
2 ARGUMENTATIVE STRANDS: A SUMMARY 
In Chapter 3, the academic debate over the research relationship was 
presented. However, rather than join in with the members and search for 
a solution to the management of the contradictory social norms of 
egalitarianism and authoritarianism, the debate itself is offered as its own 
solution. The irreconcilability of the two norms was seen to provide the 
flexibility for the roles of researcher and researched to be accomplished 
in the cut and thrust of the rhetorical arena in which they must be 
managed. This solution therefore rejects the reconciliation of the two 
counter-norms and instead recommends that the debate go on as one of 
the creative forces behind the research enterprise itself. 
In Chapter 4, the question of methodology was tackled. It was found 
expedient to relegate the usual business of such a chapter to a "non-
reflexive box" and to dedicate the main body of the text to a reflexive 
examination of methodological questions. This entailed a point-by-point 
examination of the elements which make up Gilbert and Mulkay's (1984) 
"contingent repertoire", relating how each of these is manifest in my own 
case. It was concluded that such an abandonment of the "empiricist 
repertoire" would be hazardous to the rhetorical requirements of my 
thesis. As a result the empiricist" repertoire was duly reinstated as the 
mode in which the majority of the remaining text would be presented. 
Nevertheless, I hope that the reader has remained reflexively alert to the 
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rhetorical concerns of the text without, thereby, preventing their 
successful accomplishment. 
Chapter 5 presented the analysis of how social roles and identities are 
produced out of the rhetorical requirements of the particular local context 
in which they are topicalised. In this Chapter, therefore, an extended 
extract of data was analysed in which the roles of researcher, researched 
and family member were discussed. The concern here was to present the 
research encounter as a rhetorical arena in which competing concerns, 
such as authoritarianism versus egalitarianism, independence versus 
guidance, researcher/researched versus family member, are ongoingly 
brought into being through a process of negotiation amongst the parties 
to the interaction. The locally occasioned status of pronouncements was 
highlighted, as was the inability of anyone member to dictate the nature 
of the interaction or the social objects created. 
One of the key elements identified in this analysis was the operativeness 
of humour. Theoretical claims about the ability of humour to handle 
potential conflict, problematic topics and reproof were addressed via the 
anchor of a concrete empirical analysis. This analysis of one of the data 
sections, not only offered an expansion of the work by Mulkay (1988), 
Drew (1987) and Emerson (1973), but its embeddedness within an 
ongoing analysis revealed how the humorous mode functions as a 
deployable resource in family interaction. In a similar way, an extensive 
analysis of the discretion of the researched as a gift to the researcher 
emerged out of the ongoing analysis. The implications of this formulation 
of the research relationship were also dealt with in relation to the 
academic debate over the same issue. As with the treatment of the 
academic debate on power in research, this handling of the formulation 
was presented as a propitious subversion of the usual protocols 
recommending the differential treatment of data and literature in the 
research write-up. It was via this subversion that a missing dimension in 
261 
the academic story was identified, and its absence highlighted as 
rhetorically effective. 
Over the course of the analysis, disagreement was encountered and 
potential conflict was seen to be handled through humour. However, it 
was the rhetorical, rather than the overtly argumentative dimension, 
which was the focus of this chapter. Indeed, to some extent, the chapter 
is more of an argument in itself, than an examination of argumentation 
per se. This is because it provided the empirical investigation 
recommended in Chapter 3, where it was concluded that the only access 
to the paradox of power in the research encounter, is via a discursive and 
rhetorical analysis of the interaction which actually takes place in that 
arena. 
The focus for Chapter 6, was upon a phenomenon called "Check 
formulations". Through concrete empirical investigation, this was 
identified as a mechanism used in the family interaction for accomplishing 
contention and for perpetuating disagreement in a sociable manner. This 
analysis provided evidence for a theory about the accomplishment of 
sociability in interaction. 
This theory challenged the overgeneralised assumption in social science 
as a whole, and conversation analysis in particular, that sociability rests 
on agreement and harmony. In rejecting this assumption, a call was 
made to acknowledge that there are multiple potential paths towards 
sociability available to the interlocutor, politeness-as-sociability being only 
one of these. Argumentation and the humorous parody of unsociability 
were offered as alternatives. It was also noted that unsociability is an 
accomplishment in itself, rather than merely a mistake in the doing of 
sociability, as seems to have been assumed. Over the course of the 
chapter the particular example of the "Check formulation" was used to 
ground this theoretical assertion in empirical analysis. It was intended 
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that the in-depth explication of argumentation as a form of sociability 
captured in the deployment of a single rhetorical device, would provoke 
the reader into a serious re-analysis of the taken for granted assumptions 
in the CA literature. Although this is by no means the first attempt to 
highlight the sociability of argumentation, it is hoped that the identification 
and explication of "Check formulations", and the overt engagement with 
how this phenomenon challenges the assumptions of mainstream CA, 
will offer a persuasive addition to the growing case for argumentation as 
a sociable phenomenon. 
Chapter 7 was an extension of the CA work which has attempted to 
capture the inexplicit, shared assumptions which make social interaction 
accomplishable (Sacks, 1972; Heritage, 1984). Over the course of an in-
depth empirical analysis of a lengthy extract of family data, I try to apply 
the writings of a variety of conversation analysts to provide an explication 
of the inexplicit, shared assumption of "family" as a social entity. 
In some ways this is a very uphill struggle, for CA is a tool very much 
more suited to the analysis of that which appears overtly in a text, than to 
the exploration of that which is not made overt. The approach adopted 
here to deal with the problem of analysing unstated assumptions was to 
simultaneously examine the way in which disagreement makes social 
objects concrete (e.g. roles, identities and behaviours). This was done in 
the hope of counterbalancing and thereby clarifying the inexplicitness of 
the agreed and the agreedness of the inexplicit. In this way, the 
relationships between explicit topicalisation and disagreement, and that 
between untopicalised assumption and agreement, were identified as two 
sides of the same coin. 
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B DEVELOPING THE ARGUMENT 
1 ARGUMENTATION 
In championing the efficacy of argumentation in social life, this thesis 
recommends that, in the future, this dimension of social interaction 
should be accorded greater attention. The in-depth empirical 
investigation into the discursive accomplishment of sociable argument 
contained within these pages has focused upon interaction in only two 
social institutions - family and research. This suggests that a 
corresponding analysis of other arenas in which sociable argumentation 
might take place would be a profitable endeavour. In particular, it would 
be highly beneficial to the persuasiveness of the pro-argumentation 
perspective, if numerous social arenas could be demonstrated to involve 
argumentation as a fundamental constituent. 
Areas where it would appear that argumentation plays a particularly 
important role would, I suggest, include: parliament; law; newspaper 
letters to the editor; debates; industrial relations; panel chat shows; and 
confrontational job interviews. It should also be noted, that the 
examination of the research write-up and research encounter have by no 
means exhausted the potential arenas in which the argumentative 
dimension of the institution of academia might be manifest. Additional 
arenas might include: the conference, the tutorial, the class discussion 
and the viva. 
2 UNSOCIABILlTY 
The analysis of how argumentation accomplishes sociability and how 
humour avoids unsociable consequences by parodying them, suggests 
the utility of investigation into the accomplishment of unsociability as a 
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phenomenon in itself. Although conflict talk has indeed been investigated 
(e.g. Grimshaw, 1990b), it might be beneficial to the pro-argumentation 
perspective for a comparison to be made between sociable forms of 
argument and the pursuit of disruptive and anti-social ends through 
discourse. Examples of such accomplishments might include 
harassment, prejudice, officiousness and the intentional initiation of 
physical fights, for example, in night-clubs or on the football stands. 
3 "SOCIOLOGICAL AMBIVALENCE" 
In addition to the identification of "sociological ambivalence" in the role of 
the researcher, the treatment of other paradoxes, contradictions and 
ambiguities in the management of social life could be profitably 
addressed as means by which complex social roles and identities can be 
managed in the face of rhetorical contingency. The contradictions and 
ambivalences involved in authoritarianism versus egalitarianism and 
neutrality versus concern, have been addressed for the accomplishment 
of roles such as the physician, the expert and, here, the researcher. 
Other examples that might provide interesting insights might be: parents 
as love-givers and teachers; teachers as educators and disciplinarians; 
prison officers as punishers and rehabilitators; social security officers as 
service providers and adjudicators of entitlement to benefit; etc. 
4 DOING DISAGREEMENT 
The identification of the "Check formulation" as a rhetorical device for 
promoting ongoing disagreement, represents a single example of such a 
phenomenon. It would be highly informative to identify other such devices 
which assist in the accomplishment of social relations through 
argumentation. 
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5 SOCIAL OBJECTS 
The argumentative construction of social roles, identities and behaviours 
within the family, which this thesis examines, is also limited to a few 
examples. This leaves an innumerable variety of social objects open to 
future exploration, whose constitution could be the subject of empirical 
analysis, both within the family and in alternative arenas such as those 
discussed in Section 1 above. One interesting example, from within the 
family, would be the constitution of emotions as social objects within the 
rhetorical context of family interaction. The deployment of references to 
emotional states in the self and in others is, I would imagine, an important 
rhetorical device, in accomplishment of interactional business in such a 
site of social intimacy. Again, the argumentative deployment of emotion 
discourse is unlikely to be confined to interaction within the family and 
could profitably be investigated in alternative arenas. 
6 THE MUNDANE AND THE INSTITUTIONAL 
Finally, I would suggest that the analysis of Chapter 7 represents a 
challenge to "mundane conversation" as a meaningful category of 
discourse. The family talk analysed within these pages would be treated 
by traditional CA as a prime example of this category. However, within 
this analysis, the particularised and occasioned elements of family talk 
are highlighted, especially with reference to the effects of its dimensions 
of argumentation, institutionality and multi-partedness. In this way, 
assumptions as to the homogeneity of the category of "mundane 
conversation" become compromised. Further work emphasising the 
particularity of familial conversation would clarify this point. 
Meanwhile, questions are simultaneously raised regarding the 
institutional, or otherwise unique, dimensions of further examples of 
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discourse that have also been grouped under the heading of mundane 
conversation by traditional CA. Analysis might therefore profitably be 
made into friendship or the extended family. Similarly, other particularised 
features subsumed into this category might be investigated for their 
consequentiality. For example, the effects of different configurations of 
multi-partedness dyads versus triads etc.. Indeed, the 
ethnomethodological studies into the effects of undertaking a particular 
task while communicating in the workplace (cf. Suchman, 1987; Drew 
and Heritage, 1992) might be usefully extended to look at how task 
accomplishment in less formal settings might affect interaction. The old 
question of the unique properties of telephone conversations might even 
be worth re-evaluating, now that examples of so many different 
interactional contexts can be used as the basis for comparison. 
C HAVING THE LAST WORD 
It seemed appropriate to conclude this thesis with the words of the 
participants. To give them, as it were, "the last word" (cf. Billig, 1987) 
within this text1• However, as discussed in Chapter 4, giving the 
participants their "voice" in this way is highly suspect. This extract has 
been chosen by the researcher to do the rhetorical job of bringing the 
thesis to an end - the family are not asked in advance if they want the 
final impression of them to come in this form. Indeed, I very much 
suspect that they will have something to say on the matter! It should also 
be noted, that even for the reader this is not really the last word - the 
Appendices and the Bibliography are yet to come. 
1 Although not necessarily the "last word" in the argument. Indeed, it is hoped that 
features such as those discussed in the previous section will open up future debate and 
generate the sort of disagreement that will establish this perspective within the social 
scientific community. 
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Despite the above, please accept the following extract, taken from about 
halfway through the second recording, as the "last word": 
EXTRACT 1 
(2/4/2 4-23 and 33-49) 
4 Dad: 
5 
6 Mum: 
7 
8 Sue: 
9 Dad: 
10 
11 Mum: 
12 Dad: 
13 Ava: 
14 
15 
16 Mish: 
17 Dad: 
18 Sue: 
19 Mum: 
20 
21 
22 Sue: 
23 
33 Dad: 
34 
35 
36 
37 Sue: 
38 Dad: 
39 Mum: 
40 
41 Dad: 
42 
43 Dad: 
44 Ava: 
45 Mish: 
46 Sue: 
47 Dad: 
48 Mish: 
49 Sue: 
as I've mentioned about 
this puts a com~ely different §.!<mt on arguing 
yes ( ) arguments 
[since Ava's been dOing her (.) a (people a fir) 
[yeh 
I can't really get into a gQ.Qd. argument now 
without thinking 
({laughs)) 
well t em should I [be saying 
[so what ia 
a good argument then 
(.) 
when [it wasn't ex~rrated 
(what is em 
when you don't think about what you're dQing 
we analyse everything 
when Dad starts saying something to me 
I say to him there you are [( ) 
!&La should be here 
Mum goes 
[it breaks down 
and just we start !hin.!s.ing it 
thinking of it as an srrgument 
that can be di~ted (.) [by AYa 
[and analysed 
and analysed (.) and er the ~ (.) 
I must tell phone AYa up 
tell her [to put the tape on I say 
[and the whole MlQhasis is miss[ing 
[((laughs)) 
the whole MlQhasis breaks down 
so have [I ~ it for everybody 
[this is (.) a good argument is 
yep 
we're ~ver going to argue again 
[well 1 think the 
[no never 
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I APPENDIX 1 
ARGUING VERSUS DISCUSSING 
(1/1/3 40-49) 
40 Sue: 
41 Ava: 
42 Sue: 
43 Mum: 
44 Ava: 
are we talking ab[out ARGUING OR= 
[but THAT'S NOT 
=Dls=ing [though 
[ah we're talking aBOUT (.) 
BUT IT'S arguing lllliI discussing 
45 Mum: --'I!Id dis[cussing right 
46 Sue: [both 
47 Ava: anything [it doesn't HAVE TO BE 
48 Mum: 
49 Dad: 
(2117n 19-33) 
[what do you think you ARGUE ABout 
you when does one WllIl and the other start 
19 Ava: [but you would you l:aI.l this an argument 
20 Sue: no 
21 Mum: [no 
22 Mish: [no 
23 Ava: [((sighs)) 
24 Sue: [((sighs)) 
25 ((laughter)) 
26 Sue: we're [back to the ~ 1b.ing again= 
27 Dad: [well at ~ 
28 Sue: =aren't we 
29 Mish: yes Mum 
30 Dad: at times it i.a and at times it i.ari.l 
31 Mum: yeh 
32 Ava: [this is (the person to speak) 
33 Dad: [sometimes its just a dis~ion 
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APPENDIX 2 A GUIDE TO THE TRANSCRIPT 
NOTATION USED 
[ 
= 
underlining 
CAPITALS 
°speechO 
(single brackets) 
((double brackets» 
(.) 
? 
overlapping speech 
utterances continue without any delay 
emphasised syllables or words 
delivered in a louder than normal voice 
delivered in a quieter than normal voice 
utterance unclear, best guess presented 
some non-verbal action performed 
a pause (untimed) 
rising intonation 
vowel sound extended 
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